The relationship between emotional awareness and human error in aviation by Stipp, Andrea
  
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMOTIONAL AWARENESS AND 
HUMAN ERROR IN AVIATION 
 
by 
 
ANDREA STIPP 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF COMMERCE 
 
in the subject 
 
Industrial and Organisational Psychology 
 
at the 
 
University of South Africa 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr H Von der Ohe 
 
November 2017 
  
 ii 
 
 
 
DECLARATION  
 
 
Student number: 3123 4224 
 
I declare that “The relationship between emotional awareness and human error in 
aviation” is my own work and that all the resources that I have used or quoted were 
indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________      _____________________ 
SIGNATURE        DATE 
Andrea Stipp       
  
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the following people who supported me in 
writing this dissertation: 
 To my friends and colleagues who contributed to my research exploration and pursuit 
to understand human factors in aviation. To the aviators who participated in my 
survey and lost their lives, I will never forget you. You contributed to aviation safety 
with more than your life. Each of you inspired me to persevere and complete my 
dissertation with unknown strength, eager drive and commitment. Your final moments 
fuelled my passion and desperate search for understanding. I relived the end of your 
life a thousand times. It kept me awake night after night. I constructed your case and 
defended it like my own, because I knew you and the sincere questions you asked 
during crew resource management training. Since aviation safety was your concern, 
I simply refused to give up on this dissertation or to miss a single lesson from your 
tragic life-ending event. 
 
 My friends who echo my expression “desperate search for understanding”, because 
it is tangible, painful, irritating and sometimes questionable, only because I know the 
dead silence of an aircraft engine above ground level and a tipping nose attitude 
towards a beautiful remote valley and the feeling of going down. The feeling of “I’m 
going to die”, but I didn’t. My desperate quest for understanding and continuous 
exploration became a permanent journey, an attitude, a mission and life declaration. 
I will always explore causations, possibilities and hypotheses to enhance situational 
awareness. I will teach human factors passionately and effortlessly to instil an 
understanding, until the end. 
 
 Dr Hartmut von der Ohe, thank you for an indescribable academic journey. For 
believing in my reseach aim and hypothesis. You inspired me persistently, and did 
not give up for one second. You displayed constant understanding, and were always 
willing to guide and motivate. Thank you for sharing my passion and dream to 
contribute to aviation safety. Thank you for trusting my abilities and for all the extra 
 iv 
hours that you invested in my search for meaning. I admire your people skill, patience, 
dedication and motivational abilities through challenging times.  
 
 My statistician, Dr Martie Pohl, who displayed incredible skill, calmness and focused 
strategy in the midst of loads of data and spreadsheets. Without your guidance, 
persistence and consistent drive to calm me and analyse various options aligned to 
my hypothesis, this study would have had little meaning. I am forever grateful to you.  
 
 My editor Carol Jansen, who performed between silent gaps and massive waves of 
demand. Time constraints and huge pressure compelled you to sacrifice many hours 
and sleep. I always knew I was not the only one awake after midnight. Your dedication 
and joyful passion is inspiring.  
 
 Yolande Janse van Rensburg, who inspired me to register for Master’s degree. You 
listened patiently and encouraged me with enthusiasm, supporting my views and 
theories during many bicycle rides. You motivated me constantly and inspired me to 
continue my knowledge journey. Besides my supervisor, you are one of the most 
inspirational people I know, and your passion and energy were truly contagious. It is 
a privilege to also have you as a friend. 
 
 The chief of the South African Air Force, Lt Gen. F.Z. Msimang, for your support and 
inspiration. Director of Aviation Safety (2012-2015), Col. S. Gardiner, thank you for 
your co-operation. WO2 Nelson, thank you for preparing safety data and organising 
information in accordance with the research requirements.  
 
 Armin Ehmke, my son. I commenced my studies when you were born. Sometimes I 
regret that decision, when I think of all the priceless moments I missed. I deprived 
you of a lot of time, attention and patience, yet, I salute your understanding and 
support. I always say that you are my best motivator and psychologist and, lately, 
also the most amazing aviator. Somehow, I believe you did gravitate towards my 
passion for aviation. You will always have my admiration and heart.  
 v 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The general purpose of this study was to determine whether a relationship exists between 
emotional awareness and human error in aviation. A quantitative analysis approach was 
used to explore this by means of a cross-sectional survey design. The independent 
variable emotional awareness and the dependent variable human error were 
contextualised and operationalised. During the empirical phase, biographical information 
was collected and the Hartmann Emotional Boundary Questionnaire was administered to 
a purposive sample consisting of 173 aircrew members within the South African Air Force.  
 
Factor analysis revealed an eight-factor structure: involved; exactness; blend; openness; 
structured; unstructured; flexibility; and imagination. No differentiation was found between 
the mustering groups in relation to emotional awareness and human error. However, 
correlations differentiated between aircrew with zero human error and aircrew with “more 
than ten years’ aviation experience”. The test for differences between human error and 
the emotional awareness sub-construct "imagination" indicated a medium significance. 
From this relationship, the researcher deducted that “imaginative aircrew are prone to 
err”. 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This dissertation explored the relationship between emotional awareness (EA) and 
human error (HE) in aviation. Chapter 1 provides the background and motivation for this 
study. Guided by these, the researcher formulised the problem statement and research 
questions, and discussed the paradigm perspectives ‘research design’ and 
‘methodology’.  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
Safe aviation requires aircrew with the highest level of skills to work safely with machines. 
Despite advances in technology to assist aircrew members, human factors remain at the 
centre of aviation accidents (Bach & Biede, 2016; Walton & Politano, 2016). Recent 
accident data attributes more than 95% of aviation accidents to human error. Civil aviation 
authorities prescribe Crew Resource Management (CRM) as the first line of defence to 
avoid threats and errors. Although Threat and Error Management (TEM) involves a high 
level of vigilance, experts contest available theories and argue that they are limited in 
scope and application.   
 
Numerous aviation experiences reported in safety literature reveal effective but re-active 
safety risk management. Often, aviation organisations reflect on their safety culture only 
after an air disaster, whilst aircrew hide behind Cicero’s famous quote “to err is human”. 
Although human factor studies agree that emotion influences how aircrew observe and 
perceive reality, human error theories are descriptive, rather than prescriptive. 
 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (International Civil Aviation Organisation 
[ICAO], 2002) finds that human error is the main contributor to more than 90% of all 
aviation accidents and incidents. Furthermore, aircraft accident analyses and applied 
human factor studies are becoming increasingly concerned with human-machine 
integration and the human limitations that influence safe performance and aviation safety. 
Human limitations unfortunately result in human error (Kern, 2009). 
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1.2 HUMAN FACTORS 
 
To address human-machine integration and human limitations, aviation regulators, ICAO 
and South African Civil Aviation Authority (South African Civil Aviation Authority [SACAA], 
2016) prescribe mandatory and applied human factor training, integrated with Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) to teach aircrew safety concepts and skills such as 
situational awareness, stress management, emotional intelligence and communication 
skills.   
 
It is no secret that aircrew consider CRM training as a “tick in the box” currency to be “fit 
to fly”. Since TEM entails enhanced SA, the researcher is of the opinion that CRM is not 
ticking the safe box. To maintain situational awareness and reduce human error, 
emotional awareness is essential. The researcher believes, findings from her study will 
propel a new human factors perspective, broadening the scope of CRM training. As EQ 
training is not prescriptive, the researcher suggests emotional awareness training to 
provide aircrew self-knowledge and strategies to manage and regulate their emotion 
thereby enhancing situational awareness.   
 
1.3 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
 
Situational awareness is an essential prerequisite for safe aviation operation (Sarter & 
Woods, 1991) and aircrews develop it as an intrinsic part of learning how to fly (Melander 
& Sahlstrom, 2009). For aircrews to perform safely, accurate cognitive and environmental 
data must continuously be integrated. Aviation analysis, and specifically accident 
analysis, refers to the concept of situational awareness to explain “how” and “why” an 
accident occurred. This study originated from the researcher’s interest in human error, 
which led to her exploration of the phenomenon called situational awareness. 
 
Endsley (2000) defines situational awareness as a key concept in aviation safety. 
Understanding human error, it is important to reason from the theory of Endsley’s (2000) 
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taxonomy model, which assigns 76.3% of human error to a failure in perceiving a situation 
correctly, 20.3% to a failure in comprehending the situation correctly, and 3.4% to a failure 
in projecting the situation correctly. Furthermore, according to Wickens (2002), perception 
errors result from communication errors, mental model errors, memory errors and 
cognitive biases. Advances in technology require continuous human-machine integration, 
which raises additional safety concerns (Barker, 2011; Kanki, Helmreich & Anca, 2010; 
McGuinness, 2004; Strauch, 2004; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
 
Situational awareness has many definitions. Sarter and Woods (1991) criticise situational 
awareness as ill-defined and with little consensus and empirical evidence to support a 
colloquial understanding. Although many researchers have attempted to specify 
components of situational awareness, they are too general (Doane, 2003; Melander & 
Sahlstrom, 2009). Whereas situational awareness definitions focus on external 
information of which aircrew need to be aware, little progress has been made to support 
information acquisition and attention filtering. This poses a problem to aircrew in 
understanding this phenomenon.  
 
Although situational awareness and the importance thereof is recognised and explained 
during Crew Resource Management (CRM) training (Hughes, 2013; Odendaal, 2012), 
Kern (2009) recognise the value of emotional awareness training to enhance situational 
awareness to reduce human error.  
 
1.4 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS RELATED TO EMOTIONAL AWARENESS 
 
Brown and Moren (2003) explored safe behaviour in aviation related to the phenomena 
emotional awareness and situational awareness. The researcher agrees and argued that 
emotionally aware aircrew understand themselves and others, therefore they have the 
ability to differentiate between their emotional representations and reality. Emotionally 
aware aircrew regulate their emotion and thoughts, and they spend their energy on 
strategies to stay ahead and avoid human error.  
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Kern (2009) refers to human error as the “blue threat” inside and explains that emotional 
awareness is a personal mastery skill that can reduce human error. The only available 
approach in aviation is a theoretical situational awareness explanation that names human 
factors like stress, experience, expectancies, workload and attention (Endsley, 2000; 
Strauch, 2004), but makes no reference to the role of emotions (Kern, 2009; Pollatos & 
Schandry, 2008). The study in hand focused on human error related to emotional 
awareness. Some people are not aware of their emotions. To act upon emotions, one 
needs to be aware of them (Newby & Narain, 2016). Emotionally aware people are not 
only acutely conscious of their thoughts and feelings, but also attuned to the messages 
their body sends them and to aspects of their emotional states. This heightened sensitivity 
is beneficial in several ways (Davidson & Begley, 2012). People are driven by tension 
locked into their bodies, which has been induced by thoughts and emotions. 
 
We spend so much time in our heads that we almost forget we have a body at all. This 
can end up undermining our physical and mental well-being (Williams & Penman, 2011). 
Realising the importance of emotional awareness as distinguishable components, namely 
the extent to which one attends to and values one’s emotions, and the extent to which 
one can identify and describe one’s own emotions (Kerns & Berenbaum, 2003; Davidson 
& Begley, 2012; Goleman, 2004; Jawer & Micozzi, 2011; Lehrer, 2009; Reuven, 2007; 
Williams & Penman, 2011). To cultivate emotional awareness, we need to become fully 
integrated with our bodies (Williams & Penman, 2011) so as to be able to perceive 
interceptive signals (Pollatos & Schandry, 2008). Jawer and Micozzi (2011) suggested 
that emotionally unaware parents effectively teach the same ignorance of feelings to their 
children. Like in this study, they propose that alexithymia is tied to concrete thinking that 
is dissociated from emotion and needs to come home to the core of being. 
 
Emotional awareness is affected by various influences such as stress, social factors, lack 
of knowledge, fatigue and sensory overload (Kanki et al., 2010). Strauch (2004) believes 
that high workload, competing task demands and ambiguous cues all contribute to human 
error, even with experienced and well-trained aircrew. Emotional awareness involves 
attentiveness to the internal aspects of one’s self, such as memories and feelings (Govern 
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& Marsch, 2001). The current study focused on reducing human error that leads to 
accidents, by focusing on the emotional awareness of aircrew. 
 
Recent years have witnessed a proliferation in human error frameworks. Aviation uses 
system models and taxonomies to classify information processing failures, and 
emphasises the system in case of an accident in a “just” culture, and not the individual 
per se (Wiegman & Shappel, 2003; Kanki et al., 2010). 
 
Brown and Moren (2003) argue that by applying the psychology of emotions in CRM, 
aircrew can understand why they behave the way they did. CRM training can devise more 
varied training methods for improving both the aircrew’s intra-action and interaction. In 
this study, the role of emotional awareness will be investigated as a factor that contributes 
to human error in aviation. 
 
In 1986 the ICAO Assembly recognised Resolution A26-9 on human factors in an attempt 
to increase awareness about the influence of human factors on safe performance. This 
ignited extensive CRM training and regulation in the aviation industry around the world. 
Furthermore, CRM was introduced to provide aircrew members with a better insight into 
and a better understanding of the role that human factors play in aviation incidences 
(ICAO, 2013). CRM was also developed as a response to new insights into the causes of 
aircraft accidents, following the introduction of flight recorders. Information gathered from 
these devices suggested that many accidents do not result from a technical 
malfunctioning of the aircraft or its systems, nor from the lack of aircraft-handling skills or 
technical knowledge, but they are caused by the inability of aircrew to respond 
appropriately to the situation. Inadequate communications between crew members were 
found to often lead to a breakdown of situational awareness levels (Kern, 2009). 
 
Worldwide, aviation does not recognise emotional awareness as a human factor as it is 
hypothesised in this study. The term ‘situational awareness’ as defined in CRM courses 
leaves pilots with an abstract comprehension as if it is something dispositional and 
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axiomatic, rather than something that provides a deeper understanding of emotional 
awareness and how it could enhance safe performance (Govern & Marsch, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, the aviation industry is considered a man’s world where the “real-men-don’t-
cry” kind of aphorism prevails (Vermeulen & Mitchell, 2007). The notion of “the right stuff,” 
which originated in the United States military air force, is epitomised by aviators and 
astronauts who possess extreme levels of confidence, assertiveness and 
competitiveness driven to achieve personal goals (King, McGlohn & Retzlaff, 1997). This 
hard-core attitude and behaviour was popularised in movies such as “The Right Stuff” 
and “Top Gun”. Furthermore, military training aims to produce “warrior heroes” and in 
aviation, a mistake-free performance (Brown & Moren, 2003). No real evidence of this 
generalisation, belief and culture with regard to aircrews exists, but remarks during safety 
courses have highlighted the fact that this hard-core attitude does not cater for emotion. 
 
Human factors training was included in CRM training mainly by experienced male pilots 
(Mitchell, Kristovics & Vermeulen, 2006), but according to Brown and Moren (2003), there 
is a general lack of vocabulary for emotions in the flying community. In fact, many 
discussions with pilots confirmed the problem that aircrew do not realise the value of 
emotional awareness to reduce human error. Is the “hard-core” attitude to blame for 
ignoring the role that emotions play in an operational environment? Interviews with many 
display pilots revealed only a few individuals who could verbalise emotion accurately 
while flying an airshow display sequence (Ehmke, 2012). This omission of the human 
factors trait ‘emotional awareness’ in CRM training was the impetus for the current 
research into human error management, which opposes the hard-core “Top Gun” image 
and focuses on ‘emotional awareness’ instead of the general aviation term, ‘situational 
awareness’ (Kern, 2009; Moon & Berenbaum, 2009). 
 
Lehrer (2009) suggests that we need to find ways to be as perfect as possible by 
assessing our flaws and our talents, whereas Dijksterhuis, Chartrand & Aarts (2007) 
argues that anyone who is constantly making poor decisions can benefit from a more 
emotional thought process. Important for this study in which we are trying to conceptualise 
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human error, Goleman (2004) argues that destructive emotions prevent the mind from 
ascertaining reality as it is. Adding to this, visual appearances affect expectations, 
memories and associations. Relevant to this study, Kern (2009) observes that a loss of 
emotional awareness is often a precursor to a loss of situational awareness. 
 
Situational awareness is influenced by many environmental factors, some too complex to 
be measured. Literature guided this study to explore the stable trait emotional awareness 
instead. The researcher hypothesised that levels of emotional awareness, influences 
human error. The research was planned against the background of aviation and 
attempted to measure the trait emotional awareness in relation to recorded human error 
data in the South African Air Force (SAAF). 
 
1.5 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Aircrew requires a high degree of concentration and emotional stability to be able to 
perform safely. Even more so, adverse weather conditions demand from them a clear 
mind so as to be prepared for any emergency (Butcher, 2002; Kern, 2009; Odendaal, 
2012). Often, failure of information transfer, which is vital for decision making, leads to 
human error (Brown & Moren, 2003). Adding to this, military operations that often have to 
deal with complicated missions, bad weather and time constraints, have a smaller margin 
for human error than do commercial operations (clearly not a homogeneous organisation) 
(Kanki et al., 2010). 
 
Central to this study, researchers argue that if missions seem uncontrollable, aircrew uses 
emotional defences such as denial, projection or reaction formation to perform (Murray, 
2011). In support of this argument, aircrew who survived air accidents often reported 
hazardous attitudes resulting in a loss of situational awareness (Griffin, Young & Stanton, 
2015). Thus, human error often results from being aircrew being unaware of emotional 
states in respect of intra- and interpersonal communications, degraded trust, ego and 
stress (Davidson & Begley, 2012; Kanki et al., 2010). Literature provides evidence that 
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emotional awareness is a stable Human Factors trait to be explored within the human-
machine interface (Killian, 2012). 
 
Organisational and system approaches focus mainly on human error studies of large 
groups. Supporting Reason’s Swiss Cheese model, the aviation Human Factors Analysis 
Classification System (HFACS) explains quantifiable accident causation within a system 
and series of human errors (Kanki et al., 2010; Reason, 1990; Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). Kern (2009) argues that although the systems approach is important, we tend to 
neglect the individual origin of human error and its contribution to accidents. Kern (2009) 
observes that a loss of emotional awareness is mostly a precursor to a loss of situational 
awareness. He states that this problem is an opportunity for a different approach to human 
error management, providing aircrew with emotional awareness and skill to perceive their 
environment and react in real time (Kern, 2009).  
 
Goleman (2004) argues that our traditional way of understanding intelligence does not 
allow for the role of emotions in thoughts and decision making. He believes that people 
who experience negative emotions do not absorb information efficiently, but tend to focus 
their attention on preoccupations that interfere with an attempt to focus elsewhere. Adding 
to his argument, a German study explored the relationship between emotional awareness 
and emotion regulation strategies (Newby & Narain, 2016). The concept of emotional 
awareness is defined as the ability to perceive adaptively, and to understand and manage 
emotions in the self and others (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Schutte et al., 2001). Considering 
the importance of levels of emotional awareness for emotion regulation strategies and 
safe performance, this study was directed to explore emotional awareness related to 
human error. 
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1.6 MEASURING INSTRUMENT 
 
A study performed by Brown and Moren (2003) guided the researcher to explore the 
emotional intelligence sub-construct; emotional awareness. The Boundary Questionnaire 
was considered suitable for this study since the survey measures levels of emotional 
awareness referred to as ‘degree of separateness’ or connection between mental 
functions and processes to enhance safe behavior valuable for effective threat and error 
management in aviation. 
 
The Boundary Questionnaire measures specific emotional awareness traits relevant to 
safe behavior in aviation, associated with open mindedness, creativity, and imagination 
versus reality. Emotional aware aircrew differentiate clearly between reality and 
imagination and self and others and tend to prefer well defined structures (Hartmann, 
1991). Since 1980, more than one hundred published papers referenced Hartmann’s 
Boundary Questionnaire. The scores on the Boundary Questionnaire are distributed 
across the spectrum and range from people with ‘thin’ to ‘thick’ boundaries of the mind. 
These boundaries indicate people’s degrees of separateness in terms of emotional 
awareness that result in various pathological predispositions like stress, anxiety 
depression, poor concentration and false perceptions (Jawer & Micozzi, 2011). Pulley 
(2009) in turn describes emotional awareness as an ongoing attention to one’s internal 
state.    
 
Emotional awareness is a key component of emotional intelligence (Bar-On,1997; 
Goleman, 1998; Killian, 2012). Brown and Moren (2003) state that emotion is powerful 
and influence awareness, thinking and actions, whether thinking was stimulated by 
emotion or not. A number of studies over the past decade have indicated a significant 
relationship between emotional intelligence and safe performance (Bar-On, 1997; Bar-
On, Handley & Fund, 2006). The average predictive validity coefficient for these studies 
is .55 (Bar-on, et al., 2006). Brackett and Salovey (2006) support these results and 
revealed correlation coefficients ranging between .22 and .46. The consensus of findings 
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indicates that the most powerful emotional intelligence contributors are conceptualised in 
the model proposed by Reuven Bar-On. 
 
Bar-On’s model consists of five meta-factors, namely: 
a. Intrapersonal (self-awareness); the ability to understand emotions as well as to 
express our feelings. 
b. Interpersonal (social awareness and interaction); the ability to understand others and 
relate to their feelings. 
c. Stress management (emotional management and control); the ability to manage and 
control our emotions. 
d. Adaptability (change management); the ability to solve problems of an intra- or 
interpersonal nature. 
e. General mood (self-motivation); the ability to generate a positive mood and motivate 
oneself. 
An extensive study of Bar-On’s model and the meta factors and sub-scales of emotional 
intelligence directed this study more specifically towards emotional awareness and its 
relationship with human error (Killian, 2012). The question arose whether being unaware 
of one’s own emotions will break down situational awareness as well as situational 
understanding. The study in hand proposes that emotional awareness is required for 
perceiving the correct information in each situation and it is therefore comprehended and 
projected in effective decision making. Kern (2009) studied many accidents and 
concluded that the reason why highly skilled and trained professionals did not realise 
what was going on regarding their situation, team or equipment at the time of the accident, 
was because they lost all awareness of what was going on with themselves. From this 
statement, one can deduce that the aircrew members had low emotional awareness, they 
were supressing stress or they experienced sensory feelings of overload. Kern (2009) 
observes that a loss of emotional awareness is mostly a precursor to a loss of situational 
awareness. Davidson and Begley (2012) explain how people with similar backgrounds 
respond in different ways to the same situation, for example, why some are resilient in 
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the face of stress, while others fall apart. The question was whether emotional aware 
aircrew actually realise when they fall apart. Are they aware of their unique stress-coping 
ability to realise the difference between eustress to distress. Are they aware that they do 
not speak up when in doubt or stressed, but instead project an image of an inflated ego, 
due to shame or feelings of insecurity (Brown & Moren, 2003; Murray, 2011). Goleman 
(2004) argues that if people could be emotionally aware, they should recognise feelings 
and perceive both their inner state and environment realistically and in context. 
 
Some people simply find it difficult to “name” their feelings accurately. As Jawer and 
Micozzi (2011) explain, some feelings are repressed or denied and do not register in our 
awareness. They argue that a person with limited emotional awareness (thick) appears 
aloof, imperturbable or even dull and is dissociated from his/her feelings. Davidson and 
Begley (2012) report research results that indicated lower insula activity in the brain of 
participants on the alexithymia (difficulty identifying and describing one’s emotion) scale. 
The research indicates a correlation between levels of emotional awareness and insula 
activity, which is the brain’s monitoring station for the visceral organs like the heart, lungs 
and stomach. As Jawer and Micozzi (2011) explain, emotionally aware people are acutely 
conscious of their thoughts and feelings and attuned to the messages their body sends 
them. They know for example that the reason why they shout at someone is because they 
are stressed about something else. 
 
Resilience indicates how long it takes an individual to recover emotionally in the face of 
adversity (Davidson & Begley, 2012). Some people recover quickly, while others are 
overcome or paralysed by intense emotions like stress, which illustrates the importance 
of emotional awareness and knowing your own emotional state and limitations in aviation 
(Kern, 2009). Whenever a pilot or air traffic controller (ATC) (referred to collectively as 
aircrew) experiences an emergency, it is critical to remain calm and attend to the problem, 
and not to get overwhelmed by or flooded with anxiety. An Air Force light aircraft accident 
in 2011 at the Kai River airfield in the Eastern Cape illustrated the result of low emotional 
awareness. The pilot was stressed during an emergency and could not attend to the 
problem adequately, which caused human error. 
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Aircrew need to pay attention to a large amount of data inside and outside their cockpit 
(Plant & Stanton, 2012). Melander and Sahlstrom (2009) argue that the situational content 
is constantly negotiated and the pilot is required to understand the information pertaining 
to the environment in relation to task demands. Murray (2011) believes that if the pilot is 
aware of his/her emotional limitations, proper emotional awareness training might provide 
the necessary skills and resilience to remain calm in adversity, attend to an emergency 
correctly and save not only lives, but also the aircraft. 
 
Situational awareness is an essential prerequisite for safe operations (Wickens, 2002). 
Sarter and Woods (1991) stress that the term “SA” is not appropriately understood in 
aviation terms and they refer to situational awareness as an ill-defined phenomenon. 
McGuinness (2011) defines situational awareness as the situation-specific inferences 
represented in a person’s mind when deciding. He explains that situational awareness is 
a dynamic, multifaceted phenomenon that involves a perception and understanding of 
oneself and the situation in the relevant context. He extrapolates emotional awareness 
as a metacognition of situational awareness. Melander and Sahlstrom (2009) regard 
situational awareness as a mental phenomenon. Unfortunately, since no comparable 
index exists that distinguishes between states of awareness in aviation in a reliable 
manner, this presents a dilemma for researchers who study the effects of situational 
awareness (Govern & Marsh, 2001). Doane (2003) explains situational awareness as a 
range of complex cognitive abilities. He argues that there is no consensus about a 
definition for situational awareness and states the term has been criticised for being 
circular and inadequate to explain and measure related to human error. 
 
When the aircrew’s cognitive limits are stressed, various emotional predispositions may 
combine to induce human error (Kanki et al., 2010; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Murray, 
2011; Kern, 2009). Since situational awareness is too complex to measure (Govern & 
Marsh, 2001), literature guided this study to explore the relationship between emotional 
awareness and human error. The researcher is of the opinion that there is a need for a 
comprehensive understanding of emotional awareness as a Human Factor trait to 
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manage human error in aviation. The relationship between emotional awareness and 
human error needs to be explored to demonstrate that low emotional awareness may 
result in human error. The researcher was concerned with understanding emotional 
awareness related to human error and hopes that this study might bring a new perspective 
to aviation safety and contribute to safe performance. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The researcher based her research on scientific human factor literature, previous 
research limitations, recommendations, and aviation safety data. Accordingly, she 
formulated specific and general research aims to conceptualise emotional awareness and 
human error for application within the applied science of aviation human factors and 
human error management. 
 
The researcher realised a gap in the body of knowledge regarding aviation psychology 
and applied human factors and discovered that the aviation phenomenon “situational 
awareness” was difficult to fathom and measure. She was interested in reconceptualising 
this critical aviation safety construct, “situational awareness”, that had been 
conceptualised by Reason (2000). With regard to aviation safety concerns, the researcher 
hypothesised that although situational awareness cannot be measured, it is closely linked 
to emotional awareness and human error. Therefore, she raised the question whether a 
significant relationship exists between emotional awareness and human error. By 
exploring emotional awareness and human error, she hopes to add value to error 
management in aviation and bring about a new understanding to safe performance. 
 
Exploring recorded aviation human error data directed the hypotheses that were 
formulated in this study to explore the relationship between emotional awareness and 
human error.  
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1.7.1 Research questions for the literature review  
 
The researcher formulated the following research questions based on the literature 
review: 
 Research question 1:  How does this study fit into the current framework of aviation 
psychology and the applied human factors paradigm? 
 Research question 2:  Conceptualise human error in aviation. 
 Research question 3:  Explore emotional awareness in aviation. 
 Research question 4:  Will understanding emotional awareness encourage safe 
behaviour traits to effectively manage human error?  
 
1.7.2 Research questions for the empirical study 
 
The researcher formulated the following research questions for the empirical study: 
 Research question 5: Are there any differences between human error incidences 
related to gender, aviation experience and mustering? 
 Research question 6: Is there a relationship between emotional awareness, human 
error, gender, aviation experience and mustering? 
 Research question 7: To enhance aircrew performance, can the emotional 
awareness construct be divided into sub-constructs? Can these sub-constructs be 
related to human error? 
 
1.8 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This study aimed specifically at exploring significant differences of levels of emotional 
awareness related to aviation human error. The general aim was to address human 
factors application in practice, to explore the value of emotion awareness for effective 
human error management. 
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1.8.1 General aim 
 
The general aim of this study was to explore the relationship between emotional 
awareness and human error in aviation among aircrew members in the South African Air 
Force. To explore emotional awareness related to human error, the researcher formalised 
specific research aims. These aims involved conceptualising and operationalising 
emotional awareness related to human error, as synthesised against the background of 
aviation human error management.  
 
1.8.2 Specific aims 
 
In support of her research question and general research aim, the researcher 
conceptualised this study based on available literature and recorded human error data. 
By reasoning from the general human factor paradigm to the variables, she formulated 
specific aims to explore the relationship between emotional awareness and human error. 
The specific aims of this study are discussed next. 
 
1.8.2.1 Specific aims of the literature review 
 
Research aim 1:  Conceptualise the human factor paradigm in aviation. 
Research aim 2:  Conceptualise human error in aviation.  
Research aim 3: Conceptualise emotional awareness related to aviation. 
Research aim 4: Conceptualise the theoretical relationship between emotional 
awareness and human error. 
 
1.8.2.2 Specific aims of the empirical study 
 
Research aim 5: Operationalise human error measurement in aviation. 
Research aim 6: Operationalise emotional awareness measurement with the Boundary 
Questionnaire. 
Research aim 7: Operationalise the relationship between emotional awareness and 
human error in aviation.  
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1.9 THE PARADIGM PERSPECTIVE 
 
Paradigms are all-encompassing systems of interrelated practice and thinking that define 
the nature of their enquiry along three dimensions, namely ontology, epistemology and 
methodology for researchers. If the researcher believes that what is to be studied consists 
of a stable external reality, then we can adopt an objective and detached epistemology 
stance towards that reality to apply a methodology that relies on the control and 
manipulation of reality. 
 
The aim of such research was to provide an accurate description of the laws and 
mechanisms that operate in social life, which implies a positivist approach (Durrheim, 
2006). It is important to note that Comte coined the term ‘sociology’ in 1822 to constitute 
the foundation for the development of the social sciences, and he argued that knowledge 
is based on observation through the senses, rather than on belief. Durrheim (2006) 
explains positivism as realism, which suits those who are pursuing objective facts. 
 
Since the internationally applied human factor ‘discipline’ is concerned with human 
performance (Harris, 2012), Munene (2016) realised the gap in aviation accident analyses 
as well as the prevalence of human error and deficiency in aircrew, thus he suggested 
that emotion awareness strategies should be employed. Theoretical studies and empirical 
evidence support these views and are concerned with emotional awareness traits as an 
integral part of safe performance. Human factors practitioners and aviation psychologists 
added to these arguments by relating emotional awareness as the most prevalent human 
factor trait for human error management (Tehrani & Molesworth, 2016).  
 
1.10 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
A research design is the “strategy for the study and the plan by which the strategy is to 
be carried out” (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004). When developing a research design, the 
researcher must decide about four dimensions: the purpose of the research; the 
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theoretical paradigm informing the research; the context within the research is conducted; 
and the research techniques employed to collect and analyse data. Mouton (2008) 
compares the research design with building a house, which involves the systematic, 
methodical and accurate execution of the design. One can say that the planning and 
compilation of the procedures and methods for building a house entail a similar process 
as that involved in the design of a research project. 
 
This research was designed in accordance with the aims articulated in the problem 
statement (Msweli, 2011). The design therefore reflects the plan of how the researcher 
intends to answer the research questions. According to Msweli (2011), a deductive 
research design approach guides the research based on questions that require an 
explanation of incidences that can be quantified (i.e. “how” and “what” questions). A 
deductive research design is also applicable when asking “where”, “how many” and “how 
much” questions. In this research, the deductive method was the most applicable method 
for obtaining answers for the quantitative study. 
 
Since the research design provides the necessary evidence to enable the study to answer 
the question as unambiguously as possible, the design that was chosen for this study 
involved a logical method. The research design was used to plan the research and 
constructed to maximise the validity of its findings (Mouton & Marais, 1990). Hofstee 
(2006) recommends that detailed information be obtained regarding the research design 
and its applicability, before commencing with the study. 
 
 
1.11 NON-EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY RESEARCH 
 
Survey research was explored as a systematic method for collecting data from a 
representative sample of individuals by using instruments composed of closed and/or 
open-ended questions, observations, and interviews. A survey is one of the most widely 
used non-experimental research designs across disciplines to collect large amounts of 
survey data from a representative sample of individuals. The survey group is a sample 
taken from the targeted population and data is gathered by a variety of modes (face-to-
 18 
face; telephone; mail; electronic (web-based and e-mail). Survey research is considered 
one of the most important research designs and survey instruments, and survey methods 
are frequently used to collect data for the quantitative, qualitative, and mixed research 
designs (Kalaian & Kasim, 2012).  
 
1.12 RESEARCH VARIABLES 
 
Hopkins (2008) explains that in quantitative research the aim is to determine the 
relationship between two phenomena (the independent variable and the dependent 
variable) in a population. Every variable should be exhaustive, and it should classify every 
observation in terms of one of the attributes composing the variable. Attributes composing 
a variable must be mutually exclusive – hence we should be able to classify every 
observation in terms of one attribute only (Babbie, 2008). 
 
1.12.1 Independent variable 
 
Emotional awareness has been highlighted in various human factor studies as a safety 
performance indicator (Fruhen, Mearns, Flin & Kirwan, 2014). Because it recognises the 
limitations of human factor research, this study aims to explore the human factor 
construct, emotional awareness (EA), as the independent variable. Hartmann explains 
emotional awareness as being related to different levels (Jawer & Micozzi, 2011). It was 
operationalised by the Boundary Questionnaire that was developed by Dr Ernest 
Hartmann to indicate how different people experience their feelings to various degrees. 
To operationalise the independent variable, aircrew members were requested to 
complete the Boundary Questionnaire on a pre-selected day, in order to explore their 
individual emotional awareness levels. 
 
1.12.2 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable for this study, human error, was categorised per recorded human 
error severity as follows: (0) zero-reported human error; (1) hazards; (2) incidents; and 
(3) accidents (Yantiss, 2011). Worldwide, incident and accident reporting is compulsory 
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and regulated, as stipulated in legislation (SACAA, 2016). An effective reporting culture 
should provide reliable data as a true indication of human error incidences in the flying 
environment. Different human error classifications will be defined and discussed in 
Chapter 2 as part of the literature review. 
 
1.12.3 Moderator variables 
 
Moderator variables indicate under which conditions or for which participants the 
relationship between two variables differ. The moderator variables that could influence 
the relationship between emotional awareness and human error in this study are aviation 
experience and aircraft type (referred to as mustering) (Gibbon, 2014b). 
 
1.13 TYPE OF RESEARCH 
 
Quantitative research designs are either descriptive (subjects are usually measured once) 
or experimental (subjects are measured before and after treatment). This study is a non-
experimental study that will establish the causality between two variables. For an accurate 
estimate of the relationship between variables, a descriptive study usually needs a 
sample of hundreds or even thousands of subjects, and statistics is a valuable tool in 
organising a useful argument from quantitative evidence (Jose, 2017). Statistics involves 
a set of mathematical techniques that allow the researcher to make claims about the 
nature of the world, using forms of principled statistical arguments (Durrheim, 2006). This 
method enables the research and description of social structures and processes that are 
not directly observable. Positivist research is based on the belief that the scope of the 
programme evaluation is limited to those aspects of social programmes that can be 
observed and tested objectively, using a variety of methodologies and procedures 
(Posavac & Carey, 1989). A non-experimental (quantitative) design was used to measure 
the relationship between the variables in the current study.    
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1.14 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
 
According to Babbie (2008) there is no limit to what can be studied and units of analysis 
are those things we examine, namely individuals or collectives. The unit of analysis refers 
to the “what” of the study, in other words “what” object, phenomenon, entity, process or 
event that the researcher is interested to investigate. The current researcher views the 
topic and unit of analysis as very relevant to the background of applied aviation 
psychology and human factors. In this study, pilots and ATCs in the SAAF will be the unit 
of analysis, and they will be referred to collectively as aircrew. 
 
1.15 VALIDITY 
 
Validity refers to the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real 
meaning of the concept under consideration (Babbie, 2005). Validity in quantitative 
research is concerned with establishing how good measuring instruments measure what 
they are supposed to measure and validity is established during the data collection and 
analysis phase (Msweli, 2011). Msweli names five major types of validity, namely 
construct validity, predicative validity, content validity, internal validity and external 
validity. Conceptualisation, operationalisation and validity checking are related tasks in 
the positivist tradition (Durrheim, 2006). When using an existing instrument, it is essential 
that information is available about the construct validity and reliability of that instrument. 
Internal validity sustains its findings and conclusions. A way of conceptualising internal 
validity is in terms of a classic form of logical argument called a syllogism. The findings 
produced by the design can be sustained, which indicates a relationship between 
emotional awareness and human error in aviation within the SAAF. A study has external 
validity when its findings or conclusions can be generalised beyond the confines of the 
design and the study setting (Durrheim, 2006). 
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1.16 RELIABILITY 
 
Bergh and Theron (2003) defined reliability as the consistency of measurements and the 
dependability of a measurement instrument, that is, the extent to which the instrument 
yields the same results in repeated trials (Babbie, 2005). Msweli (2011) states that 
reliability measures can be assessed through test and re-test, or by comparing scores of 
a test administered to a single group to measure the same construct or trait. However, 
reliability does not ensure accuracy any more than it does precision (Babbie, 2005). The 
researcher was cautious about the effect of bias to make the research findings look good, 
and therefore she attended to objectivity and remained neutral during data observations 
and interpretations. 
 
1.17 METHODS TO ENSURE ETHICAL RESEARCH PRINCIPLES 
 
Hofstee (2011) suggests naming the potential ethical problems and obtaining formal 
approval to conduct the study. This study was conducted in accordance with three ethical 
principles: first, respect for the autonomy of all individuals participating in the research; 
second, non-maleficence by not harming any person who is part of the research in any 
way; and third, beneficence, by contributing to the applied human factor science 
(Durrheim & Wassenaar, 2002; Msweli, 2011). Ethical clearance was obtained from 
UNISA prior to the research. Since this study took place within the parameters of the 
SAAF, approval had to be obtained from the Chief of the Air Force and the Chief Director 
Force Preparation. Approval from Dr Ernest Hartmann to use his Boundary Questionnaire 
was also confirmed (Jawer & Micozzi, 2012). Furthermore, UNISA procedures to secure 
sensitive and confidential SAAF information were adhered to, as well as special methods 
to archive confidential information. 
 
Hofstee’s (2011) principle was followed to protect aircrew from any potential harm, 
therefore all reasonable and ethical attempts were made to counteract it. The researcher 
identified and considered all possible ethical threats in the study. A consent form was 
completed voluntarily by all the informed participants (aircrew) prior to the test (Durrheim 
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& Wassenaar, 2002). The aircrew had a full briefing regarding the nature of the research, 
after which they decided whether they wanted to participate or not. The confidentiality 
and security of all research data were protected strictly. The findings of the analysis were 
reported in accordance with ethical guidelines (Msweli, 2011). Communication and 
feedback of the test results occurred on a one-to-one basis. This feedback included 
suggestions for specific emotional awareness therapy according to the participant’s 
unique emotional boundary type (Jawer & Micozzi, 2011). Pope (1992) argues that 
providing effective and constructive feedback to participants is a challenging skill to 
master, which the researcher believes was achieved. 
 
1.18 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The research question was formulated according to the independent and dependent 
variables specified in the hypotheses and research questions. The researcher discussed 
the various available measures for emotional awareness and found the Boundary 
Questionnaire most suitable to measure the specified independent variable (Zborowski, 
Hartmann, Newsom & Banar, 2003). This research was conducted in three phases, with 
each of these phases consisting of several steps. 
 
1.18.1  Phase 1: Literature review 
 
A literature review concerning two constructs – human error and emotional awareness in 
the military aviation paradigm – was carried out and integrated theoretically. The 
researcher identified deficiencies in previous studies to emphasise the importance of 
emotional awareness to manage human error, which is neglected in aviation and CRM 
programmes.  
 
1.18.1.1 Step 1: The independent variable: Emotional Awareness  
 
Emotional awareness was conceptualised in an incident that occurred in 1991 during 
Operation Desert Storm, where a naval officer recognised a threatening radar blip as a 
silkworm missile. This happened although there was no logical explanation of how he 
 23 
could detect the difference between an American combat aircraft and the approaching 
enemy missile on the radar. He had seconds to decide before attacking the fast-
approaching threat and ordered his men to fire. His accurate decision had psychologists 
fascinated. They questioned this incident – how he knew the truth innately, and 
consequently made the right decision because it felt right, saving many lives with this 
critical decision. The researcher claimed that he was aware of his emotions and the innate 
truth upon which he acted, although no visible evidence could explain why he had felt that 
way. 
 
Similarly, in 1949, a parachute brigade of fire-fighters was dispatched to put out a blaze 
in the Rocky Mountains. A veteran with nine years’ smoke-jumping experience was in 
charge when a fire was overwhelming, blowing straight towards them. The veteran 
ordered his men to retreat, but they ignored him and tried to escape the fire. The veteran 
intuitively devised a creative escape plan that had never been used before. He lit a match 
and ignited the ground in front of him and seconds later stepped into the ashes of his own 
fire, thus being the only survivor. His technique has since become a standard firefighting 
method. Lehrer (2009) argues that the men were in the grip of stress, which narrowed 
their thoughts. In contrast, the experience of the veteran and his emotional awareness 
kept him calm enough to access his inner resources and save his own life. 
 
Decision making is an important element in aviation, and it is considered as subconscious 
logical analysis. Goleman (1998) explains it as the brain’s calculations to derive at a 
weighted conclusion. Brown (2003) actually studied emotional awareness and concluded 
that we instantly know what the right thing is to do, without going through a logical 
reasoning process.  
   
According to a number of Harvard studies, during the first thirty seconds of an encounter 
people sense intuitively what basic impression they will have of the other person – even 
after fifteen minutes or a year. Similarly, people who watched thirty-second snatches of 
teachers giving a lecture, could assess each teacher’s proficiency with 80% accuracy. 
According to Goleman (1998), intuition represents the capacity to sense messages from 
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our internal store of emotional memory and our own reservoir of wisdom and judgment. 
Thus, emotional awareness suggests that one should acquire all relevant information 
when a decision is needed; however, one should not analyse the information, but allow 
your subconscious mind to digest it. In addition, various studies contend that innate 
knowledge mostly provides the correct choice (Dijksterhuis, Chartrand & Aarts, 2007). 
 
Stein and Book (2011) state that in the emotional intelligence model, emotional 
awareness refers to the ability to monitor one’s own emotions, and it represents the 
fundamental skill to be intelligent about our emotional life. Jawer and Micozzi (2011) 
support this with their wise words, “when we ignore what matters most to us, it will become 
the matter within us”. Literature indicates that emotional awareness creates a clear mind 
that makes us aware of and able to manage emotion, resulting in sharpened senses. 
These discussions argue the importance of a balance between thinking and feeling. 
 
Emotions are innate to human beings, and help us to survive and succeed in life (Izard, 
1992). They are evident in young children, and their innocence is always a pleasure to 
watch, as they express their emotions. They are completely open and honest without any 
defence mechanisms to mask their intent to help or to disguise their emotions. They are 
easy to read, and their feelings and needs are clearly displayed. Unfortunately, over time 
and with experience, emotions become tools driven by cognitive processes and agendas. 
A sense of movement is reflected in the word “emotion”, which is derived from the Latin 
word emovere (“to move from”) – it can therefore be argued that emotion acts as an 
impetus for a need. 
 
For this study, emotional awareness is coined as human factor and defined as the ability 
to be aware of different emotions. According to Goleman (1998), we have to differentiate 
between emotions, to know what we are feeling and why (Bar-On, 1997). Importantly, 
emotion not only influences how reality is perceived, but it also affects our decision 
making and behaviour (Brown & Moren, 2003). Aircraft accident analyses relate human 
error to emotion, which is why the researcher formulated the research question of whether 
emotional awareness can be related to human error. 
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Guiding this research, emotional intelligence and emotional awareness show many 
similarities, and originate within the concept of social intelligence identified by Thorndike 
in 1920. Dr Claude Steiner used the term “emotional literacy,” and adding to this, Salovey 
and Mayer (1990) were among the first to propose the term “emotional intelligence” to 
define the ability to deal with emotions. Emotional intelligence refers to the competence 
required to identify and express emotions, and to assimilate emotions in thought. 
Accordingly, prior to identifying and expressing emotion, the researcher argues the 
importance of emotional awareness as the ability to be aware of emotions first. According 
to the researcher, emotional awareness is the primary condition leading to aircrews’ safe 
performance. 
 
Supporting this argument, Daniel Goleman (1998) focused on the interface between 
psychobiology and behaviour, and claimed that emotional awareness matters twice as 
much as cognitive abilities or technical expertise. Additionally, Goleman, (1998) considers 
emotional awareness to have a competitive edge, and in his opinion, emotional upsets 
interfere with one’s mental state, limiting your performance. Related to aviation and 
situational awareness, accurate perception is integrated with innate messages from the 
environment. Negative emotion tends to focus attention on our own preoccupations, and 
interferes with attempts to focus elsewhere. With regard to aircrew, Goleman (1998) 
commented that out-of-control emotions make smart people stupid. 
 
Tehrani and Molesworth (2016) emphasises the importance of emotional awareness to 
prevent human error, as emotionally intelligent individuals cope better with life’s 
challenges and stresses. She argued that individuals with a high emotional awareness 
would be less likely to err, and more likely to act in a responsible and safe manner. 
Furthermore, Landman, Groen, van Paassen, Bronkhorst and Mulder (2017) and 
Matthews, Strater and Endsley (2004) believe that a scientific understanding of emotional 
awareness will contribute towards the science of applied human factors in aviation and 
towards safety strategies to enhance safe behaviour and aircrew performance.  
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1.18.1.2 Step 2: The dependent variable: Human error 
 
To “err” is human, they say, and making mistakes is part of the human condition. In the 
world of aviation, however, human error has serious consequences. In terms of ICAO and 
IATA statistics, 95% of all accidents are related to human factor. Kern (2009) claims that 
all accidents and incidents are attributed to human error. It has been suggested that 
human factors such as stress, sensory overload, information overload and mistrust adds 
to a breakdown in human performance. Worldwide, human error is categorised using a 
modified version of the Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) framework of Rasmussen, namely 
skill-based, rule-based, knowledge-based, and procedure violations. The Swiss cheese 
model of accident causation illustrates that, although many layers of defence lie between 
hazards and accidents, there are flaws in each layer that, if aligned, can allow the accident 
to occur (ICAO, 2013). 
 
Reason (1990) uses the Swiss cheese model of accident causation to illustrate that if the 
holes in multiple layers of cheese (flaws in the defences of the human system) are aligned 
with each other, accidents (human errors) may occur. The metaphor emphasises the 
significance of casual human factors leading to an accident and explains how latent errors 
can affect complex systems. Based on the Swiss cheese model and human error 
classification, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is a 
framework developed and tested within the US military force as a tool for investigating 
and analysing the human causes of aviation accidents. The HFACS addresses human 
error at all levels of the aviation system, including the condition of aircrew and 
organisational factors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). An aviation accident or incident is 
thus not seen in isolation, but investigated as a series of events and various contributing 
factors in an organisation. 
 
The SHELL model developed by Edwards in 1972 was modified into a 'building block’ 
structure by Hawkins in 1984 and Hawkins and Orlady (Hawkins & Orlady, 1993), 
indicating the four components and human interfaces with software, hardware, 
environment, and live-ware of the aviation system. The SHELL model suggests that the 
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human is rarely, if ever, the sole cause of an accident (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The 
systems perspective considers a variety of task-related factors that interact with the 
human operator, thereby affecting performance (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
 
Threat and error management (TEM) is an applied human factor safety concept regarding 
aircrew performance to enhance aviation safety. It classifies human error into five 
categories, namely intentional non-compliance errors; procedural errors; communication 
errors; proficiency errors; and operational decision errors.    
 
Aviation science argues that human error is inevitable. For safe performance, CRM and 
human factor training aim to reduce error as far as possible. Aviation safety requires 
defences to mitigate risk, therefore pro-active error detection is required to reduce errors. 
To date, aviation psychology and applied human factors have been unable to define a 
safe aviator profile. A taxonomy of behavioural traits is required to guide aircrew selection 
and CRM training to reduce human error.   
 
1.18.2 Phase 2: The empirical study 
1.18.2.1 Step 1: The non-experimental study 
 
The current study was a non-experimental quantitative study to explore the causality 
between two variables: emotional awareness and human error. Babbie (2008) explains 
the effects of an independent variable on a dependent variable by taking the form of an 
experimental stimulus, which is either present or absent. The survey methodology 
measures variables by asking people questions and examining the relationships among 
them (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004). The Boundary Questionnaire was self-administered by 
aircrew over a two-year period during annual CRM training. 
 
1.18.2.2 Step 2: Research sample 
 
Babbie (2008) suggests that the overall matching process for a study can be achieved 
through the creation of a quota matrix constructed of all the most relevant characteristics. 
Alternatively, we might recruit more subjects than our experimental design requires. In 
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this study, aviation, hazard, incident and accident reports determined and directed the 
human error sample. Randomly assigned participants avoided the main sample of interest 
to be tested in isolation. 
 
1.18.2.3 Step 3: Data collection 
 
Firstly, the Boundary Questionnaire developed by Dr Ernest Hartmann was selected as 
measuring instrument to measure the independent variable, emotional awareness. Jawer 
and Micozzi (2011) explain the applicability of the Boundary Questionnaire by arguing 
that ‘thick boundary’ people are less aware of feelings and most often maintain a calm 
demeanour, while denying or distancing themselves from strong feelings. Feelings are 
described as flowing like water in continuous motion. In the case of people with thin 
emotional awareness boundaries, the flow is quicker and more direct, resulting in better 
inner reality and legitimacy. 
 
This study administered 70 items of the Boundary Questionnaire on a unipolar five point 
Likert scale. Each item was allocated ratio variable scores from 0 to 4, where 0 indicated 
“not at all” and 4 “yes, definitely”. The data was coded and tabulated for SPSS analyses. 
The researcher contacted Dr Hartmann and Jawer and Micozzi for approval to use the 
Boundary Questionnaire. 
 
Secondly, like the SHELL and HFACS models that were discussed, aircraft investigations 
and analysis attribute the causes of accidents to various degrees to management, man, 
machine, medium and mission, which is referred to as the 5M principle (Stolzer, Halford 
& Goglia; 2011; Yantiss, 2011). The 5M principles was used to classify the human error 
data in this study.  
 
(1) Management (M1) 
The responsibility of management towards aviation safety is far reaching and reflected 
within the safety culture and just reporting concept (Dekker, 2014). As defined in the 
HFACS, management involves resources, aircraft missions, approval of systems design 
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concepts, CRM training, regulations, maintenance, employment, adequacy of accident 
investigations and corrective measures (ICAO, 2016b). 
 
(2) Man (M2) 
Humans are ultimately the most important element in the aviation system and human 
factors are the most quoted causal contributor to human error, which results in accidents. 
Human error stems from human shortcomings and inadequacies of emotion, senses and 
human behavioural patterns. The researcher considered human factors and limitations 
and these guided the research question. She identified current shortcomings within CRM 
training regarding ergonomics, fatigue, motivation, trust, responsibility, discipline and 
environmental stressors (ICAO, 2016b). 
 
(3) Machine (M3) 
Despite major technological advances, machine limitations are reflected in inadequate 
design, use outside the design parameters, improper maintenance, material fatigue, man-
machine interface and machine-environment interface. Mitigation methods such as 
regular inspections, maintenance, human factor training and accident investigations are 
used to negate the harmful influence of machine-induced accidents that remain within the 
human component (ICAO, 2016b).  
 
(4) Medium (M4) 
Although aircrew members have little control over environmental influences, terrain, 
weather and noise, the role of the medium should be borne in mind when planning flights, 
selecting routes and specific flying areas (ICAO, 2016b).  
 
(5) Mission (M5) 
This category refers to exceptional cases when a known risk is calculated against three 
factors, namely exposure, probability and severity. Where the inherent risks associated 
with the operational mission are outweighed by the importance of accomplishing the task 
(ICAO, 2016b).  
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1.18.2.4 Step 4: Formulation of research hypotheses  
 
A hypothesis is a tentative statement about the world involving conjectures about 
relationships that have not yet been verified: It is a prediction. Hypothesis testing is done 
to determine what is true and would explain certain observations or phenomena. A 
hypothesis is an a priori statement of expectation that includes who is involved and to 
which treatment or intervention they will be exposed, the outcome measures to be used, 
and the comparison group (Msweli, 2011). The relationship between emotional 
awareness (EA) and human error (HE) is indicated as follows: 
 
 (H0) There is no significant relationship between emotional awareness 
and human error. 
 (H1) There is a significant relationship between emotional awareness and 
human error. 
 (H2) There is a significant relationship between emotional awareness, 
human error and experience. 
 (H3) There is a significant relationship between emotional awareness, 
human error and mustering. 
 
1.18.2.5 Step 5: Data analysis 
 
The results are discussed in Chapter 5. The researcher planned to explore the 
relationship between two variables for statistical significance and to determine how large 
the effect size is (Muijs, 2011). The success of quantitative research depends on the 
researcher’s ability to use observed statistics to reject or fail the null hypothesis. 
Conclusions from test statistics can result in Type I or Type II errors if the wrong 
hypothesis is rejected (Allen, Titsworth & Hunt, 2008). A correlation coefficient that was 
used to express the relationship between variables in a precise manner gave an indication 
of the degree, size or strength of the relationship, as well as the direction of the 
relationship (Grieve, Van Deventer & Mojapelo-Batka, 2006). An inverse or negative 
relationship means that when one variable increases, the other variable decreases, as in 
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the proposed inverse relationship between emotional awareness and human error in this 
study. 
 
The small random sample size (N = 173) and nominal and ordinal data scales directed 
this study to explore non-parametric techniques. Data from each aircrew member was 
ranked as per original data and counted only once. The data did not influence each other 
as assumed by non-parametric tests. To limit the effect of outliers, non-parametric tests 
were conducted with ranks rather than the actual data in order to explore possible 
relationships between the following variables: aviation experience; mustering; emotional 
awareness, and human error (Vermeulen & Mitchell, 2007). 
 
The researcher explored the relationship between human error (dependent variable) and 
emotional awareness (independent variable) groups by conducting the Kruskal-Wallis 
test to test for differences between groups and to compare multivariate data. The mean 
rank scores of the independent variable were compared with human error ranks to guide 
further analysis in the study. The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test for any significant 
differences within the ranked mustering groups and experience. The scores of 173 
aircrew members (N = 173) were ranked according to the independent mustering 
variables and coded as follows: helicopter pilot = 1; fixed-wing pilot = 2 combat pilot = 3; 
air traffic controller = 4.  
 
1.18.2.6 Step 6: Reporting and interpretation of results 
 
Mouton (2008) explains that interpretation involves the synthesis of one’s data with larger 
coherent wholes. One explains observations or data by formulating hypotheses or 
theories to account for observed patterns and trends in the data. The present study 
related emotional awareness with human error and with the aviation safety concept of 
situational awareness. Babbie (2008) mentions that questions need to be asked in terms 
of reporting and interpretation. The researcher placed the project in the context of 
previous research and formulated her questions accordingly. The Boundary 
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Questionnaire and human error results were interpreted within the applied human factor 
perspective. 
 
1.18.3 Phase 3: Conclusions, limitations and recommendations 
 
According to Mouton (2008), fieldwork refers to the part of the research process where 
the researcher leaves her study and enters the real world (World 1) to collect, select and 
analyse data. The research field of this study was aviation – within the applied aviation 
psychology and human factor sciences. 
 
1.18.3.1 Step 1: Conclusions 
 
The sample population target was SAAF aircrew, more specifically SAAF pilots and air 
traffic controllers (ATCs). The results of the Boundary Questionnaire and human error 
were concluded and discussed within the applied human factor perspective, related to 
human error with practical application to reduce human error with CRM training. 
 
1.18.3.2 Step 2: Limitations of the research 
 
The sample size for a quantitative research study may be a challenge, since the 
availability of human error data is limited due to various reasons – including under-
reporting. The willingness of aircrew to participate in the survey could also be a problem, 
especially among those with a history of many incidents. Aircrew members have negative 
associations with psychological testing, since they are annually subjected to medical and 
psychological testing by the South African Institute of Aviation Medicine to obtain valid 
flying ratings. 
 
1.18.3.3 Step 3: Recommendations 
 
The research in hand explored the relationship between aircrew’s emotional awareness 
and human error within aviation. Research results were explained against the background 
of the applied human factor paradigm. Emotional awareness training was explored with 
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a view to its inclusion in the applied human factors dealt with in CRM safety training so 
as to reduce human error, thereby contributing to aviation safety. 
 
1.19 CHAPTER LAYOUT 
 
Chapter 1 presented the scientific orientation to the research. Chapter 2 and 3 
encapsulate the literature review and Chapter 4 the experimental quantitative design. 
Chapter 5 will discuss the research results, and Chapter 6 contains the conclusion, 
limitations and recommendations of this study. 
 
1.20 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The background and motivation for this study were discussed, as well as the problem 
statement, aims and objectives. The paradigm perspectives, research design and 
research methodology were also discussed and explained. Endsley and Jones (2012) 
mentioned the need for practical situational awareness training in aviation, and this, 
together with the researcher’s identification of a gap in the science of applied human 
factors for effective CRM, formed the premise for this study. Although CRM training 
addresses situational awareness theoretically as prescribed by ICAO (International Civil 
Aviation Organisation [ICAO], 2013), theory does not prescribe the practical application 
of situational awareness. This gap created the impetus to research emotional awareness 
as a leading variable that may be related to human error in aviation. Human Factor studies 
provided evidence of a positive relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error. This study aims to motivate the use of emotional awareness training strategies to 
reduce aviation human error to acceptable levels. Additionally, emotional awareness traits 
could be introduced for consideration in general aviation safety and it may contribute not 
only to Human Factors for CRM, but also as introduction to future studies. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON HUMAN ERROR 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Several researchers have investigated the difference in situational awareness between 
pilots who perform well and pilots who do not, which led to research aim 3, namely to 
conceptualise aviation human error. The researcher obtained ethical clearance from the 
Chief of the South African Air Force to conduct this specific survey as well as approval to 
analyse captured safety data for the period 2005 to 2015. The researcher coded the 
safety incidence data according to four levels of safety severity.  
 
Technology in aviation has evolved exponentially to keep up with an increasing demand 
for air transportation in seamless skies. Aviation safety experts became increasingly 
aware of the human-machine performance challenges associated with keeping up with 
both safety demands and technology acceleration. Accordingly, the aviation safety 
initiatives introduced a human-centred approach to the Human Factors (HF) and 
Ergonomics discipline. Despite ICAO regulation and many human factor safety initiatives 
such as Crew Resource Management (CRM), aircraft accidents continue to occur. In fact, 
aircraft accident investigation statistics confirm human error (HE) as the main cause of all 
accidents and incidents (Barker, 2014; Harris, 2011; Landry, 2012).  
 
Aviation safety studies are consistent with the above findings and support the view that 
the human factor, situational awareness, is crucial for human performance and flight 
safety. It is therefore interesting to note that evidence from research proposes that 
emotional awareness has a critical effect on our cognitive processes, our behaviour and 
our decision making as part of situational awareness (McKeown, 2013). 
 
The purpose of this study was to conceptualise the phenomenon ‘situational awareness’ 
related to emotional awareness and human error from an aviation human factor 
perspective. In this regard, this researcher defined and conceptualised the constructs of 
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emotional awareness and human error. Emotional awareness is the extent to which 
aircrew identify, attend to and value their emotions (Moon & Berenbaum, 2009). The 
researcher argues that this ability would enhance situational awareness, thereby reducing 
the probability of human error. 
 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 
 
To answer the research question, the order of the variables for this study flows from 
emotional awareness influencing situational awareness and resulting in possible human 
error (see Figure 2.1). The variables related to the following aviation concepts were 
discussed in order of possible causal link:  
 Situational awareness (SA) 
 Threat and error management (TEM) 
 Aviation psychology and the applied human factors (HF) discipline 
 Human error (HE) within the aviation system 
 Human error analysis models 
 Emotional intelligence (EI) 
 Emotional awareness (EA) 
 
2.3 THE AVIATION HUMAN FACTOR DISCIPLINE 
 
The concept ‘human factors’ (HF) has evolved over the last 60 years to become an 
independent discipline that is used synonymously with ergonomics, denoted as Human 
Factor Ergonomics (HFE) (Karwowski, 2012). To be specific, “human factors” is an 
international discipline associated with human error (Harris, 2012). Applied Human 
factors were initially confined to the Ergonomics Research Society in 1949, the HF and 
Ergonomics Society in 1957 and the International Ergonomics Association (IEA) in 1959.  
 
Human factors are embedded in the selection, training and design processes within threat 
and error management (Harris, 2012). ICAO (2002) integrated the concept of ‘human 
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factors’ with safety management systems (SMS) in aviation and defines human factors 
as people in their living and working situations, their relationship with machines and with 
procedures within a specific environment. Human performance capabilities, limitations 
and human behaviour are considered central to human factors. Threat and error 
management aims to reduce human error and increase aviation safety, human 
performance and efficiency (ICAO, 2013).  
 
The IEA (International Ergonomics Association [IEA], n.d.) defines ergonomics or human 
factors as the scientific discipline concerned with an understanding of the interactions 
among humans and other elements of a system (such as aviation), and applied theory, 
principles, data and methods to optimise human well-being and overall system 
performance. The ergonomics discipline promotes a holistic human-centred approach to 
work systems design that considers physical, cognitive, social, organisational and 
environmental factors. 
 
The problem with the regulation and application of human factors lies within aviation 
safety training. Regarding safety, we cannot afford to pass on human factor knowledge, 
skills and training superficially (Wilson, 2012). The paramount objective of the human 
factor discipline, therefore, is to understand the interactions between people and 
everything that surrounds them, and based on such knowledge, to optimise human well-
being and overall system performance (Karwowski, 2012). Previously, technology was 
the main impetus for ergonomics. The human factor discipline aims at understanding 
human error within the human-machine interaction (Karwowski, Salvendy & Ahram, 
2010). Thus, reducing human error by focusing on human factors to increase system 
performance and safety are the main objectives of human factor ergonomics (Salas & 
Maurino, 2010). 
 
Aviation specialists argue that human factor research should consider the total context 
within which aircrew must operate when performing a task (Harris, 2012; Landry, 2012). 
In the past, scientific literature myopically focused on either the cognitive or physical 
system individually. Only recent research recognises that interactions occurring between 
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all the systems can have a profound influence on the performance and dictate overall 
system safety (Harris, 2012).  
 
Internationally, HF specialists support the view of interactions between the various 
elements within the aviation environment that cause human error. Safety specialists 
agree that a systems approach will optimise safety within the complex aviation system 
(Marras & Hancock, 2014). 
 
2.3.1 Human factors within the complex aviation system 
 
The systems approach is the most dominant concept used in aviation safety to analyse 
aircraft accidents (Underwood & Waterson, 2013). The ICAO and the SACAA adopted 
the term “Safety Management Systems” (SMS). An SMS is a framework of data to 
manage the flow of information and actions in an organisation or system (ICAO, 2013; 
SACAA; 2016). The systems approach then focuses on a “complex whole” with the 
emphasis on interacting, interrelated and interdependent elements (Salas & Maurino, 
2010; Landry, 2012). Byron (2007) defines an SMS as a systematic approach to 
managing human errors, including organisational structures, accountability, policies and 
procedures. Human error management is a consolidated and pro-active safety approach 
that entails a comprehensive and effective effort within a complex system (Kritzinger, 
2006).  
 
People often think of a human error as an erroneous action made by the last person to 
touch the aircraft before things went wrong. Although there might have been an erroneous 
action, it is important to consider the context of the entire complex aviation system and 
contributing organisational factors that may have contributed to the accident (ICAO, 
2013).  
 
Numerous human operators are involved and interact within the complex aviation system 
at any given moment (Landry, 2012). Kramer (2013) explains the complexity of the 
aviation system and the teamwork required between pilots and ATCs regarding 
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Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) (Kramer, 2013). ATCs need to ensure that pilots comply 
accurately with the instructions. Human error can occur if an instruction is not adhered to 
– even if it was due to an innocent oversight. Consequently, human error can have an 
adverse effect on the highly fluid air traffic situation and complex aviation system (Kramer, 
2010). 
 
Ernest Gann, American aviator and author, avers that fate is a hunter. An insignificant 
human error such as commencing a missed-approach procedure at the wrong point can 
put a pilot outside safety margins. In addition, it is particularly hazardous to start a climb 
past the minimum approach position (MAP) or below the minimum decision altitude 
(MDA) (Miller, 2013a; 2013b). 
 
Human Factor research has concluded that human errors occur three times more often 
in the military sector than in civil aviation. The reason for this is that military flight 
operations can be far more complex than in the civilian sector, due to the operational 
environment, mission timing constraints and workload (O’Connor, Hahn & Nullmeyer, 
2010). 
 
2.4 CONCEPTUALISATION OF HUMAN ERROR IN AVIATION 
 
Internationally, is air traffic increasing and threat and error management is becoming 
more complex as the airspace becomes more saturated. Accordingly, ATCs and pilots 
(aircrew) are challenged daily to maintain high safety standards within these complex 
aviation systems and stressful air traffic control situations (Brink, 2009; Tshabalala, 2011). 
It should also be pointed out that the human error phenomenon is complex and comes in 
many forms. Human performance is adversely affected by human error and poses a 
serious threat to the safety of flight operations (Harris, 2011; Kern, 2009). The aircrew are 
at the forefront of human error and performance limitations could result in a breakdown 
of situational awareness. This may in turn result in flawed decision making that causes 
accidents (Hollnagel, 2013). 
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Human error can be defined as those occasions when a planned sequence of mental or 
physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome (Shuen-Tai & Wei-Min, 2011; 
Liang, Lin, Hwang, Wang, & Patterson, 2010). The roots of human error are diverse and 
pose a challenge to effective threat and error management (Harris, 2011). The Classical 
Rasmussen Decision Ladder categorises human error into three different types of 
information processing that are skill-, rule- and knowledge-based (Rasmussen, 1986). 
Limitations with regard to aircrew skills, knowledge and attitude, combined with human 
factors such as stress, work overload and individual predisposition, may cause human 
errors and result in aircraft accidents (Kanki et al., 2010). 
 
Human error is a primary risk in aviation safety. Research in aviation supports the 
argument that human error remains the main cause of aircraft incidents and accidents 
(Dekker, 2014; Froslee, 2012; Harris, 2011; Kern, 2009; Kilingaru, Tweedale, Thatcher & 
Jain, 2013; Walker, O’Connor & Little, 2013). Human errors are inevitable and affect both 
performance and aviation safety adversely. In addition, it is usually the culmination of 
failure of certain human factors such as emotion, communication, decision making and 
degraded situational awareness (Walker, et al., 2013). A case in point is the analysis 
synopsis of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft accident that 
confirms that numerous human errors contributed to the Asiana Airlines Flight 214 
accident on 6 July 2013 in San Francisco. Although the pilots were qualified, extremely 
experienced and well trained, they were not immune to human errors, and descent below 
the visual glide path on the final approach to San Francisco, California resulted in an 
impact with the seawall (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2014).  
 
A better understanding of the etiology of human error is required to mitigate its 
catastrophic consequences (Griffin, Young & Stanton, 2015). In aviation, system reliability 
is high, and accidents are seldom caused by one single human error (Avers & Johnson, 
2011). Accidents occur when multiple human error contributors combine and fail to cope 
effectively within a complex environment such as aviation. To conceptualise human error 
clearly in aviation, we need to understand the organisational context, the system and 
influences in which they occur (Hollnagel, 2013). 
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2.4.1 Human error in the complex aviation system 
 
Undoubtedly, there is no room for human error in aviation, which is a complex 
sociotechnical system involving numerous interacting human operators at any given 
moment. The flawless collaboration of these human operators is paramount to ensure a 
seamless and exact performance (Harris, 2011). Human error is found to be the main 
contributing factor in events leading up to an accident or to the severity of the outcome 
(Avers & Johnson, 2011; Harris, 2011; Kern, 2009; King, 2013). Landry (2012) argues 
that the different system components need to be engineered in such a way that they are 
resistant to one single human error. Early human error detection and alerting mechanisms 
need to be built into the complex aviation system so that human error may be identified 
and mitigated pro-actively. 
 
Pilots and ATCs are front-end operators in the complex aviation system and they face 
challenges imposed by the need to operate and control a multivariate lagged and complex 
system in a heterogeneous multi-task environment (Tshabalala, 2011).  
 
To reduce future aircraft accidents, human error analysis is necessary to trace the chain 
of human error events back through all the contributory events and latent errors. Aviation 
safety experts have divided human error into three categories: acts of omission, 
commission and precision. The most common errors in aviation are due to omission, for 
example, to omit setting the flaps correctly on the aircraft just before landing, due to 
human factors such as stress, work overload or complacency (Hobbs, 2008). 
 
According to Arendt and Adamski (2011), aviation accident statistics reflect a 60 to 90% 
human error relation in aircraft accidents.  
 
While the advances in technology and the increasing number of applications for 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) may eventually reduce aircrew, the impact on safety will 
probably not improve until humans are completely removed from the complex aviation 
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system. This will entail a completely automated and thoroughly debugged set of protocols 
for the design, engineering, manufacture and operation of UAVs wherein human factors 
are not allowed to influence any aspect. Until then, aircraft will continue to crash due to 
human error (Burnside, 2006). 
 
Because humans are fallible, human error will be inevitable and cannot be eradicated 
(Dekker, 2011). To improve aviation safety, the risk that human factors pose to safe 
operations can only be managed to acceptable levels. To date, managing human error in 
aviation has remained a challenge and research is needed to change or influence aircrew 
behaviour using all available resources with CRM training (Brooker, 2010; Tehrani & 
Molesworth, 2016). 
 
Human error is an inevitable part of flying and can never be eliminated completely 
(Dekker; 2011). Human factor and ergonomic models such as Threat and Error 
Management (TEM) and Crew Resource Management (CRM) have gone a long way with 
regard to training aircrew and ATCs the necessary human factor skills (Harris, 2011). 
Dekker (2011) believes that to understand why an accident occurred, we must look at the 
functioning of the individual parts to understand the linear sequence of human error 
events within the system.  
 
2.5 HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS MODELS 
 
Worldwide, aviation safety experts agree that human factors are responsible for human 
errors that lead to aircraft accidents. Pilots and ATCs are the two main frontline operators 
who interact continuously within the aviation system at any given moment (Landry, 2012). 
To ensure a safe flight, it is important to identify human factors pro-actively – before 
human error can result in an accident. 
 
The Human Factor field has changed in scope into a multidisciplinary field that draws on 
principles from the behavioural and social sciences as well as industrial systems 
engineering to optimise human performance and reduce human error. Aviation safety 
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experts analysed numerous accidents and classified human error into five broad 
categories in terms of the accident analysis synopsis (Hackworth & Holcomb, 2008). 
1. Procedural errors. Slips, lapses and mistakes. 
2. Communication errors. Failures in the transfer of information, including 
misstatements, misunderstandings and omissions. 
3. Decision errors. When the crew follows a course of action that unnecessarily 
increases the risk to the flight in a situation not governed by formal procedures. 
4. Proficiency errors. 
5. Intentional non-compliance errors. 
 
Additionally, Hobbs (2008) differentiates between physical errors and psychological 
errors, and listed the following psychological errors that contribute to human errors in 
aviation. 
1. Perception errors 
2. Memory lapses 
3. Slips 
4. Wrong assumptions 
5. Procedural violations 
6. Fatigue 
 
Kern (2009) highlights the continuous struggle of human performance experts to discover 
a broad-spectrum antibiotic to cure the human error disease. Findings from Tshabalala’s 
study (Tshabalala & De Beer, 2014) support the argument that human factors lead to 
human errors. He studied ATCs and found that emotional intelligence, work stress, work 
performance and emotional coping within the stressful aviation environment contributed 
to human error. Brink (2009) studied 64 South African ATCs and found statistically 
significant relationships between stress and EI. In the current study, the researcher aims 
to extend previous aviation human factor research and focus specifically on the first 
emotional intelligence construct, namely emotional awareness (EA), within the existing 
human factor paradigm and human error framework. 
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The South African Air Force must manage acute pressures in a dynamic and demanding 
environment. Additionally, aircrew perform air operations within shared African airspace, 
challenging terrain and weather conditions, with limited navigation systems and ground 
facilities. Aviation studies, threat and error models and the HFACS accentuate a renewed 
human factor approach and prescribe training to embed skills for safe behaviour 
(O'Connor & Campbell, 2010; Salas & Maurino, 2010). Current human factor training is 
limited since it does not train aircrew with adequate knowledge, skills and attitude to 
proactively detect threats and errors (Harris, 2011). For effective threat and error 
management aircrew need to be aware of hazardous attitudes and cognitive biases such 
as gender biases that affect their attitudes and perceptions (Gibbon, 2014a; Harris, 2012; 
Kern, 2011) 
 
2.5.1 Accident causation and human error analysis models 
 
The requirement for the highest aviation safety standards possible within the aviation 
system cannot be emphasised enough. Various human error analysis models have been 
developed as safety tools to manage the human factor and enhance aviation safety 
(Landry, 2012). Aviation safety models focus primarily on the systems approach, and they 
recognise the importance of interacting, interrelated and interdependent elements (Salas 
& Maurino, 2010; Landry, 2012). Illustrating the scope of human factors leading to human 
error, the researcher explored the primary human error analysis models. The following 
accident causation models will be discussed: the SHELL model (Hawkins & Orlady, 
1993), Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1990, 2000), 5M and HFACS (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). 
2.5.1.1 The SHELL model for human error accident causation 
 
The ICAO prescribes the classic SHELL model (Hawkins & Orlady, 1993; International 
Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], 2013) to illustrate the relationship between the 
different aviation systems and human components (see Figure 2.1). The SHELL model is 
a classic human performance model used for threat and error management to explain 
 44 
how various aviation elements interact (ICAO, 2013) and it consists of the following five 
elements: 
 
1. S – Software (procedures, checklist) 
2. H –Hardware (physical system, like the aircraft, the ATC console) 
3. E – Environment (weather, working conditions, organisational culture) 
4. L – Live ware (pilots, ATC, mechanics, navigators) 
5. L – Live ware (other aircrew) 
 
This model highlights the continuous interaction between the five elements, namely the 
influence human factors have on aircrew integrated with software, aircraft (hardware), 
and co-pilots or ATC (other live ware) within the dynamic aviation environment. The 
researcher simplified her understanding of this model with the human being (L) at the 
centre acting as the glue in the middle, striving to keep the other elements within the 
system together in harmony. The effectiveness of this harmony depends on the strength 
of the human or live ware and the glue that holds them together (Ehmke, 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The SHELL Model  
Source: ICAO (2013, p. 2-7) 
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2.5.1.2 Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1990) for human error accident causation 
 
Another classic human error management system of accident causation is the well-known 
linear “Swiss Cheese” Model (ICAO; 2013; Reason, 1990). According to Reason, 
accidents occur when there are breakdowns in the interactions among the SHELL 
components (see Figure 2.2). These failures, which are depicted as “holes” lining up 
within the different layers of the system, degrade the integrity of the entire aviation system, 
thereby transforming what was once a productive process into a failed system. The Swiss 
Cheese model is primarily descriptive and not analytical.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 The Swiss Cheese Model 
Source: SKYbrary Wiki (https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/James_Reason_HF_Model) 
 
2.5.1.3 The 5M Principle of Human Error (HE) accident causation 
 
Although not invented by the SAAF, the 5M human error analysis model developed by 
T.P. Wright, is similar to the components within the SHELL model (as previously 
discussed), illustrated in a pie chart. The 5M categories are management, man, machine, 
medium and mission interlocking circles. The 5M human error model supports human 
factor causation distribution, which consistently indicate ‘man’ as contributor to human 
error (Yantiss, 2011). 
 
 46 
2.5.1.4 The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
 
The ICAO suggests the HFACS model as a quantitative framework for threat and error 
management. The HFACS is the most comprehensive human factor causation model 
developed for aviation by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). The HFACS framework 
identifies active and latent human factors in the aviation system associated with human 
error (Figure 2.3). This comprehensive framework is based on Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
Model, to illustrate how causal human factors align over time, adding up to and resulting 
in human error. Related to the current study, this framework was defined by analysing 
hundreds of aviation accident reports. To understand the influence of human factors 
during accident investigation and determine possible human errors, each level of the 
HFACS model is evaluated to discover all relevant and latent human conditions (see 
Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)  
Source: McCune, Lewis & Arendt (2011, p. 155) 
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A relevant study conducted by Froslee (2012) and using the HFACS model identified the 
following adverse mental states that lead to human error: 
1. Decision errors are honest mistakes due to a lack of knowledge or bad choices. 
2. Skills-based errors result from vulnerability to failures of attention, memory and/or 
techniques. 
3. Perceptual errors occur when sensory input is degraded, and decisions are made 
based on faulty information. 
4. Violations are wilful deviations from procedures. 
 
2.6 AVIATION THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT  
 
Globally, aircraft accident rates remain high. Aviation research confirms human error and 
reduced situational awareness as primary human factor, while human error models are 
criticised as not sufficient in providing adequate causal explanations (Plant & Stanton, 
2012). 
 
Human performance is a primary safety measure (Landry, 2012), effected by adverse 
mental states that lead to human error (Tehrani & Molesworth, 2016). Wiegmann and 
Shappell (2003) highlight situational awareness, task fixation, distraction and mental 
fatigue due to lack of sleep or stressors as primary human factors. Secondary factors 
include overconfidence, complacency and misplaced motivation. A study by Cooke 
(2012) indicates that the highest number of human errors is caused by perceptual-motor 
bungles and decision errors.  
 
Adding to these studies, a revised version of the Fleishman method was used in a NATO 
study on pilots from several countries. The most important abilities and skills identified for 
safe performance were situational awareness, memory, motivation and reasoning. 
Fleishman’s method was also used in a study of German ATCs (Eissfeldt, Heil & Broach, 
2002), while a number of extra scales were added such as cooperation, communication 
and the ability to handle stress (Martinussen & Hunter, 2010). 
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Data from aircraft accident investigations (AAI) confirm that human factors are mainly 
responsible for a breakdown in situational awareness and the primary cause of human 
error (Durso & Alexander, 2010). Furthermore, the aviation system requires effective 
communication between the flight deck, aircrew and ATCs. Failure in the information 
transfer process, degraded situational awareness and flawed decision making, have led 
to many accidents (Brown & Moren, 2003). The value of this study for effective threat and 
error management is supported by Brown and Moren (2003) who suggested that human 
factor training includes concepts such as ‘inquiry’, ‘advocacy’ and ‘assertion’. 
  
2.7 HUMAN FACTORS RELATED TO HUMAN ERRORS IN THE COMPLEX 
AVIATION SYSTEM 
 
Over the course of hundreds of nautical miles, ATCs are responsible for organising a 
chaotic flow of air traffic efficiently and effectively. They apply standard arrivals (STARs), 
precise radar vectoring, speed and altitude control to compress air traffic into organised 
"streams" and direct them safely to individual runways. Often, though, it appears that 
pilots erroneously think, "What's 10 or 20 degrees? The ATC won't notice!” However, if 
the controller fails to notice the seemingly insignificant deviation, the entire air traffic 
system could be severely disrupted, due to one seemingly insignificant human error 
(Kramer, 2013). 
 
According to Pestal (2010), decision making must be objective and not clouded by 
emotion. Pestal explains the human error potential in seemingly insignificant 
transgressions and emphasises the critical importance of being aware of these small 
violations and wilful deviations from procedures – no matter how trivial they might seem. 
Emotional decisions create the first bad link in a potential accident chain (Pestal, 2010). 
Hazardous emotional states have been identified as the primary human factor responsible 
for aircraft accidents. In effect, an emotional state is influenced by a variety of 
environmental stresses (Kanki et al., 2010). Excellent multi-tasking abilities, as well as 
extraordinary levels of attention and response speed are required to maintain situational 
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awareness in a stressful environment (Pecena et al., 2013). It is important to note that 
synergy, teamwork, workload, data interpretation, stress and leadership are interrelated 
human factors affecting CRM. Although automation increases safe performance, 
overreliance on technological solutions often results in human errors (Kanki et al., 2010; 
Lintern, 2011).  
 
2.8 HUMAN FACTOR TRAINING TO MANAGE HUMAN ERRORS IN AVIATION 
 
For effective threat and error management, the ICAO prescribes mandatory human 
factors training for aircrew. Human factors training relates to the effectiveness of all the 
available resources (Figure 2.1) as well as interpersonal activities such as leadership 
styles, communication, decision-making, problem-solving and judgment, to achieve safe 
and efficient flight operations (ICAO, 2002; 2013). 
 
2.9 THE HISTORY OF APPLIED HUMAN FACTOR TRAINING FOR CREW 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
 
A fatal runway collision in March 1977 between two Boeing 747s at Tenerife Airport – 
KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736 – resulted in a tragic disaster. This accident 
serves as a textbook example of the complex interaction between human error, 
organisational influences and environmental preconditions. KLM realised the human 
factor training limitations after analysis of the accident and initiated basic human factor 
training based on the SHELL model (Figure 2.1). Although human factor training is 
focused on skills training and addresses the challenge of optimising the human/machine 
interface, aircrew members generally regard human factor training as unwarranted 
psychological meddling (Kanki et al., 2010).  
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2.10 AVIATION SAFETY TRAINING INITIATIVES TO REDUCE HUMAN ERROR 
2.10.1 PAVE 
 
Exploring the scope of applied human factor training, limitations are reflected in current 
safety management tools and CRM training initiatives such as the acronym for the popular 
PAVE checklist (pilot, aircraft, environment, external pressures), which allows pilots to 
identify hazards and human error risks. 
 
2.10.2 IMSAFE 
 
The IMSAFE acronym provides aircrew guidance in terms of illness, medication, stress, 
alcohol, fatigue and emotion (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Wright, 2012). 
 
Illness 
According to Wright (2012), even a minor illness suffered in day-to-day living can 
seriously reduce situational awareness. Although the safe option is not to fly while 
suffering from any illness, aircrew often divert from SACAA aviation medical standards. If 
this rule is considered too stringent for a particular illness, aircrew should contact an 
Aviation Medical Examiner for advice (SACAA, 2016). 
 
Medication  
Wright (2012) comments that aircrew performance can be degraded by prescribed and 
over-the-counter medications, as well as by the medical conditions for which they are 
taken. The Germanwings accident in 2015 (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la 
Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile [BEA], 2016) alerted medical practitioners to rethink ethical 
disclosure of medication and the risk posed with evaluation by independent aviation 
medical examiners.  
 
Stress 
Schwarz, Kallus and Gaisbachgrabner (2016) argue that stress can impair aircrew 
performance, often in extremely subtle ways. Psychological stress degrades situational 
awareness and may result in human error. 
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Alcohol  
Aviation medical research warns against the hazards of alcohol consumption and flying. 
Results indicate that as little as one ounce (28 grammes) of liquor, one bottle of beer, or 
four ounces (60 grammes) of wine can impair performance and degrade situational 
awareness (Wright, 2012). 
 
Fatigue 
According to Wright (2012), fatigue and lack of adequate sleep continue to pose a threat 
to aviation safety, as it may not be apparent to aircrew until serious errors are made 
(Wright, 2012). 
 
Emotion 
Tehrani and Molesworth (2016) conducted a study examining the effect of mood on 
performance. In support of this study, results indicated that affective states such as anger, 
anxiety or ego, have a negative influence on aircrew performance and may cause human 
error (Stein & Book, 2011; Wright, 2012). 
 
2.10.3 The aviation safety training conundrum 
 
Considering the effect of human factors, aviation safety training aims to understand 
human errors and discover counter-measures that are necessary to mitigate human 
errors before they become consequential (Gunther, 2010). 
 
Recent studies in aviation safety emphasise the need for extensive studies in the human 
factors discipline, so as to provide aircrew/ATCs with the necessary psychological skills 
to perform optimally (Antoško, Pil’a, Korba, & Lipovský, 2014; Brink, 2009; Cooke, 2012; 
Harris, 2012; Kern, 2009; Tshabalala, 2011). Human factor training aims at empowering 
aircrew to understand emotion, thought and behaviour to act pro-actively and mitigate 
human error (Dekker, 2011).  
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2.10.4 Military Crew Resource Management training 
 
Due to the demanding operational environment, mission timing and workloads, military 
aviators may find it more difficult than civilian aviators to identify and avoid errors. Despite 
some research on military human factor training over the past two decades, there is still 
scant literature or studies available on military human factor training programmes (Kanki 
et al., 2010; O'Connor & Campbell, 2010). 
The SAAF introduced the concept of ‘human factors’ as part of ‘crew resource 
management’ for effective threat and error management. The training includes 
transactional analysis (TA), communication skills and emotional intelligence training. In 
1990, the chief of the SAAF, General J. van Loggerenberg, officially instructed that human 
factor training be applied as CRM in the South African Air Force. On 17 September 1990, 
Major D.J. Keth and Major J.O. Branders presented the first SAAF CRM course at 
Loskopdam. General van Loggerenberg personally attended this historical event to 
demonstrate his support (Branders, 2013). More than two decades later, Chief of the 
South African Air Force, Lt Gen. F.Z. Msimang also realised the importance of future 
human factor research and development in the field of aviation safety. He therefore 
supported this study with enthusiasm and inspired the researcher throughout her studies 
to conclude it with confidence.  
 
2.10.5 Civilian human factor training 
 
For effective threat and error management, Air Canada safety programmes included 
essential human factor skills such as leadership, emotional awareness, preparation and 
planning, monitoring, feedback, situational awareness, communication, decision making, 
and workload management (Dowd, 2010). Shuffier, Salas and Xavier (2010) propose that 
the following human factors be taught: communication, briefing, mutual performance 
monitoring, team leadership, decision making, assertiveness and situational awareness. 
Human factors such as problem solving and decision making are reliant on Level 3 
(comprehension) situational awareness (Endsley, 2000). SAA considers the following 
human factors – cognitive limitations, fatigue, work overload, inadequate training, poor 
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maintenance of equipment and errors induced by ATC – as challenges that can 
exacerbate latent human error (Odendaal, 2012).  
 
The famous successful emergency landing of US Airways Flight 1549 on the Hudson 
River on 15 January 2009 is a reflection of effective CRM and successful culmination of 
trained human factor skills. In effect, multiple human factor skills contributed to enhanced 
situational awareness that culminated in a safe emergency landing on the Hudson River, 
after a total engine failure was caused by bird ingestion (Hollnagel, 2013).  
 
Some aviation researchers criticise the human factor training limitations of the systems 
approach (Tshabalala, 2011; Cooke, 2012), in that they do not place enough emphasis 
on individual human errors or, as Kern (2009, p 1) refers to it, “the threat inside” or the 
“blue threat”. Unchecked egos and negative emotional states often result in pushing the 
limits of fatigue and stress that could result in distraction (Kern, 2009). Cooke (2012) 
recommends an enhanced individual safety culture, and presents the notions of human 
behaviour and behavioural change through a comprehensive understanding of human 
error in order to provide a behavioural change model to develop safety-based thinking 
and behaviour. 
 
Aviation safety specialists support the hypothesis that threat and error management 
requires human factor training, therefore they argue that training is a controllable variable 
(Salas & Maurino, 2010). Kern (2009) strongly supports the individual-focused approach 
to human factor training and argues the importance of emotional awareness for effective 
threat and error management. Martinussen and Hunter (2010) support the view of Kern 
(2009) and believe human factor training should focus on both system and individual. 
Aviation studies conclude that effective threat and error management requires the 
following human factors traits to be addressed (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010): 
 
 Avoiding tunnel vision and being aware of factors such as stress 
 Active monitoring of all information systems 
 Staying ahead of the curve in preparing for contingencies 
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 Communicating plans 
 Communicating workload distribution 
 Prioritising secondary operational tasks 
 Planning for sufficient time 
 Recognising and reporting work overload 
 Ensuring all crew members are aware of status and changes in automation 
 Recognising potential distractions 
 
Human factor specialists concur that a breakdown of aircrew situational awareness is 
central to human error and a prerequisite skill linked to optimum performance. A review 
of the literature supports the hypothesis that emotional awareness is singled out as the 
key Human Factor trait related to human error (Salas & Maurino, 2010; Wickens, 2002; 
Di Nuovo, Cannavo, Di Nuovo, Schmorrow & Fidopiastis, 2011). 
 
2.11 CONCEPTUALISING THE TERM ‘SITUATIONAL AWARENESS’ 
 
Situational awareness is a key concept in the discipline of human factors, research and 
threat and error management (McGuinness, 2004; Pion, 2013). It provides the basis for 
safe behaviour, effective decision making, use of procedures and automation, effective 
team interactions and informed expectations (Salas & Maurino, 2010). Situational 
awareness is widely recognised as a leading contributor in the field of human factor 
research (Bencini-Tibo, 2012). It contributes to safety by providing for the effective 
detection of human error, communication and decision making. A breakdown in 
situational awareness is widely recognised as the leading contributor to human error 
(Kilingaru et al., 2013; Salas & Maurino, 2010). 
 
There is continuous interest and debate among human factor practitioners in terms of 
conceptualising and measuring situational awareness. Understanding situational 
awareness is critical to provide a better understanding to practitioners who seek to 
improve the human-machine performance (Vidulich & Tsang, 2012).  
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Situational awareness is a colloquial aviation safety construct commonly used worldwide 
as a critical human factor concept and prerequisite for safe flight, as it depicts a clear 
presence of mind, vigilance and alertness. Furthermore, situational awareness is used 
extensively as a precursor to proper airmanship and flight safety. Central to this study, a 
multitude of definitions exist (Cooke, 2012; Kern, 2011) and the literature represents a 
great deal of discrepancy regarding the use of the concept ‘situational awareness’ 
(Hokeness, 2013).  
Situational awareness is fundamentally a cognitive concept pertaining to the operator’s 
accurate understanding of the present situation – hence it is closely linked to decision 
making and human error (Vidulich & Tsang, 2012). In explaining this phenomenon, the 
researcher pursued an understanding of the underlying variables of situational 
awareness. She contextualised situational awareness as related to emotional awareness 
with the classical definition that is still applicable in aviation safety, according to three 
levels (Endsley, 2000): 
Level 1: Perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space 
Level 2: Comprehension of the current situation 
Level 3: Projection of information in the near future  
 
Endsley (2000) also describes situational awareness at three levels, known by aircrew as 
“PCP”. This acronym is a familiar aviation concept and is still highly applicable in aviation 
schools of thought.  
 Level 1: Perceiving the status, attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the 
environment  
 Level 2: Comprehending the significance of these elements 
 Level 3: Projecting current assessment to future status 
Reason’s (2000) model explains that aircrew are surrounded by a wealth of sensory 
information from which they must extract critical information. Displays in the cockpit and 
control towers provide a complex visual experience for which accurate visual perception 
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is critical (Curtis, Jentsch & Wise, 2010). A lack of situational awareness is one of the 
most critical and challenging features leading to human error. In a study of accidents 
among major airlines, 88% of those involving human error could be attributed to degraded 
situational awareness (Endsley, 2000; Van de Merwe, Oprins, Eriksson & Van der Plaat, 
2012).  
 
The human factor perspective explains that situational awareness is the continuous 
interaction and relationship between aircrew, including various artefacts relating to the 
five SHELL components (Figure 2:1). Adding to this, Kern (2009) explains emotional 
awareness related to situational awareness known as “NIFITI”: 
 
 Name It. This is the emotional awareness stage where the environment is identified 
and expressed in a common aviation language, for example, “I do not feel 
comfortable” or “I feel stressed about the oil pressure”. 
 Frame It. Contextualise the potential problem and decide on potential action to 
mitigate the challenge; for example, decide to consult the oil pressure checklist. 
 Tame It. To act and correct the situation pro-actively before it spins out of control; for 
example, decide to divert the aircraft to a closer airfield for a technical opinion and oil 
pressure analyses. 
 
In relation to threat and error management, situational awareness is referred to as a 
cluster of specific outcomes including preparation, planning, vigilance, workload 
distribution and distraction avoidance (Kanki et al., 2010). Furthermore, situational 
awareness is explained within the distributed cognition perspective (Stanton, Salmon, 
Walker & Jenkins, 2010). Hazardous attitudes such as stress, biases and work overload 
could result in a potential cognitive bottleneck, influencing perception and resulting in 
human error (Vidulich, Wickens, Tsang & Flach, 2012). 
 
However, human factor studies support the paramount importance of situational 
awareness for optimum performance and aviation safety (Nicholsen, 2010; Pasztor, 2010; 
Stanton et al., 2010). Emotions such as stress and anxiety are cognitive stressors that 
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influence perception, decision making, cognitive processing and performance, and that 
reduce situational awareness (Tichon, Mavin, Wallis, Visser, & Riek, 2014).  
 
Literature provides sufficient evidence and consistency between the prevalence of human 
factors related to reduced situational awareness and causing human error (Hokeness, 
2013). To date, human factor research has focused largely on operator (pilot/ATC) trust 
and reliance, while ignoring the role of emotion in safe flight (Hughes, Rice, Trafimow, & 
Clayton, 2009).  
Aviation research supports the view of the researcher and highlights limitations within 
current human factor models. So far, little research explored and investigated the 
relationship between emotional awareness and situational awareness to reduce human 
error (Jeon, Walker & Gable, 2014). Kern (2009) argues effective threat and error 
management requires emotional awareness. Importantly, training programmes should be 
more prescriptive and include practical methods to enhance aircrew emotional awareness 
(Matthews, Strater, & Endsley, 2004).  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW ON EMOTIONAL AWARENESS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The researcher explored literature and trends that explain the importance of emotional 
awareness as central to the Human Factor perspective (Jeon, Walker & Gable, 2014; 
Tshabalala, 2011). In aviation, safe performance is dependent on emotional awareness 
to detect early warning signs of potential human error, so as to pro-actively act and rectify 
the threat. Emotional awareness creates an array of personal resources for problem 
solving, decision making, and social skills, including psychological resources such as 
resilience and motivation, thereby enhancing situational awareness (Grant, 2013; 
Hefferon & Boniwell, 2011).  
 
3.2 CONCEPTUALISE THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: EMOTIONAL 
AWARENESS 
 
Research literature provides evidence of the purpose of emotion and it considers emotion 
more powerful than thoughts (Lehr, 2014). Emotion triggers conscious and unconscious 
effects related to the environment as well as important factors to consider (Behrmann, 
2015). In relation to situational awareness level 1 perception, emotional awareness 
communicates important messages about ourselves and the environment (Reason, 2000; 
Hefferon & Boniwell, 2011). Ekman (2003) identifies six hazardous human emotions, 
namely anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness and surprise. Emotion is also defined as a 
psychological state in which subjective feelings or characteristics and patterns of 
physiological arousal influence thought and behaviour. In turn, emotional awareness is 
defined as the extent to which an individual consciously perceives emotion and 
distinguishes between different bodily feelings (Alpullu, 2013; Davidson & Begley, 2012). 
Relating to situational awareness, Stein and Book (2011) explain emotional awareness 
as the ability to tune into the world, read situations and connect with others. Emotional 
awareness is a prerequisite for emotional regulation and it involves the ability to monitor 
and differentiate between emotions, locate their originators and acknowledge the value 
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and importance of their messages (Camodeca & Rieffe, 2013; Stein & Book, 2011; 
Tshabalala, 2011).  
 
For the purposes of this study, emotional awareness is divided into two components, 
namely the extent to which one is aware of one’s emotions and the extent to which one 
can identify and describe one’s own emotions (Moon & Berenbaum, 2009). According to 
Coates (2008), negative past experiences could result in emotional suppression or 
repression for survival. Humans ignore emotions selectively or try to control them. 
Suppressed emotions become imprisoned in our subconscious or unconscious minds. 
 
Furthermore, emotion influences cognitive processing and is the key determinant of 
behaviour, performance and decision making. Negative emotions such as stress and 
anxiety are cognitive stressors that influence decision making and result in degraded 
performance (Tichon et al., 2014). 
 
People employ three strategies to cope with stress: problem solving, avoidance and social 
support (Amirkhan, 1998). Negative emotions influence safe performance by focusing on 
what is wrong instead of what is right (Fredrickson, 2001; Straus & Allen, 2006). Positive 
emotions build personal resources such as problem solving, social skills and 
psychological resources such as resilience and goal orientation (Hefferon & Boniwell, 
2011). A behavioural approach study by Newby and Narain (2016) to determine the role 
of emotions in aviation safety describes unsafe behaviours as driven by emotion. Their 
study refers to 12 hazardous attitudes (Table 3.1) tabulated in the so-called Dirty Dozen 
as common causes of human error. Fakoussa (2012) refined those attitudes to only six.  
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Table 3.1 The Dirty Dozen  
Original Dirty Dozen Dirty Dozen by Fakoussa 
Lack of communication  
Complacency Lack of awareness 
Lack of knowledge  
Distraction Lack of attention 
Lack of teamwork  
Fatigue Lack of sleep/breaks 
Lack of resources  
Pressure Lack of stress resistance/self-confidence 
Lack of assertiveness  
Stress Lack of relaxation 
Lack of awareness  
Norms Lack of creativity 
Source: Newby & Narain (2016, p. 7) 
 
Adding to these hazardous attitudes, results from a survey administered among the global 
aviation community (Newby & Narain, 2016) to define the role of emotion in aviation 
safety, identified five top emotions (see Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 The top five emotions identified 
Emotion Interpretation 
Fear  Something specific in the future is likely to harm me and the predisposition is to run 
away or avoid it. 
Care The person/place/thing is the value to me and the predisposition is to protect. 
Arrogance I believe I am smarter than others and as a result I am also better than them. My 
tendency will be to dismiss their ideas and suggestions as coming from an inferior 
being. 
Compliance I will go along with this initiative because I do not have the freedom to decline and the 
predisposition is to go through the actions. 
Complacency I believe I know enough to get by and as a result do not put effort into checking or 
learning. 
Source: Newby & Narain (2016, p. 9) 
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Related to aviation and emotion, Brown and Moren (2003) studied the emotion of shame 
and coping responses and they proposed that emotional dynamics are involved in aircrew 
stress coping or avoidance strategies (see Figure 3.1). They also suggested emotional 
awareness training for aircrew, to become aware of their emotions (shame), speak up 
and communicate important information when they feel uncomfortable about a situation. 
 
 Coping with stress through 
withdrawal 
 
 
 
Coping with stress by 
attacking other 
EA 
 
 
 
Coping with stress by 
attacking self 
 Coping with stress through 
emotional 
avoidance/suppression 
 
   
Figure 3.1 The compass of emotional awareness avoidance responses  
Source: Adapted from Brown & Moren (2003, p 273) 
 
As discussed, human factor research limitations directed the research problem and aim 
of this study, namely that aircrew behaviour is driven by emotion and, to avoid human 
error, aircrew should be emotionally aware. However, studies identifying the relationship 
between emotional awareness and human error are limited (Brown & Moren, 2003; 
Dobson, 2013; Killian, 2012; Larkins, 2010; Newby & Narain, 2016). 
 
3.3 EMOTIONAL AWARENESS IN RELATION TO EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
Considering the three main criteria for a nomothetic relationship in social research 
(Babbie, 2013), the researcher hypothesised a relationship between emotional 
awareness and human error. Supporting this argument, Stein and Book (2011) 
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conceptualised emotional awareness and converted information from the environment for 
effective decision making. As shown in Table 3.3, emotional awareness is a construct of 
emotional intelligence (EI) (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). For this study, emotional awareness 
pertains to innate intelligence and is concerned with conscious and cognitive activity. 
Additionally, emotional awareness is the acquisition of knowledge and decision making 
through emotions, while unconscious activity plays a vital role because emotions emanate 
from it (Lehr, 2014). For aircrew to be able to maintain situational awareness, they need 
to be able to perceive emotion. This is vital to recognise their own emotion as well as the 
emotion of another aircrew member (Alpullu, 2013; Endsley & Jones, 2012; Killian, 2012). 
Brown and Moren (2003) explain that emotion influences thought and behaviour, which 
indicates a significant relationship between emotional intelligence and human 
performance (Bar-On, 1997; Brackett & Salovey, 2006; Bar-On et al., 2006). Because of 
the importance of emotional awareness and the influence it has on the aircrew’s 
perception and decision making, emotional awareness formed the basis of this study. 
 
Emotional intelligence researchers argue that a person’s personal and professional 
success in life depends not only on cognitive abilities, but also on emotional skill and 
social traits (Killian, 2008; Stein & Book, 2011). Various theorists propose different 
concepts related to emotional intelligence and agree on emotional quotient dimensions 
(see Table 3.3) namely, emotional awareness, social awareness, self-management and 
relationship management (Killian, 2012; Bar-On, 2010). 
 
Additionally, emotional intelligence moderates the relationship between stress and 
performance (Alpullu, 2013; Wu, 2011). Stein & Book (2011) explains emotional 
awareness as a sub-scale of emotional intelligence in that it represents the potential for 
behaviour and not the actual behaviour. A study of Reuven Bar-On’s model and meta 
factors pertaining to emotional intelligence sub-scales directed this study to explore the 
relationship between emotional awareness and human error (Alpullu, 2013; Bar-On, 
2010; Killian, 2012).  
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3.3.1 Emotional awareness: Bar-On’s emotional intelligence sub-scale  
 
Exploring the scales of emotional intelligence, this study focused on the composite 
emotional awareness based on findings from Bar-On (2010), which indicate emotional 
awareness as a building block to self-perception and an activator to emotional intelligence 
(Table 3.3). Relevant to our effort to conceptualise emotional awareness, research by 
Stein and Book (2011) provided conclusive evidence that cognitive ability identifies and 
describes one’s own emotional experiences as well as those of others (Lane & Schwartz, 
1987) by describing emotional awareness as the conscious processing of emotional 
information (Lane, 2000). Aircrew must be prepared for any situation or emergency. In 
the case of the Hudson River landing, emotional awareness provided skill and strategies 
to adapt to and deal successfully with any situation. Therefore, the researcher postulates 
that there is a relationship between emotional awareness and human error (BEA, 2016). 
Table 3.3 EQ-I 2.0 Model. Scales and assessment 
EQ-I 2.0 scales  EI competency assessed by 
each scale 
Self-perception Emotional awareness 
Self-regard 
Self-actualisation 
Self-expression Emotional expression 
Independence 
Assertiveness 
Interpersonal Interpersonal relationships 
Empathy 
Social responsibility 
Decision making Impulse control 
Reality testing 
Problem solving 
Stress management Flexibility 
Stress tolerance 
Optimism 
Adapted from Stein and Book (2011, p. 23) 
Recognising the importance of emotional awareness to notice one’s own thought and 
feelings, Coates (2008) states the significance of being able to observe the constant 
interaction between thought and emotion. Brown and Moren (2003) argue that when 
aircrew fail to identify their emotions, this might result in amplification, suppression or 
maintenance of an inappropriate emotion, resulting in human error. Applied to aviation, 
 64 
emotionally aware aircrew will observe stress within themselves or other aircrew 
members and display calmness. Emotionally aware aircrew may reduce their stress, 
thereby enhancing confidence and performance.  
 
Considering the importance of emotional awareness in relation to aviation safety, the 
researcher argues that emotional suppression is detrimental to perception and may lead 
to human error. Emotional awareness is therefore paramount to recognise subtle 
emotional cues and to be equipped for dealing with one’s circumstances (Hefferon & 
Boniwell, 2011). Kern (2009) states that low emotional awareness may cause highly 
trained and skilled aircrew to err. Applied science and human factor research recognise 
how important it is for emotionally aware aircrew to accurately perceive stress to regulate 
and manage their environment (Han & Johnson, 2012).  
 
Human factor science argues that the ability to be consciously aware of emotion is an 
important and unique competency. Being aware of emotion is important to recognise the 
situational nature of the environment and to modulate and manage reactions to stressful 
events (Morris et al., 2010). Adding to this, emotion contains important messages that 
cannot be ignored (Newby & Narain, 2016). Safe performance requires aircrew to be 
aware of their emotional states and to operationalise underlying messages related to their 
environment. Aircrew need to be skilled in emotional literacy and emotional awareness 
lexicon to distinguish and express their emotion (Brown & Moren, 2003). 
 
A study conducted by Reyes-Dominguez (2010) supports this hypothesis and suggests 
that there is a relationship between emotional awareness, success and increased 
performance. Additionally, emotional awareness has been associated with signs of 
positive mental health, job satisfaction, organisational commitment, productivity and trust 
(Schutte & Malouff, 2012). The most prevalent Human Factor traits currently studied by 
positive psychologists are self-regard and self-acceptance, based on emotional 
awareness. Human factor research agrees that emotional awareness could affect and 
regulate safe performance, decision making and problem solving to reduce human error 
(Hefferon & Boniwell, 2011; Newby & Narain, 2016; Bar-On, 2010). 
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3.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMOTIONAL AWARENESS AND HUMAN 
ERROR  
 
This study originated from the human factor approach to operationalise the phenomenon 
‘human error’ as how aircrew judge a situation based on their perceptions. The scope of 
human factor training directed this study to explore the relationship between emotional 
awareness and human error. To gain a deeper understanding of human factor training 
limitations, the researcher explored literature pertaining to aviation and related to safe 
performance within the application of various CRM modules. 
 
The SAA’s human factor training includes the following five most common hazardous 
behaviours related to human error (Odendaal, 2012): 
1) Anti-authority (don’t tell me what to do!) 
2) Impulsivity (do it quickly!) 
3) Invulnerability (it won’t happen to me.) 
4) Macho (I can do it!) 
5) Resignation (what’s the use?) 
    
ICAO (2013) human factors training prescribe EI training and the importance of emotional 
awareness in terms of ego, complacency, fatigue, stress, experience, gender and cockpit 
gradient as safety barriers. Several empirical studies on aircrew and stress indicated 
strong relationships between emotion, performance and human error (Brink, 2009; 
Tshabalala, 2011). Emotional awareness affects human judgment and drives behaviour 
and decision making. Adding to this, Goleman (1998) argued that emotional upsets 
interfere with one’s mental life. Aircrew caught in a destructive emotional state do not 
perceive and comprehend information correctly, which results in human error (Endsley & 
Jones, 2012). Negative emotions direct attention towards one’s own preoccupations and 
interfere with an attempt to focus elsewhere, leading to situational awareness 
deterioration and ultimately to human error (Afolabi, Ogunmwonyi & Okediji, 2009).  
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Emotional awareness plays an essential role in value recognition and teamwork to enable 
aircrew to regulate their emotions and cope within a complex and demanding environment 
where situations change frequently and extensively (English & Branaghan, 2012). 
Therefore, it can be argued that aircrew need the trait ‘emotional awareness’ to perceive 
and comprehend a situation accurately, so as to adapt and deal safely with the possible 
consequences of a situation. 
 
This study’s hypothesis is supported by a recent study in South Africa on civilian ATCs 
that revealed a positive correlation between emotional awareness and increased 
situational awareness. Local research suggested that aircrew suffer from stress-induced 
emotion namely apathy, they neglect normal safety precautions and express more risk-
taking and ego-driven behaviour (Tshabalala, 2011). 
 
Brown and Moren (2003) conceptualise emotional awareness in their study and argue 
that pilots are more driven by excitement than the average person. This quality is 
associated with a tendency to avoid self-blame and to focus on excitement, self-
confidence or ego to cover the shame effect (Brown & Moren, 2003). They propose that 
emotional dynamics such as shame prevents aircrew from speaking up. Low emotional 
awareness results in failure to communicate relevant information in the aviation system 
(Bienefeld & Grote, 2012). This argument is based on emotional awareness and the 
shame effect, and it results in apprehensiveness to communicate, due to fear of an attack 
on one’s personal competence. Kern (2011) argues that safety is affected by negative 
emotions, which results in hazardous attitudes and turns aircrew into their own worst 
enemy. Kern (2009) studied aviation accidents and concluded that the reason highly 
skilled aircrew lost situational awareness before an accident, is because they were not 
emotionally aware of what was going on within themselves.  
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3.5 COPING WITH EMOTIONAL STRESS IN AVIATION 
 
The extensive cognitive demands made on aircrew are indicated through various 
performance and stress-related studies (Brink, 2009; Larkins, 2010; Tshabalala, 2011). 
How aircrew cope with stress is a major human factor research focus. Schwarz et al., 
(2016) analysed stress related to air traffic management and concluded that human 
performance is the key success factor to manage safety. Studies argue that stress has a 
negative impact on working memory capacity, productivity and performance (Kanki et al., 
2010; Tshabalala, 2011). A study by Wu (2011) confirms a negative relationship between 
emotional stress and performance. His study explains that emotionally aware aircrew are 
able to observe emotions such as stress and anxiety pro-actively and regulate emotions 
to manage a situation before human error occurs.  
 
A study in which employees were asked to define work-related stress illustrated an 
obvious inability to describe the emotions related to stress. This inability to recognise 
emotional discomfort and the lack of a psychological vocabulary resulted in 
psychosomatic symptoms. These results illustrate the importance of emotional 
awareness for stress management and regulation to prevent human errors (Grieve et al., 
2006). 
 
Research studies indicate a correlation between stress and a wide range of negative 
emotions such as aggression, depression and anxiety (Schwarz et al., 2016). The 
relationship between emotional stress, arousal and performance was established by 
Yerkes and Dodson in 1908. The Yerkes-Dodson law states that performance increases 
when arousal increases, but only to a moderate level, before it reaches an optimal 
performance level that is required for aircrew to operate safely. Beyond the optimal level, 
performance starts to decrease and may lead to human error. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, 
aircrew become tense and lose concentration, and their performance degrades, which 
leads to human error (Grieve et al., 2006). 
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Figure 3.2 The optimal performance curve  
Source: Teigen (1994, p. 534) 
 
The Yerkes and Dodson stress curve indicates the relationship between stress and 
performance (see Figure 3.2). Dobson (2013) studied 193 aviation accidents and the 
results indicated a relationship between negative emotions such as stress and human 
error. His study found that stressed aircrew erred in performing unnecessary emergency 
landings due to emotions that affect their judgment and decision making. 
 
You, Dai, Yang & Chang (2009) supports these studies and argues that enhanced 
emotional awareness should reduce human error. In turn, Causse, Dehais, Péran, 
Sabatini and Pastor (2013) conducted behavioural research on the effects of emotional 
awareness on aircrew. Their data presented a temporary impairment of rational decision 
making due to negative emotions such as stress. 
The researcher discussed the importance of emotional awareness related to the influence 
of stress and negative emotion on safe performance. As suggested in the investigation of 
the Germanwings accident, aircraft accidents are usually the culmination of a chain of 
events and not a single human error occurrence (BEA, 2016). To reduce human error, it 
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is essential to understand the how emotion affects aircrew and eventually results in 
decision shortcomings. Furthermore, human error is linked to emotional states that result 
in the failure to communicate, poor decision making and degraded situational awareness 
(Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Walker et al., 2013). Studies support the view that poor 
judgment results from a breakdown in emotional awareness, leading to poor decision 
making associated with human error.  
 
3.6 MILITARY PILOTS AND EMOTIONAL AWARENESS 
 
A study by Meško et al. (2013) on Slovene military pilots produced a profile of a typical 
military pilot. The study indicated that the typical military pilot should have emotional 
control, emotional stability, extrovertedness and high impulse control. Suppressing 
emotion pertains to perceptual distortions and inability to process information accurately, 
which leads to human error (Marquardt, Robelski, & Hoeger, 2010). Joseph, Reddy and 
Sharma (2013) conducted a study on 205 Indian army pilots and found a correlation 
between human error and emotional awareness to regulate stress, anxiety, impulsivity 
and low self-confidence. 
 
Realising that knowledge and skills are not enough for safe performance, a review of the 
available literature conceded that the human factor remains the weak link in the aviation 
system and human error is the main cause of accidents (Carlson, 2013). Literature 
supports the researcher’s argument that emotional awareness influences safe 
performance. The researcher asked the question whether emotionally aware aircrew who 
operate in stressful environments can successfully perform to operational requirements. 
This study proposes emotional awareness training to teach aircrew members the 
necessary emotional skills to manage and regulate emotions such as stress and workload 
so as to reduce human error (Canan, 2014; Ion, 2011). 
 
According to Brown and Moren (2003) a paradigm shift is required and they confirm that 
safe behaviour is driven by emotions. Maier (2014) conducted a study on ATCs and found 
that emotional awareness enhanced their reaction and ability to handle stress effectively. 
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The current researcher proposes that aviation will benefit from human factor training 
directed at emotional awareness. Aircrew members need skills to regulate emotional 
barriers with regard to response strategies and flexibility for any circumstance (Luuk, Luuk 
& Aluoja, 2009; Sanchez, 2012).  
 
Dewe, O’Driscoll and Cooper (2010) note that the level of attention that organisations pay 
to addressing emotion-related issues is still relatively low when compared to their 
investments in financial budgeting, marketing and technological development. Hollnagel, 
(2013) argues that organisations should focus on emotional wellness and create a 
positive spiral by enhancing aircrew’s emotional awareness and resilience, and by 
encouraging aircrew to speak up and learn from human errors and past experiences.  
 
3.7 MILITARY AIRCREW SELECTION 
 
Proposed selection requirements for aircrew and ATCs include tests for specific 
emotional constructs such as level-headedness. Additionally, aircrew response should 
indicate situational awareness, mental alertness, multi-tasking abilities and attention 
(Mnguni, 2011). As competency in emotional awareness includes emotional regulation 
strategies, stress management, decision-making and cooperation within a team, this 
study might be beneficial and contribute to future aircrew recruitment (Drury, Ferguson & 
Thomas, 2012; Subic-Wrana et al., 2014).  
 
3.8 APPLIED HUMAN FACTOR STUDIES 
 
Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factor studies contribute towards 
understanding the human science (ICAO, 2013). Although results from human factor 
research and literature provide some understanding towards aircrews’ safe performance 
(Ortner & van de Vijver, 2015), advances in technology and applied sciences in human-
machine integration are falling behind. Aviation safety is reliant on research, applied 
human factors and behaviour-based assessment to understand aircrew performance. 
Continued human factor research in aviation is paramount in an attempt to overcome the 
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human error and environmental threats, and to formulate safe performance indicators as 
guidelines for effective human factor training.  
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
 
There is much more to be learned from the synthesis between the human error 
phenomenon related to emotion in aviation. Literature review and aviation studies leave 
many questions, which at this stage remain unanswered. Researchers and aviators 
concede the importance of continuous human factor research related to various factors 
such as gender, environmental pressures, aircraft type and safe human performance in 
aviation (BEA, 2016; Karwowski, 2012). 
 
3.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Aviation studies and safety reports consistently implicate human error as the primary 
cause of accidents. If one considers the dire consequences of human error, a zero-human 
error tolerance should be implied. Literature review and human factor research also 
indicate that the human condition remains the weak link in the aviation system and the 
main cause of accidents. Knowledge and skills are not enough to prevent human error. 
The researcher proposes that emotional awareness as a human factor trait should be 
included in training to teach aircrew the emotional skills to manage and regulate their 
emotions and enhance safe performance.  
 
With aviation as background, the researcher conducted literature studies and 
conceptualised the constructs within the scope of situational awareness and human error 
related to emotional awareness. Following the research aims, the researcher performed 
a comparative examination of existing literature and research concepts. Furthermore, the 
emotional awareness and human error phenomena were conceptualised within the 
Human Factor paradigm. The relevance of the current study was illustrated and the 
researcher argued theoretically that emotional awareness can be related to human error. 
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The following chapter outlines the research design and methodology that were used for 
this study. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study focused on human error in aviation as aviation is one of the most complex 
man-made systems, leaving “no room for error” (Kern, 2011). Adding to this concern, air 
traffic is set to double between 2020 and 2025 (Salas & Maurino, 2010). The aviation 
system is interdependent and it demands a zero-error tolerance margin. A breakdown 
between any one of the interacting components causes a drift into error and may have 
dire consequences (Dekker, 2011).  
 
This constant interaction between human and aircraft requires superior performance. In 
aviation, situational awareness is expressed as a precursor to airmanship and flight 
safety. Although ill-defined, situational awareness (Reason, 2000) is a colloquial term 
used worldwide as a foundation safety concept to depict a clear presence of mind, 
vigilance and alertness (Tehrani & Molesworth, 2016). The researcher concerned herself 
with this classical safety term, as a multitude of definitions and interpretations made it 
practically impossible to measure situational awareness (Cooke, 2012; Kern, 2011). 
 
The researcher was interested in measuring emotional awareness influencing 
performance and human error. Based on the general aim of the current research to 
explore a relationship between emotional awareness and human error, the practical 
application of this study aimed to discover a taxonomy of emotional awareness traits. 
Therefore, the researcher explored, analysed and investigated this construct for a 
comprehensive understanding and synthesis to apply to future CRM training. The 
researcher hypothesised that a significant relationship exists between emotional 
awareness and human error.   
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4.2 SPECIFIC AIMS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The general aim of this study was to explore limitations within the applied science of 
human factors to reduce human error. Aviation concepts were formulated to understand 
the human factors related to safe behaviour – specifically emotional awareness and 
human error. 
 
To achieve the general aim of this study, the following specific aims were formulated to 
guide the empirical study: 
 
 Research aim 5: Operationalise human error measurement in aviation. 
 Research aim 6: Operationalise emotional awareness measurement with the 
Boundary Questionnaire. 
 Research aim 7: Operationalise the relationship between emotional awareness 
and human error in aviation. 
 
4.3 FORMULATION OF THE HYPOTHESES 
 
A hypothesis is a tentative statement about the world that involves a conjecture about 
relationships that have been predicted but not verified yet. Hypothesis testing is done to 
determine what is true and what would explain certain observations or phenomena. A 
hypothesis is an a priori statement of expectation that includes who is involved, to what 
treatment or intervention they will be exposed, the outcome measures to be used, and 
the comparison group. The research in hand hypothesised a possible relationship 
between emotional awareness and human error, and explored significant differences 
between aircrew’s emotional awareness and human error related to aviation. The 
researcher formalised additional hypotheses of relationships between emotional 
awareness and human error groups, related to aviation experience and mustering. 
 
The empirical study focused on the variables emotional awareness and human error: 
Step 1: Emotional awareness - EA (independent variable) 
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Step 2: Human error - HE (dependent variable) 
Step 3: Aviation experience and mustering groups (moderator variables)  
 
Aviation safety research and aircraft accident investigations support the argument raised 
in this study that human error remains the primary cause of aircraft accidents (Karanikas, 
2016). To operationalise the human factor paradigm and contextualise emotional 
awareness, the researcher formulated the general aim of this study to explore the 
relationship between emotional awareness and human error. In addition, she extended 
her study to contribute to the social sciences, aviation psychology and applied human 
factors. The researcher hypothesised possible significant relationships between 
emotional awareness, human error and the variables, aviation experience and mustering. 
 
 (H0) There is no significant relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error. 
 (H1) There is a significant relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error. 
 (H2) There is a significant relationship between emotional awareness, human error 
and experience. 
 (H3) There is a significant relationship between emotional awareness, human error 
and mustering. 
 
4.4 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The current research was designed in accordance with the formulised aims articulated in 
the problem statement. The design was the plan on how to answer the formulated 
research questions. Msweli (2011) defined the deductive research design approach by 
asking questions that require the explanation of incidences that can be quantified (e.g. 
'how' and 'what' questions). A deductive research design was applicable to this study 
since the questions were “where,” “how many” and “how much”. The deductive method 
was the most applicable method to derive answers for a quantitative research approach 
(Creswell, 2014). 
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A research design ensures that the evidence obtained enables the researcher to answer 
the initial question as unambiguously as possible. The researcher considered the design 
for this study as a logical method to answer the research question in a non-complicated 
and understandable manner. The research design was viewed as a plan for the research 
that was constructed to maximise the validity of its findings (Mouton & Marais, 1990). 
Hofstee (2006) recommended that one should obtain detailed information on all research 
designs and their applicability before committing to the study. Moreover, a 
phenomenological research is a design of inquiry rooted in aviation psychology, in which 
the researcher describes the experiences of individuals regarding a phenomenon as 
described by participants (Creswell, 2014). The current research was concerned with the 
aviation context. Theory and empirical research were interwoven and explored the 
phenomenology of human error related to emotional awareness. 
 
4.4.1 The paradigm perspective 
 
The research approach followed the assumptions of social sciences and explored existing 
frames of references related to emotional awareness and human error. Guided by existing 
paradigms, the researcher considered the value of stepping outside existing paradigms, 
exploring new perspectives, theories and realities within natural science. By describing 
the phenomenon human error within the context of aviation, the researcher aimed to 
explain how emotional awareness influences aircrew behaviour and reduces human 
error.  
 
4.4.2 The positivist perspective 
 
The basic positivist paradigm assumes that the social world is no different from the natural 
world. What is relevant to this study in the context of aviation, is that the positivist 
perspective is confronted with the basic question of how the aviation system influences 
aircrew behaviour. Human factor studies and knowledge from accident observations 
revealed anomalies within the perspective of the human error theory that are related to 
aviation safety expectations that are not met. Social research paradigm limitations guided 
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this study to explore human error as it is closely related to perceiving reality objectively 
(Babbie, 2013). 
The positivist model stresses the importance of precise and reproducible measurements. 
It stems from the belief that research can only improve by gaining knowledge of causes 
and consequences of behaviour (Loseke, 2013). The positivist approach provided 
research knowledge regarding aircrew’s emotional awareness and behaviour within the 
aviation context to contribute to social science and aviation safety (Creswell, 2014; 
Loseke, 2013). 
Adding to the aim of this study, the positivist assumption was selected as a scientific 
method to conceptualise the need for safe aviation behaviour and to identify and assess 
the causes that influence outcomes (Babbie, 2013). In the present study, the researcher 
was interested in exploring the relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error. 
Babbie (2013) explains that knowledge through a positivist lens is obtained from careful 
observation and measurement of the objective. Positivist research is based on the belief 
that the scope of the programme evaluation is limited to those aspects of social 
programmes that can be objectively observed and tested, using a variety of 
methodologies and procedures. In this study, a non-experimental (quantitative) approach 
was followed to explore the relationship between the variables emotional awareness and 
human error (Creswell, 2014).  
Positivistic social scientists have erred in their assumptions that human always act 
rationally. The influence that Human Factor traits have on perceiving reality and human 
behaviour is underestimated. Human factors such as stress, biases and attitudes often 
result in non-rational behaviour and human error. 
This study questioned the principle of rational behaviour related to human factors and 
environmental influences within the aviation system. By finding common ground on 
subjective experiences, scientist agree that emotion influences our perceptions of 
individual reality, but objective reality is confirmed by social agreement. The present study 
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is based on a collaboration of social sciences that explore aircrew performance and 
human error within the concept of agreed objective reality (Babbie, 2013).  
 
4.5 THE QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
Babbie (2008) argues that there is no limit to what can be studied. The topic for this 
research is relevant to all forms of social research, although its implications are clearest 
in the case of nomothetic, quantitative studies.  
When we observe a social phenomenon in a systematic and scientific way, the 
information gathered is referred to as data. The data is organised in such a way that it 
can be analysed and interpreted by means of quantitative methods (Antonius, 2003). 
Creswell (2014) further explains that quantitative research is an approach for testing 
objective theories by examining the relationship among variables. These variables can 
be measured with instruments and the numbered data can be analysed using statistical 
procedures. 
Quantitative research also involves the collection of primary data from large numbers of 
individual units with the intention to project the results to a wider population – for the 
purposes of this research study, to aviation. The quantitative research approach was used 
to examine statistically significant differences between emotional awareness and human 
error variables (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004). The researcher decided to use an exploratory 
strategy of enquiry (Documents Analysis and Expert Review) to establish an 
understanding of emotional awareness traits that are related to aviation human error. 
 
4.6 RESEARCH VARIABLES 
 
Hopkins (2008) explains that quantitative research aims to determine the relationship 
between an independent variable and a dependent variable or outcome variable in a 
population. Every variable should be exhaustive and must be able to classify every 
observation in terms of one of the attributes composing the variable. Similarly, Babbie 
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(2008) argues that attributes composing a variable must be mutually exclusive and must 
be able to classify every observation in terms of that one attribute only. 
 
4.6.1 Independent variable 
 
In the attempt to conceptualise emotional awareness, no single definition could be 
established; instead, a label for the superordinate categories construed moods, feelings 
and emotions that influence judgement and behaviour (Kaufmann & Baumann, 2015). 
Multi-Health Systems (MHS) explains emotional awareness as a primary construct of 
emotional intelligence (Stein & Book, 2011). Important for this study, MHS defines 
emotional awareness as the ability to recognise and understand feelings and realise their 
impact on decision-making and problem-solving abilities. Aircrew need emotional 
awareness to regulate their thought processes that pass through the emotional centre of 
the brain and convert important outside information via the senses into responses or 
behaviour (Stein & Book, 2011).  
 
Research aim 4 conceptualised emotional awareness in relation to aviation human factor 
studies, namely that aircrew depend on cues from themselves and the environment to 
perceive the situation accurately (Brown & Moren, 2003). Aviators acknowledge that 
suppressing emotion limits them from detecting critical environmental changes (Tietz, 
2016). The Boundary Questionnaire developed by Dr Ernest Hartmann was used to 
measure the independent variable, emotional awareness, and to indicate the way 
different people experience their feelings. Hartmann (Jawer & Micozzi, 2011, p. 20) 
explains the boundary type of people by stating that “each individual can be characterized 
on a spectrum of boundaries from thick to thin”. SAAF aircrew members were tested for 
their individual emotional awareness boundary types. 
 
4.6.2 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable was human error in the military aviation environment, and it was 
categorised according to severity in terms of hazards, incidents and accidents (Yantiss, 
2011). The SAAF regulates compulsory incidents and accidents reporting within a just 
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culture based on the aviation safety policy (SACAA, 2016). This safety philosophy makes 
provision for open reporting and is a relatively true reflection of human error incidences 
recorded over the past ten years. The human error reporting classifications were coded 
for no recorded human error, hazards, incidents and accidents (Yantiss, 2011). 
 
4.6.3 Moderator variables 
 
Guided by Department of Defence Human Resource policy regarding aircrew recruiting 
and training, the researcher expected some influence from moderator variables. For the 
purposes of this research, the following moderator variables were explored as they were 
expected to influence the relationship between emotional awareness and human error; 
aviation experience and mustering groups (Creswell, 2014; Gibbon, 2014b). 
 
4.7 EXPLORATORY STUDIES 
 
Babbie (2013) argues that social research is the systematic and empirical exploration of 
human social life. Additionally, Loseke (2013) states that social research is detective work 
to explore the mysteries of social life. Loseke adds that researchers employ exploratory 
research when little is known about a specific topic and previous theories or ideas are not 
applicable. The researcher was interested in a relationship between emotional awareness 
and human error within the science of applied human factors. The exploratory study 
clarified the research problem and gathered information that was used to formulate the 
research questions.  
Investigating human factors in aviation is relatively new and has only been done over the 
past two decades. Exploratory studies are valuable in social science and they are used 
mostly for three purposes: (1) to satisfy the researcher’s curiosity; (2) to test the feasibility 
of a more extensive study; and to (3) develop and employ methods for the study (Babbie, 
2013). The purpose of this research was to explore the field of the applied human factor 
sciences to obtain a better understanding of human errors related to emotional 
awareness.  
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4.8 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Literature studies guided this research to explore aircrew performance and their 
perceived reality in relation to emotional awareness. A non-experimental quantitative 
research design was followed and a possible relationship was examined between the 
independent variable emotional awareness (measured with Hartmann’s Boundary 
Questionnaire) and existing pre-recorded human error data. The researcher obtained 
quantitative human error data that had been recorded over a ten-year period. Variables 
were conceptualised to specify the exact meaning of each emotional awareness and 
human error concept. Measurement indicators were described to measure specific 
behaviour characteristics of the emotional awareness concept related to human error. 
The independent variable (emotional awareness) was conceptualised in the literature 
review in Chapter 2, and operationalised with the Boundary Questionnaire (Zborowski, 
Hartmann, Newsom & Banar, 2003). The Boundary Questionnaire was administered to 
173 aircrew members to measure emotional awareness sub-constructs, and to 
operationalise and explore the relationship with human error in aviation (Creswell, 2014). 
 
4.9 AIRCREW SAMPLE  
 
Babbie (2008) states that units of analysis are the phenomena examined to describe such 
units and explain their differences. There are two different units of analysis involved, 
namely individuals or collectives (Antonius, 2003). The unit of analysis refers to the “what” 
of the study, in other words, what object, phenomenon, entity or process the researcher 
was interested in investigating. In this study, the unit of analysis was aircrew, which 
collectively refers to pilots, navigators and air traffic controllers (ATCs).  
Cluster sampling used to be the preferred method to study similar flying groups 
(mustering) individually at a given time (Verhoeven, 2011). Probability or representative 
samples were collected because the researcher was interested in inferential statistics to 
discuss the characteristics of aircrew based on the specific aims (Loseke, 2013). In this 
study, all aircrew members had an equal opportunity to participate in the study, pending 
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their individual availability on the day the questionnaire was administered. Central to the 
positivist-informed research, statistical generalisation from the aircrew sample can be 
related to the general aviation population, as the study aimed to explore the general 
human factor laws of aircrew behaviour and human error in aviation (Loseke, 2013).  
A stratified random sample was selected according to SAAF mustering groups in such a 
way that every aircrew member had an equal chance of being included; therefore, this 
study’s sample presents a miniature aviation population (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams, 
2015; Loseke, 2013) consisting of combat pilots, fixed-wing pilots, helicopter pilots, 
navigators and ATCs – referred to as aircrew mustering. 
A cross-sectional study involves the observation of a sample of a population (aircrew) or 
phenomenon (emotional awareness) at one point in time, such as the Boundary 
Questionnaire survey. Relevant to this study, exploratory studies are often cross-sectional 
(Babbie, 2013). Research suggests that the overall matching process could be most 
efficiently achieved through the creation of a quota matrix constructed of all the most 
relevant characteristics, as was performed with the selected Boundary Questionnaire 
categories applicable to aircrew. This research focused on the emotional awareness traits 
related to human error. 
 
4.10 MEASURING INSTRUMENT FOR EMOTIONAL AWARENESS  
 
A survey design provides a quantitative description of human error trends and aircrew 
emotional awareness attitudes. For this study, the Hartmann Boundary Questionnaire 
results of the aircrew participants were captured, analysed, inferred and generalised to 
the aviation population (Creswell, 2014). The researcher selected a questionnaire, as it 
is one of the most widely used methods for non-experimental research designs across 
disciplines to collect large amounts of survey data from a representative sample. 
Additionally, a questionnaire is considered one of the most important research designs, 
and survey instruments are frequently used to collect data (Kalaian & Kasim, 2012).  
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Furthermore, a survey involves asking many people the same questions (Antonius, 2003). 
Important for this study, the survey provided a quantitative description of trends, attitudes 
or opinions of aircrew by studying a sample. The present study used the Hartmann 
Boundary Questionnaire with the intent of generalising findings from this aircrew sample 
to the larger aviation population (Wadsworth, 2011). 
 
4.11 THE EMOTIONAL BOUNDARY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
The Boundary Questionnaire measures emotional awareness boundaries and refer to 
degree of separateness or connection between mental functions and processes. High 
emotional awareness is associated with open mindedness, creativity, and imagination 
versus reality, high emotional boundary people have fluid sense of identity and tend to 
merge or lose themselves in relation to others. Aircrew with low emotional awareness 
differentiate clearly between reality and imagination and self and others and tend to prefer 
well defined structures (Hartmann, 1991).  
 
The Boundary Questionnaire was used as the emotional awareness measuring 
instrument. Jawer and Micozzi (2011) explains the applicability of the Boundary 
Questionnaire by arguing that ‘thick’ boundary people are less conversant with feelings 
and most often maintain a calm demeanor while avoiding, denying or distancing 
themselves from strong feelings. The authors describe emotions as feelings that flow like 
water in continuous motion. Describing that with people whose boundaries are thin, the 
flow is quicker and more direct, resulting in better emotional awareness and a sense of 
reality. 
 
Since the researcher was interested in applying emotional awareness to safe behaviour 
in aviation, she recognised the expression by Beck (1996) that emotional awareness 
enhances our observation, perception and understanding of the environment. Supporting 
his argument, thick emotional awareness boundary people commonly brush aside 
emotional upset in favour of coping with a situation and maintaining a calm demeanour. 
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The researcher argues that aircrew members practise similar strategies to avoid, 
suppress and deny strong feelings so as to cope in the aviation environment. 
Applicable to the scope of this study for the military environment, Hartmann selected 
naval officers to design the Boundary Questionnaire, with the prediction that they would 
be low on emotional awareness. Hartmann reasoned that officers’ mental structures 
would be compatible with the hierarchical-structured social organisation of the military 
and with the exact, precise and unambiguous style of its operation procedures. Against 
this military and operational background, the researcher decided to use the Boundary 
Questionnaire as a valid instrument (Harrison, Hartmann & Bevis, 2008). 
During the literature review phase, the researcher examined the application of the 
Boundary Questionnaire, as it correlates ego boundary thickness related to the emotional 
awareness constructs applicable to the military environment. The psychometric validity of 
the Boundary Questionnaire was investigated, as well as whether the scale could 
differentiate between aircrew in a consistent manner. Internal consistency of the overall 
Boundary Questionnaire, as well as of the world and personal total sub-scores, was 
demonstrated. The results are discussed in the context of emotional awareness boundary 
development. Studies found the “Big Five” taxonomy applicable to measure aircrew 
behaviour and for aircrew selection, regardless of mustering (Fitzgibbons, Schutte & 
Davis, 2004). Measuring emotional awareness sub-constructs related to the scope and 
aviation background of this study, the 70 tabulated items of the Boundary Questionnaire 
were administered to the aircrew (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Emotional awareness categories (70 items) in the Boundary Questionnaire  
Category  Description  
Category 1 (14 items) Boundaries related to sleep and waking 
Category 3 (16 items) Boundaries related to thoughts, feelings and 
moods, e.g. merging of thinking and feeling 
Category 5 (12 items) Interpersonal boundaries 
Category 7 (11 items) Neatness, exactness, precision 
Category 8 (17 items) Boundary preferences (e.g. structured or 
unstructured) 
Source: Jawer & Micozzi (2011) 
 
The literature review, behavioural models and EQi-20 guided the researcher towards 
specific Boundary Questionnaire categories applicable to performance in aviation. 
Considering expert opinions, the researcher pre-select data from five emotional 
awareness categories (see Table 4.1). As the focus of this study was aircrew emotional 
awareness related to human error, the tabulated Hartmann Boundary Questionnaire 
categories were operationalised. 
 
4.11.1 Reliability of the Boundary Questionnaire  
 
Reliability is described as involving the consistency of measurements. Additionally, 
reliability refers to the dependability of the measurement instrument or the extent to which 
the instrument yields the same results on repeated ocasions (Durrheim, 2006; Babbie, 
2005). Msweli (2011) argues that reliability of measure can be assessed in a test and re-
test, or to compare scores of a test administered to a single group to determine whether 
they measure the same construct or trait. However, reliability does not ensure accuracy 
any more than it does precision (Babbie, 2013). The researcher realised the effect of a 
possible bias to make the research findings look good. She was however guided by 
ethical procedures to counter any influence or bias. Reliability is related to the number of 
items and the strength of correlations between them (Anderson et al., 2015). The 
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researcher considered the concept of reliability (Riley, Wood, Clark, Wilkie & Szivas; 
2007), as more items increase the scope for error. Hence, scores were calculated for only 
five selected constructs (70 items) that were found reliable. Since random errors occur 
during research, reliability of the results is an indication of how free the research was from 
random errors. To test reliability, the research was considered replicable if it led to similar 
results (Verhoeven, 2011). 
 
As internal consistency is the purest form of reliability, reliability analysis was performed 
on the selected Boundary Questionnaire constructs with initial data by using Cronbach 
Alpha coefficients to assess the internal consistency (Anderson et al., 2015). Cronbach’s 
alpha was calculated for each of the scores used as part of the reliability test (Table 4.2). 
The Cronbach Alpha value for Boundary Questionnaire reliability was interpreted as 
follows: 
 
Table 4.2 Cronbach Alpha values for Boundary Questionnaire reliability 
BQ Constructs Cronbach Reliability 
Cat 1 .749 Acceptable 
Cat 3 .729 Acceptable 
Cat 5 .731 Acceptable 
Cat 7 .754 Acceptable 
Cat 8 .703 Acceptable 
 
4.11.2 Validity of the Boundary Questionnaire  
 
Validity refers to the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real 
meaning (Babbie, 2005). Validity for this quantitative research was concerned with 
establishing how good the pre-selected 70 Boundary Questionnaire items measured 
emotional awareness. Msweli (2011) names five forms of validity, namely construct 
validity, predicative validity, content validity, internal validity and external validity. 
Conceptualisation, operationalisation and checking validity are related tasks in the 
positivist tradition (Durrheim, 2006). Using an existing instrument such as the Boundary 
Questionnaire, the researcher explored information about the construct validity and 
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reliability of the instrument (see Table 4.1). Internal validity was conceptualised as a 
classical form of logical argument called the syllogism. To test construct validity within the 
Boundary Questionnaire, factor analysis was performed to reduce the number of 
variables within the scope of work. 
 
In the context of aviation, external validity was confirmed as findings and conclusions 
could be generalised beyond the confines of the design and the military setting (Durrheim, 
2006).  
 
The literature review established a theoretical justification for the comparison of content 
and face validity (Msweli, 2011). Furthermore, the “Big Five” taxonomy justified the 
selected Boundary Questionnaire items applicable to aircrew and human error 
(Fitzgibbons et al., 2004). The researcher believes findings produced by the design can 
be sustained as they indicate a relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error in aviation. To test validity of the constructs in the Boundary Questionnaire, factor 
analysis was performed to confirm content and construct validity and reduce the number 
of variables. 
 
4.12 FACTOR ANALYSIS  
Factor analysis is commonly used in the behavioural sciences to discover the underlying 
dimensions of a variable. Factor analysis is the preferred technique to mathematically 
reduce a large data set to smaller clusters of variables. 
 
4.12.1 Exploratory factor analysis 
 
Exploratory factor analysis explains the variation and co-variation in the data set. The 
literature review and previous Boundary Questionnaire studies indicated the following 
factor analysis:  
I: primary process thinking (blurry boundaries in the mind);  
II: a preference for explicit boundaries;  
III: identification with children;  
 88 
IV: fragility;  
V: percipience/clairvoyance;  
VI: trustful openness;  
VII: organised planfulness;  
VIII: belief in inpenetrable intergroup boundaries (no mixing between demographic 
groups);  
IX: flexibility;  
X: overinvolvement in fantasy;  
XI: preference for simple geometric forms;  
XII: isolation of affect (thinking and feeling kept strictly separate); and  
a final factor with no particular theme.  
Hartmann speculates that the concept of boundaries relates to Eysenck's P (measured 
by the EPQ-R).  
 
4.12.2 Factor analysis steps 
 
Although factor analysis is not alchemy, meaningful research provides meaningful results. 
The researcher performed factor analyses by following these steps (Field, 2013):  
Step 1: Calculate the maximum amount of common variance matrix from the data set. 
Step 2: Compute a factor correlation matrix. 
Step 3: Extract eigenvalues from the factor correlation matrix. 
Step 4: Obtain eigenvalues from each eigenvector based on the characteristics equation. 
Step 5: Generate the factor loadings by normalising the eigenvectors. 
Step 6: Determine the amount of variance that was not accounted for in each variable. 
Step 7: Perform factor extraction, Kaiser criterion and parallel analysis. 
Step 8: Create the final matrix of factor loadings (F) from the factors extracted by using 
principal factor extraction and maximum likelihood with oblique direct oblimin 
factor rotation. 
Step 9: Name the extracted emotional awareness factors. The factor loadings were used 
as the basis for imputing labels to the explanatory dimensions of the emotional 
awareness sub-constructs. 
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4.13 VALIDATION OF THE BOUNDARY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
The literature review confirmed the Boundary Questionnaire as a valid and reliable 
instrument in the field of psychology for measuring emotional awareness constructs. 
Considering the statement of Jawer and Micozzi (2011), the scales of the Boundary 
Questionnaire are culturally non-specific and can be used effectively for cross-cultural 
measurement; therefore, it is acceptable for research in South Africa and suitable for this 
study. It is important to note that although the Boundary Questionnaire is based on a solid 
theoretical and academic foundation and used in research worldwide, the researcher 
could not find evidence that it had been administered in South Africa before. 
4.14 RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
 
The Boundary Questionnaire survey data was obtained over a two-year period during 
annual Crew Resource Management (CRM) training courses. All aircrew who agreed to 
this study had equal opportunity to participate in this research. The survey was 
adminstered at 8am each morning and took approximately 40 minutes to complete in a 
quiet environment (a conference hall setting). The researcher personally supervised the 
participants during this time and was available to answer any questions. 
 
4.15 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Data collection entails obtaining the data in accordance with the research design 
(Creswell, 2014). The paper-based, self-completion survey consisted of 70 questions pre-
selected for this study. This study was a non-experimental quantitative study aimed at 
establishing the causality between the two variables emotional awareness and human 
error. Babbie (2008) explains the effects of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable by taking the form of an experimental stimulus, which is either present or absent. 
The survey methodology measured emotional awareness by asking aircrew questions 
and examining the relationships among them (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004).  
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4.15.1 Rating Scales for Emotional Awareness 
 
The Likert scale is used to measure attitudes towards a coherent whole (Coldwell & 
Herbst, 2004). In this case, the Likert scale was used to measure positive-negative 
tendency towards unipolar scales for 70 emotional awareness items. Aircrew had to 
choose between five positive and negative modes. The questionnaire measured five 
scales, and each item was judged with numerical data ranging from one to five ((1) 
denoting “strongly disagree” and (5) denoting “strongly agree”). Five degrees of relative 
attitudes were rated as per the following five unipolar Likert scale ratings:  
5 = Strongly agree 
4 = Agree 
3 = Uncertain 
2 = Disagree 
1 = Strongly disagree 
Aircrew responses illustrated valid dimensions that conveyed the direction of aircrew 
attitudes towards the 70 emotional awareness items. Parametric tests require a normal 
distribution of variable scores employed for continuous (interval and ratio) data scores, 
also described as continuous (Allen et al., 2009). If data distributions are skewed, non-
parametric tests will be employed.   
 
4.15.2 Rating Scales for Human Error Data  
 
Human error data was categorically coded per numerical values ranked as ordinal data 
rating scales on four different human error category values according to the severity of 
the incident (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia 2011): 
0 = (zero human error data recorded, HE0) 
1 = (human error, hazards recorded, HE1) 
2 = (human error, incident recorded, HE2) 
3 = (human error, accident recorded, HE3).  
Human error incidences were ranked according to severity (0 – 3). 
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4.16 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The data files were prepared on an Excel spreadsheet (hard copy data) before converting 
the scores to the statistical programme for the social sciences (SPSS) format. SPSS 
(2016) was used to enter and analyse the data. The statistical processing of the data was 
presented in terms of quantitative methods (Pallant, 2007). Each response was assigned 
a numerical code and tabulated for research analysis. 
 
4.16.1 Statistical Inference 
 
Socio-behavioural scientists are interested in determining whether the relationships found 
in data can be inferred as applying in general to the population from which the sample 
was drawn (Babbie, 2013). In this study, the population refers to the values of the 
variables rather than to the individual. The sample is considered a subset of the data 
values. To establish a possible relationship in the sample, the researcher calculated the 
probability of a statistically significant relationship between human error and emotional 
awareness sub-scales (Cramer, 2003). 
 
4.16.2 Biographical Questionnaire 
 
Aircrew information related to name, age, gender, mustering, years of aviation experience 
and human error incidents were gathered using the biographical questionnaire, after 
which the data was coded for the SPSS (2016) in a data file (Antonius, 2003; Gibbon, 
2014b) (mustering data and years’ aviation experience in the SAAF according to groups, 
more than ten years and less than ten years). Aircrew mustering refers to combat, 
helicopter, fix-wing, navigator or ATC. Coding and scoring of the Boundary Questionnaire 
was done according to the accepted procedures. In addition, the data was screened and 
cleaned of any errors and missing information and the variables were verified. Five 
questionnaires that were without any demographic information data were discarded, since 
these unidentifiable surveys had no value for this specific research related to human error. 
The researcher defined the variables, and provided variables with value labels. 
 92 
4.17 METHODS TO ENSURE ETHICAL RESEARCH PRINCIPLES 
 
Hofstee (2011) suggests naming all the potential ethical problems in advance and 
obtaining formal approval to conduct the study. The present study was conducted based 
on three ethical principles, namely (Durrheim & Wassenaar, 2002; Msweli, 2011) 
 respect the autonomy of all individuals participating in the research;  
 no maleficence, in other words not harming any person who is part of the research 
in any way; and 
 beneficence, to contribute to science.  
 
The researcher contacted Jawer and Micozzi by e-mail to obtain consent for this research 
and to confirm its validity and reliability in the aviation context. Approval from Dr Hartmann 
to use the Boundary Questionnaire was also obtained. Ethical clearance was obtained 
from the researcher’s educational institution, UNISA, prior to the research. UNISA 
procedures to secure sensitive and confidential information were also confirmed and 
discussed with the supervisors. Furthermore, since this study took place within the 
parameters of the SAAF, approval was obtained from the Chief of the Air Force and the 
Chief Director Force Preparation.  
Considering Hofstee’s (2011) argument that there is potential for harm in research, all 
reasonable attempts were made to counteract it. The researcher complied with all ethical 
requirements and considered ethical procedures during the study. Additionally, she 
identified and considered all possible ethical threats, such as privacy, storage of data and 
subjectivity (Creswell, 2014). 
Prior to the administration of the Boundary Questionnaire, the researcher explained the 
aim and ethics of the study to participants, and a consent form was completed voluntarily 
by all aircrew prior to the test (Durrheim & Wassenaar, 2002). The researcher provided a 
briefing regarding the nature and aim of the research study and the Boundary 
Questionnaire test, after which aircrew could decide to participate or not. The strict 
confidentiality and security of all research data were guaranteed and the findings of the 
study were reported in accordance with ethical guidelines (Msweli, 2011). The researcher 
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prepared feedback to aircrew, considering Pope’s (1992) statement that effective and 
constructive feedback to participants is a challenging skill to master. Feedback of the 
results was provided only on request during a one-to-one discussion. 
 
4.18 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
To test the different hypotheses, the small sample size and probability distribution might 
require the data to be visually presented by scatterplots following non-parametric 
techniques to test for differences between groups. The descriptive variables provided 
statistics such as the mean, median and standard deviation (Pallant, 2007). To limit the 
effect of outliers, non-parametric tests require ranks rather than the actual data to explore 
possible relationships between aviation experience, mustering groups, emotional 
awareness and human error (Vermeulen & Mitchell, 2007). 
 
4.19 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter described the research approach, research design and quantitative 
methodology followed. Non-parametric data analysis methods and methods for factor 
analysis were also discussed. Chapter 5 will report results and discuss empirical testing, 
aircrew descriptive statistics and results obtained from quantitative data.   
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH RESULTS 
5.1 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Descriptive statistics were calculated to describe the samples and participants’ responses 
on the individual item scales of the emotional awareness dimensions. Data files were 
prepared on an Excel spreadsheet from the original hard copy surveys before converting 
them to SPSS format. The statistical processing of the data was presented in terms of 
quantitative methods (Pallant, 2007), and the reverse coding and scoring of the Boundary 
Questionnaire were done programmatically. Data was screened and cleaned of any 
errors and all missing information in the variables was verified. Incomplete questionnaire 
answer sheets were disregarded. Likert response scales were coded for the SPSS as a 
numerical representation of variables. This data was subsequently processed.  
 
5.2 DISTRIBUTION OF DATA 
 
Descriptive statistics, correlation and inferential statistics were calculated for all scores of 
the independent variable, emotional awareness, and the dependent variable, human 
error. Gender was coded as a numerical representation of variables for 173 aircrew 
members.  
 
5.2.1 Gender distribution  
 
As females made up only 9% (see Table 5.1) of the aircrew sample, gender was not 
analysed further. This finding is however a reflection of the traditional male dominance in 
the field of aviation. 
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Table 5.1 Sample distribution of aircrew in terms of gender 
 Gender Frequency % 
 Female 14 9 
 Male 159 91 
 Total 173 100 
 
Although not the focus of this study, respondents assigned themselves to one of four 
ethnicity categories, namely African (25.43%), coloured (8%), white (63%) or Indian 
(3.47%). Because of the skew distribution of the aircrew sample as presented in Table 
5.2 no further analysis was undertaken. 
Table 5.2 Sample distribution of aircrew in terms of ethnicity  
         Race Frequency % 
    
 African 44 25.0 
 Coloured 14  8.0 
 Indian 6  3.0 
 White 109 63.0 
 Total 173 100.0 
 
5.2.2 Aircrew in terms of mustering  
 
Respondents assigned themselves to one of the following four mustering categories: 
ATC, combat pilot, fixed-wing pilot and helicopter pilot. The sample consisted of 23 
combat pilots, 63 fixed-wing pilots, 61 helicopter pilots, seven navigators, and 13 ATCs 
(see Table 5.3). The mustering of the aircrew sample is presented in Figure 5.1. 
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Table 5.3 Sample distribution of aircrew in terms of mustering 
Mustering Frequency % 
 Helicopter pilots 61 35.26 
 Fixed-wing pilots 63 36.42 
 Combat pilots 23 13.29 
 Air Traffic Controllers 
Technicians 
Navigators 
13 
6 
7 
  7.51 
  3.47 
  4.05 
Total  173 100 
 
  
 
Figure 5.1 Percentage distribution in terms of aircrew mustering  
 
As the technical and navigator component is very small (less than 5%), these will not be 
used as separate groups in further analysis. 
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5.2.3 Aircrew in terms of age 
 
The aircrew assigned themselves to one of the following four age categories - between 
20-30, 31-40, 41-50, or 51-60 years. The two largest age category groups were 20-30 
(37.57%) and 31-40 (46.82%). The age distribution of the sample is presented in Figure 
5.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Percentage distribution in terms of aircrew age 
 
5.2.4 Aircrew in terms of aviation experience 
 
The respondents assigned themselves to either of two aviation experience groups: (1) 
less than ten years’ experience or (2) more than ten years’ experience. This resulted in 
two groups of approximately 50% each (see Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3 Percentage distribution in terms of aircrew experience  
 
5.3 VARIABLES FOR THIS STUDY  
 
The researcher recorded human error data that had been captured over the period 2005 
to 2015 and categorised and analysed this date according to severity (Yantiss, 2011). 
 
5.3.1 Dependent variable: Human error (HE) 
 
Human error data was categorised into numerical values according to severity: 
0 = (no human error data recorded, HE0) 
1 = (HE, hazards recorded, HE1) 
2 = (HE, incident recorded, HE2) 
3 = (HE, accident recorded, HE3)  
Table 5.4 indicates the percentage human error incidences, HE0+HE1+HE2+HE3, for the 
total aircrew (N = 173). The results were as follows: Zero error recorded or HE0 group 
was the largest group (65%), followed by Accident (HE3) recorded (21.4%). The 
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remaining two groups, Hazards (HE1) recorded (5.2%) and Incident (HE2) recorded 
(8.7%) each represented less than ten percent. The human error incident classification is 
presented in Figure 5.4. The human error dataset indicates a negative leptokurtic 
distribution as well as a negative kurtosis with a value of +1.143. This distribution could 
perhaps be attributed to aircrew not reporting occurrences so as to avoid embarrassment, 
or for fear of consequences. The present study is grounded in the assumption that aircrew 
do not volunteer to admit human error and that they do not formally submit hazard and 
incident reports according to risk management procedures. Therefore, the HE1 and HE2 
data values for the period 2005 to 2015 are probably inadequate and do not include all 
human error incidences – which is a clear limitation of this study. Owing to the magnitude 
of an aircraft accident (HE3), accidents are reported immediately; therefore, accident data 
values in this study are considered accurate and reliable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Percentage distribution of aircrew human error  
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Table 5.4 Distribution for aviation human error 
HE Frequency % 
  
0 HE 
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65 
 1 Hazards 9 5.2 
 2 Incident 15 8.67 
 3 Accident 37 21.39 
Total  173 100 
 
This study aimed to explore the relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error, because human factor studies that relate to aviation accident reports indicate that 
more than 90% of all accidents can be attributed to human error (ICAO, 2002). Human 
error data such as the above therefore propelled this research to explore the relationship 
between aviation human error and emotional awareness (Msweli, 2011). 
 
5.3.2 Independent variable: Emotional awareness (EA) 
 
While conceptualising emotional awareness influences on all three taxonomy levels – 
cognitive space, information processing and decision making (Brown & Moren, 2003) – 
the researcher hypothesised a relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error. 
 
5.4 RESPONSE FREQUENCIES FOR CATEGORIES 
 
Based on the literature, the researcher selected five Boundary Questionnaire categories 
to test this study’s hypothesis (H0) and to determine whether there is a significant 
relationship between emotional awareness and human error. Due to the scope of this 
study and the limited sample size, only the following five categories were selected for 
analysis: degrees of differences between sleeping and waking; thoughts and feelings; 
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interpersonal boundaries; neatness, exactness and precision; edges, lines and clothing 
(Jawer & Micozzi, 2011).  
 
5.4.1 Boundary Questionnaire Category 1: Sleeping, waking and dreaming 
 
Category 1 of the Boundary Questionnaire measures degrees of different perceptions 
and awareness. An emotionally ‘unaware’ aircrew member does not experience 
synesthesia and is absolutely clear about when s/he is awake, asleep or dreaming; s/he 
experiences no in-between states. In contrast, aircrew who are extremely emotionally 
aware may become deeply immersed in daydreaming and imagination so that the 
boundary between real life and fantasy may become unclear (Hartmann, Harrison & 
Zborowski, 2001). Figure 5.5 indicates the distribution of aircrew responses in 
percentages for Category 1 of the Boundary Questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Percentage distribution for items: sleeping and waking 
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Figure 5.6 illustrates the distribution of responses by aircrew for inverse items in Category 
1, which represent degrees of difference between sleeping, waking and emotional 
awareness.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Percentage distribution for inverse items: sleeping, waking and dreaming 
 
5.4.2 Boundary Questionnaire Category 3: Thoughts and feelings 
 
Aircrew who keep thought and feelings separated have a sharp sense of focus in all 
senses at a given time and can focus on one thing while ignoring others (“I don’t let my 
feelings get in the way of my thinking”); they have a clear sense of the separation of past, 
present and future (“that was then, this is now”), and have a very definite sense of 
personal space (“this is my space, this is yours”). Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of 
aircrew percentages for Category 3 items measuring degrees of difference in “thought 
and feelings”. 
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Figure 5.7 Percentage distribution for items: thoughts, feelings and moods 
 
On the other hand, Figure 5.8 indicates the responses of aircrew for Category 3 lexical 
descriptors for the inverse items that measure the degrees of difference for thought and 
feeling preferences.  
 
 
Figure 5.8 Percentage distribution for inverse items: thoughts, feelings and moods 
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5.4.3  Boundary Questionnaire Category 5: Interpersonal 
 
Interpersonal boundaries of the mind refer to a personality trait that concerns the degree 
of separateness (“thickness”) or connection (“thinness”) between cognitive processes and 
identity (Zborowski, Hartmann, Newsom & Banar, 2003). Aircrew with extremely low 
emotional awareness have a sharp sense of focus and can easily concentrate on one 
thing while ignoring others. They have a definite sense of space around them. Figure 5.8 
illustrates the Category 5 distribution of aircrew percentages for items that measure 
degrees of difference for the “interpersonal” preferences of aircrew members.  
 
 
Figure 5.9 Percentage distribution for items: interpersonal 
 
Figure 5.9 shows the distribution of aircrew percentages for Category 5 inverse items that 
measure differences in “interpersonal” states. Similarly, a group of naval officers were 
found to score relatively low on emotional awareness and their results correlated with 
“defensiveness” traits (Hartmann, 2006). 
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Figure 5.10 Percentage distribution for inverse items: interpersonal 
 
5.4.4 Boundary Questionnaire Category 7: Neatness, exactness and precision 
 
The term ‘precision’ was introduced for 'virtual' realities (applicable to space and time), 
whereas the term ‘exactness’ was proposed for 'social' realities or realities by consensus 
(Sell, 2000). Moreover, flying is a sensory task and involves accuracy in perception as 
well as judgment in dealing with the environment and a multitude of inputs (Salas & 
Maurino, 2010). To reduce human error, aviation studies relate emotional awareness to 
degrees of difference with responses for “accuracy, exactness and precision”, thereby 
limiting the chances of different concepts becoming confused with each other (see 
Figures 5.10 and 5.11).   
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Figure 5.11 Percentage distribution for items: neatness and exactness 
 
Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of aircrew responses for Category 7 items that measure 
degrees of difference for inverse items measuring exactness.   
 
 
Figure 5.12 Percentage distribution for inverse items: neatness and exactness 
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5.4.5 Boundary Questionnaire Category 8: Edges, lines and clothing 
 
Category 8 of the Boundary Questionnaire is important for this study to operationalise 
emotional awareness and human error. Evidence suggests that balancing emotional 
awareness between self and the environment indicates a preference for neat, organised 
and structured vs. unstructured traits (Figure 5.12). It also differentiates between 
boundaries of sharp vs. fuzzy lines (Hartmann, Harrison & Zborowski, 2001). Figure 5.12 
shows the distribution of aircrew responses for Category 8 items that measure degrees 
of different preference for neatness or exactness. 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Percentage distribution for items: edges and lines  
 
5.5 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
The researcher expected and addressed random errors such as missing data and 
questions not completed. In this study, reliability analysis was conducted using Cronbach 
alpha coefficients to assess the overall internal consistency of the Boundary 
Questionnaire as measuring instrument. Cronbach’s alpha scores were calculated for 
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each of the eight Boundary Questionnaire constructs (Table 5.5). The Cronbach alpha 
values suggested that the categories were internally consistent and reliable.  
Table 5.5 Reliability of BQ constructs 
BQ Constructs Cronbach Reliability 
Cat 1 .749 Acceptable 
Cat 3 .729 Acceptable 
Cat 5 .731 Acceptable 
Cat 7 .754 Acceptable 
Cat 8 .703 Acceptable 
 
5.6  FACTOR ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE FIVE BOUNDARY QUESTIONNAIRE 
CATEGORIES 
 
The researcher was concerned with the number of emotional awareness sub-constructs 
that were represented and how well each item represented these domains.  
 
First of all, the factor structure of all 70 selected Boundary Questionnaire items was 
examined (see Annexure B). The interrelationships among the Boundary Questionnaire 
variables were subsequently summarised to conceptualise the component ‘emotional 
awareness’ and group it into meaningful factors. Importantly, conducting a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) was not advisable as the technique assumes uncorrelated 
factors (Preacher, Zhang, Kim & Mels, 2013), consequently an exploratory factor analysis 
was conducted. 
 
5.6.1 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
 
Since exploratory factor analysis (EFA) methods have widespread use in psychological 
research, the researcher conducted EFA to establish linear variates within the data and 
to discover degrees of difference in aircrew’s emotional awareness (Babbie, 2013). EFA 
was performed by analysing the covariance matrix as it produces a better-defined factor 
structure (Field, 2013; Preacher, Zhang, Kim & Mels, 2013).  
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EFA was performed using the maximum likelihood (ML) method of extraction to identify 
underlying emotional awareness variables. The information gained from the 
interdependencies between the observed variables was used to reduce the set of 
variables in the dataset and group the remaining traits to find the relevant latent emotional 
awareness factors. Results are reported in detail in the following sections. 
 
5.6.2 KMO measure of sampling adequacy  
 
A Kaiser Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was performed to determine 
how much variance was common variance between variables. A rotation with Kaiser 
normalisation was performed to aid the interpretation of the dimensions. Variables were 
sorted by their loading size. The diagonal elements should all be greater than 0.7 for a 
given pair of variables to ensure factor analysis yields distinct and reliable factors (Field, 
2013; Pallant, 2006). In this study, values between 0.7 and 0.9 were used. The output 
magnitude loadings from the five selected Boundary Questionnaire categories ranged 
between 0.703 and 0.749. The dimension solution explained between 19% and 31% of 
the common variance, with the individual dimensions ranging between 7% and 19% (see 
Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6 Variance accounted for by the emotional awareness constructs  
BQ 
category 
Direct oblimin rotation 
converged in iterations 
KMO Eigen-
value 
% of variance for 
each factor 
Total variance 
explained 
Category 1 26 .749 3 
1 
7 
18 
25 
Category 3 26 .729 1 
2 
1 
7 
18 
6 
31 
Category 5 28 
17 
.731 1 
1 
1 
12 
9 
7 
28 
Category 7 4 .754 2 19 19 
Category 8 27 .703 2 
1 
14 
9 
23 
(N = 173) 
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Initially, the researcher performed a promax oblique rotation, despite being aware that the 
sample size of 173 was barely adequate and these factors all had eigenvalues greater 
than 2. The data was then fitted to a factor pattern structure using oblimin rotation with 
Kaiser normalisation to aid the interpretation of the dimensions. Factor extraction was 
performed by means of Principal Axis Factoring. Where the factors correlated, sums of 
squared loadings could not be added to obtain a total variance. The individual dimensions 
only contributed between 5.6% and 19.8% variance each (Appendix A). 
 
5.6.3 Factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalisation 
 
As the pattern matrix is a simpler method to interpret, the researcher selected the factor 
loadings of the pattern matrix to decide on the factors to retain (Field, 2013). Promax 
rotation is used for large datasets and when the researcher expects the factors to be 
independent (Field, 2013). In this case, the direct oblimin rotation method was selected 
due to the limited sample of 173 aircrew and as the factors are bound not to be 
independent as the items were developed to measure one underlying construct. Oblique 
factor rotation was performed to discriminate between factors by effectively rotating the 
axes such that variables loaded maximally on only one factor (Appendix B). With direct 
oblimin, the degree to which factors can correlate is determined by the value of the delta 
constant which was kept at the recommended zero default setting (Field, 2013). The 
closer the communalities are to 1, the better the factors are at explaining the data (Pallant, 
2006). These factors all had eigenvalues larger or close to 0.7, which is within the 
acceptable limit for small samples (Field, 2013) as can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
5.6.4 Factor extraction 
 
Item cluster extraction (ML) was performed. First, the linear components within the 
dataset were determined by calculating the eigenvectors of the 70 Boundary 
Questionnaire items. Then the eigenvalue greater than one option was selected. The 
eigenvalues associated with each factor represented the common variance explained by 
that factor. Communality before extraction is the proportion of common variance, whereas 
communality after extraction is the amount of variance in each of the factors identified – 
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which can be explained by the retained factors (Field, 2013). The researcher used the 
factor correlation matrix to assume some independence between the factors. The fact 
that correlations existed, provided evidence that the emotional awareness constructs 
were interrelated (Appendix B). 
 
5.6.5 Naming of factors 
 
The researcher analysed the content of the items after rotation that loaded highly on the 
same factor to identify common themes. The factor loadings were used as the basis for 
inputting labels to the explanatory dimensions of the new emotional awareness sub-
scales. The eight extracted factors were labelled to provide a description of the underlying 
meaning of each emotional awareness sub-construct to enhance the interpretation of the 
results. The researcher named the extracted factors independently without reference to 
any personality model or EQ-i20 traits as emotional awareness sub-scales: involved, 
blend, imaginative, precise, flexible, structured thought, unstructured thought and 
openness (Table 5.7). 
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Table 5.7 Factor naming and emotional awareness trait description 
BQ Category EA sub-scales BQ items retained Sub-scale description 
Category 1: 
Sleeping, walking, 
dreaming 
Openness 72, 92, 130 Friendly, relaxed, confident, 
extraverted and open to 
experience 
Unstructured 1, 25, 37, 60, 82, 112, 119 Disorganised and careless 
Category 3:  
Thoughts, feelings, 
moods 
Involved 15 ,51 ,84, 94, 102, 106 Conscientious and focused 
attention 
Blend 3,62 Agreeableness and 
cooperative 
Imaginative 74,127,132 Creative and innovative, 
resources required for 
problem-solving abilities 
Category 7:  
Neatness, exactness, 
precision 
Exactness 43,55,76,96,108,121 Resourcefulness, complex 
questioning and detail oriented 
for decision making 
Category 8: 
Edges and lines 
Flexible 67,142,145 Emotional stability, agreeable 
and cooperative 
 Structured 44, 137 Conscientious, organised and 
careful 
 
As a sample size of 200 or more is required to reliably use a scree plot as a factor 
selection criterion (Field, 2013), an SPSS scree plot graph is not depicted (the current 
study had a limited sample size of 173). Once the factors had been extracted (ML), the 
degree to which variables loaded on the factors was determined. Factor rotation was used 
to discriminate between factors and the axes were rotated such that variables were 
loaded maximally to only one factor (Field, 2013). Factor analysis was hence performed 
to generate new emotional awareness scales in the aviation context from the item pool. 
These scales will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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5.7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE EMOTIONAL AWARENESS SUB-
SCALES 
 
The mean, standard deviation, variance, skewness, kurtosis, minimum and maximum 
statistics were calculated for each emotional awareness sub-scale. Normality of the data 
was assessed in terms of the data distribution and skewness. Data was leptokurtic 
distributed, and skewness of zero indicated range restriction, possibly due to aircrew 
selection for the military environment (see Table 5.8).   
 
Table 5.8 Descriptive statistics for the emotional awareness sub-scales 
EA 
sub-scales 
N Mean Median Std 
deviation 
Skewness Std error  
of skewness 
Kurtosis Std error of 
kurtosis 
Involved 173   .630   .5000   .649 1.530 .184 3.67 .366 
Blend 173 1.178 1.000 1.091   .774 .184 -.014 .366 
Imaginative 173 1.017 1.000 .8955   .862 .184  .309 .366 
Exactness 173 1.233 1.167 .6695   .373 .184  .975 .366 
Flexible 173 1.210 1.333 .7601   .373 .185  .337 .367 
Structured  173 1.052 1.000 .9087 1.143 .185 1.509 .367 
Unstructured  173 .4918 .2857 .5077 1.315 .184 1.668 .366 
Openness 173 .1590 .0000 .42058 3.197 .184 10.480 .366 
(minimum = 0, maximum = 4, range = 4) 
 
5.7.1 Emotional awareness sub-scale: Involved 
 
The emotional awareness sub-scale scores exhibited a leptokurtic distribution (Table 5.8) 
with a mean of 0.630 and standard deviation of 0.649. The data indicates the presence 
of a positively skewed distribution with a skewness value of 1.53 (Figure 5.13). 
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Figure 5.14 Frequency distribution for emotional awareness sub-scale: Involved 
 
The leptokurtic kurtosis value of 3.67 indicates high item responses for “not at all true” 
and “not true” measuring ‘involved’ items 15, 51, 84, 94, 102 and 106. To estimate the 
degree of association between the quantitative variables, the researcher viewed the 
relationships between each selected item and ranked human error data in scatterplots, to 
decide on the best choice of measuring association. The scatterplots (Figure 5.14) 
visually present item responses for the independent variable, emotional awareness, on 
the y-axis and for the dependent variable, human error, on the x-axis.  
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Figure 5.15 Matrix scatterplot for human error and sub-scale: Involved 
 
The scatterplots are divided into 24 quadrants. Therefore, the assumption of the 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices was met for the discrimination classes of 
emotional awareness variables and human error. The data points group themselves 
closer together at the human error point, as the correlation increases in strength. These 
plots show some evidence of linearity between the sub-scale items ‘involved’ and ‘zero 
human error’. 
 
5.7.2 Emotional Awareness sub-scale: Blend 
 
The dataset for the emotional awareness variable ‘Blend’ was leptokurtic distributed 
(Table 5.16) with a mean score of 1.17 and standard deviation of 1.09. The dataset 
indicates a positive skewed distribution with a value of 0.774 and slight negative kurtosis 
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as indicated, with a value of -0.014 that indicates lower item responses for “not true” and 
“not at all true” (Figure 5.15).  
 
 
Figure 5.16 Frequency distribution for emotional awareness sub-scale: Blend 
 
This leptokurtic distribution indicates a balance between “open” and “closed” item 
responses for the trait, “blend”. The scatterplot relating human error and items for the sub-
scale ‘Blend’ (Figure 5.16) is indicative of a linear relationship for both items. The 
scatterplot (Figure 5.16) presents item responses for items 3 and 62. Item preferences 
were evenly distributed in relation to human error. The scatterplot presents no obvious 
linear relationship for item responses 3 and 62, and a low correlation with human error. 
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Figure 5.17 Matrix scatterplot for human error and sub-scale: Blend 
 
5.7.3 Emotional Awareness sub-scale: Imaginative 
 
The data distribution was leptokurtic for the emotional awareness variable, ‘imaginative’. 
Table 5.9 with a mean of 1.01 and standard deviation of 0.895 for N = 173. The data 
reflects a positive skewed distribution with a value of 0.862 and slight positive kurtosis as 
indicated by a value of 0.366, which indicates high item responses for “not true” and “not 
at all true” (Figure 5.17).  
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Figure 5.18 Frequency distribution for emotional awareness sub-scale: Imaginative 
 
Scores were not normally distributed. This leptokurtic distribution may be attributed to a 
military profile representing the operational environment requirement of accuracy and 
precision (congruent to previous studies), as opposed to ‘imaginative’ aircrew (Mnguni, 
2012). 
 
The scatterplot for human error (x-axis) and the sub-scale item ‘imagination’ (y-axis), 
(Figure 5.18) presents a linear representation for “not at all” for item 74 “I can easily 
imagine myself to be an animal or what it might be like to be an animal”. The data points 
are grouped closer together as the correlation increases in strength.  
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Figure 5.19 Matrix scatterplot for human error and sub-scale: Imaginative 
 
5.7.4 Emotional Awareness sub-scale: Exactness 
 
The dataset was leptokurtic distributed for the emotional awareness trait ‘exactness’. 
Table 5.9 with a mean of 1.23 and standard deviation of 0.669 for N = 173 aviators. The 
dataset indicates a slight positive skewed distribution with a value of 0.373 and positive 
kurtosis value of 0.975, which indicates high item responses for “very true” and “true” 
(Figure 5.19).  
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Figure 5.20 Frequency distribution for emotional awareness sub-scale: Exactness 
 
This leptokurtic distribution might be attributed to range restriction, because the selection 
process of military aircrew prefers ‘attention to detail’ traits, vital for a safe operational 
environment (Mnguni, 2012). The human error scatterplot and sub-scale item ‘exactness’ 
(Figure 5.20) present 70 emotional awareness item responses for items measuring the 
sub-scale ‘exactness’, item 43, “I am good at keeping accounts”, item 55, “I like things to 
be spelled out precisely and specifically”, and item 76, “When I am in a new situation, I 
try to find out precisely what is going on and what the rules are”. 
 
The scatterplot represents responses for items 43, 55 and 76 that correlate with human 
error categories (x-axis). The items 96, 108 and 121 do not group within any specific 
quadrant and indicate no linear representation on item responses (Figure 5.20). 
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Figure 5.21 Matrix scatterplot for human error and items measuring: Exactness 
 
5.7.5 Emotional Awareness sub-scale: Flexible 
 
The distribution of scores for the emotional awareness sub-scale ‘flexibility’ was 
leptokurtic with a mean of 1.21 and standard deviation of 0.760 for the sample. The data 
indicates a slight positive skewed distribution with a value of 0.373 and slight positive 
kurtosis as indicated in Table 5.9, with a kurtosis value of 0.337, indicating a preference 
of item responses for “not at all flexible”, “not flexible” and “neutral” in the case of items 
67, 142 and 145 (Figure 5.21).  
 122 
 
Figure 5.22 Frequency distribution for emotional awareness sub-scale: Flexible 
 
This leptokurtic distribution might be attributed to an uncompromising personality profile 
that is preferred during selection that suits the demands of the military environment. The 
scatterplot (Figure 5.22) presents emotional awareness item responses for three items 
measuring the trait ‘flexibility’. The scatterplot presents visual responses for items 67, 142 
and 145 (y-axis) and human error (x-axis). The human error category presents no linear 
relationship with any item responses.  
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Figure 5.23 Matrix scatterplot for human error and items measuring: Flexibility 
 
5.7.6 Emotional Awareness sub-scale: Structured thought 
 
The distribution of the responses for the items representing the emotional awareness trait 
‘structured thought’ (Table 5.9) was leptokurtic with a mean of 1.05 and standard 
deviation of 0.908 for the sample of aviators. The data indicates a positive skewed 
distribution with a value of 1.143 and slight positive leptokurtic kurtosis with a value of 
1.509 (Figure 5.23).  
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Figure 5.24 Frequency distribution for emotional awareness sub-scale: Structured 
thought 
 
This leptokurtic distribution might be attributed to a structured personality profile that is 
preferred during in the organised military environment. The scatterplot (Figure 5.24) 
presents a high frequency of item responses for ‘exactness’ related to human error and 
item 44, “I like stories that have a definite beginning, middle and end” and item 137, “I like 
clear, precise borders”. Responses for “true for me” present a linear relationship between 
human error (x-axis) and ‘structured thought’ (y-axis) in the case of items 44 and 137. 
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Figure 5.25 Scatterplot for human error and items 44 and 137: Structured thought 
 
5.7.7 Emotional Awareness sub-scale: Unstructured thought 
 
The scores for the emotional awareness variable, ‘unstructured thought’ (see Table 5.9) 
were leptokurtic with a mean of 0.491 and standard deviation of 0.507 (N = 173). The 
data indicates a positive skewed distribution with a skewness value of 1.315 and slight 
positive kurtosis with a value of 1.668, indicating item response preferences for “not true” 
and “not at all true” for the items measuring ‘unstructured thought’ (Figure 5.25).  
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Figure 5.26 Frequency distribution for emotional awareness sub-scale: Unstructured 
thought 
 
This again might indicate the presence of range restriction as a result of military selection 
requirements. 
 
The scatterplot (Figure 5.26) indicates a relationship between high ‘structured thought’ 
preferences and human error (x-axis) for Items 72, 92 and 130. These preferences 
indicate a relationship between ‘unstructured’ aircrew and no recorded ‘human error’, 
signifying a balance between ‘structured’ and ‘unstructured’ thought. 
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Figure 5.27 Scatterplot for human error and unstructured thought 
 
5.7.8 Emotional Awareness sub-scale: Openness 
 
For the sub-scale, ‘Openness’ (mean = 1.6; standard deviation = 0.420; N = 173) the 
dimensions clustered around the scores indicating the opposite of ‘openness’. The data 
represents a positive skewed distribution with an extreme skewness value of 3.197 
(opposed to the previous sub-scales) and extreme positive leptokurtic kurtosis with a 
value of 10.48, which indicates very high item responses for “not at all true” (Figure 5.27). 
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Figure 5.28 Frequency distribution for the emotional awareness sub-scale: Openness 
 
Comparing these results with Hartmann’s study on Naval officers, this distribution may be 
attributed to rigid emotional boundaries that are suitable for military profiles within the 
operational environment (Jawer & Micozzi, 2011). 
 
Supporting this, on the scatterplot (Figure 5.28) the data points cluster closer together as 
the correlation increases in strength. Responses for “not at all” items (72, 92 and 130 on 
the y-axis) indicate negative ‘openness’ preferences, corresponding with the x-axis, no 
recorded ‘human error’ group and some groupings for the accident (x = HE3) group.  
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Figure 5.29 Scatterplot for human error and Emotional Awareness: Openness  
 
As presented above, the frequency distributions were skewed and parametric 
assumptions were not met. Measures of monotonic association between emotional 
awareness traits and human error were determined. Furthermore, viewing the human 
error scatterplot distributions, indicated no clear relationship with hazards (HE1) and 
incidences (HE2). Furthermore, the small sample size and use of ordinal scales 
necessitated the use of non-parametric techniques. 
 
5.8  NON-PARAMETRIC TESTS BETWEEN GROUPS 
 
As presented, the frequency distributions were skewed and parametric assumptions were 
not met. Data from each aircrew member was counted only once and the data did not 
influence each other as assumed by non-parametric tests. To limit the effect of outliers, 
non-parametric tests were conducted with ranks, exploring possible relationships 
between experience, mustering, emotional awareness and human error groups.  
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5.8.1 Kruskal-Wallis test for emotional awareness sub-scales and human error 
 
Exploring the relationship between human error and emotional awareness, the Kruskal-
Wallis test was conducted. The emotional awareness and human error mean rank scores 
were calculated for non-parametric analysis (see Table 5:9). 
 
Table 5.9 Ranks for human error groups  
Ranks 
EA sub-constructs HE groups N Mean Rank 
Involved 0 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
140 
7 
6 
20 
173 
86.81 
85.14 
79.25 
91.30 
Blend 0 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
140 
7 
6 
20 
173 
83.17 
118.29 
114.75 
94.53 
Imaginative 0 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
140 
7 
6 
20 
173 
85.39 
109.00 
44.25 
103.40 
Exactness 0 
1 
2 
3 
 
140 
7 
6 
20 
173 
87.67 
72.86 
59.25 
95.60 
Flexible 0 
1 
2 
3 
 
140 
7 
6 
21 
173 
85.17 
77.00 
82.92 
100.13 
Structured thought 0 
1 
2 
3 
 
140 
7 
6 
21 
173 
85.50 
93.21 
74.58 
94.68 
Unstructured thought 0 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
140 
7 
6 
21 
173 
86.03 
97.00 
52.08 
100.80 
Openness 0 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
140 
7 
6 
21 
173 
86.72 
85.29 
71.50 
94.20 
Note: zero = 0, hazrep = 1, incident = 2 and accident = 3. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to establish if there were any significant 
differences between emotional awareness traits and four human error groups. To counter 
the probability of a Type 1, error the significance value was set at a 95% confidence 
interval level (p ≤ .05). For this study, r values larger than .30 (medium effect) were 
regarded as practically significant. 
 
The goodness of fit test was used to test if the frequency distribution from the categorical 
data represents a good fit to the hypothesised probability. Chi square values were 
calculated (Table 5.10) and a significant difference for the emotional awareness trait 
‘imaginative’ (p = .043) was found. No other significant difference between the four human 
error groups and the emotional awareness sub-factors were found.’  
Table 5.10 Kruskal-Wallis test: Emotional awareness and human error 
 Involved Blend Imaginative Exactness Flexibility Structured Unstructured Openness 
Chi-square .308 6.06 8.173 3.03 1.927 1.1 4.88 2.240 
df 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. sig .958 .109 .043 .386 .588 .775 .181 .524 
** correlation is significant at the level p ≤ .05 (2-tailed). 
 
5.8.2 Kruskal-Wallis test for relationships between EA, HE and mustering  
 
To explore the relationship between human error and emotional awareness and 
mustering, the Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted for differences between independent 
mustering groups. The mean rank scores of 160 aircrew were ranked per four 
independent mustering groups (Table 5:11). The technical (N = 7) and navigator (N = 6) 
mustering groups were not included in the analysis for mustering, due to small sample 
sizes. 
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Table 5.11 Ranks for aircrew mustering groups  
EA sub-constructs Mustering N Mean Rank 
Involved 1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
60 
61 
23 
13 
160 
80.80 
82.44 
68.37 
73.35 
Blend 1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
60 
61 
23 
13 
160 
77.46 
84.40 
63.93 
87.42 
 
Imaginative 1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
60 
61 
23 
13 
160 
83.04 
74.19 
84.07 
73.96 
 
Exactness 1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
60 
61 
23 
13 
160 
77.34 
81.12 
79.50 
75.81 
 
Flexible 1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
60 
61 
23 
13 
160 
74.85 
80.55 
80.73 
81.96 
 
Structured Thought 1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
60 
61 
23 
13 
160 
78.07 
72.48 
93.57 
83.27 
 
Unstructured Thought 1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
60 
61 
23 
13 
160 
85.00 
78.43 
63.39 
81.58 
 
Openness 1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
60 
61 
23 
13 
160 
81.86 
81.14 
67.02 
76.96 
 
Note: Combat = 3, Helicopter = 1, Fixed Wing = 2 , ATC = 4. 
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No statistical significant relationships were found between the mustering groups and 
emotional awareness traits. The values ranged between p = .236 and p = .882 (Table 
5:11). 
The goodness of fit test indicated that the frequency distribution of the categorical data 
was a good fit to the hypothesised distribution. Chi square values (Table 5:12) were all 
above the critical level of p = .05, confirming that no significant difference between any of 
the four mustering groups and emotional awareness sub-factors existed, rejecting the H4 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 5.12 Kruskal-Wallis test: Emotional awareness and mustering groups 
 Involved Blend Imaginative Exact Flexible Structure Unstructured Openness 
Chi-square 1.94 4.05 1.636 .282 .663 3.822 3.907 4.242 
df 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. sig .584 .256 .651 .963 .882 .281 .272 .236 
** correlation is significant (Sig.) at the level p ≤ .05 (2-tailed). 
 
5.9  NON-PARAMETRIC MEASURES OF BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS  
 
Next a correlation analysis was conducted to assess the relationship between the 
emotional awareness sub-scales and human error. To measure association, the non-
parametric Spearman rank correlation coefficients were calculated. 
 
5.9.1  Measures of association 
 
As the data was not normally distributed and scatterplot distributions, HE1 and H2 did not 
present sufficient incidences (see Scatterplot Figures; 5.14, 5.16, 5.18, 5.20, 5.22, 5.24, 
5.26 and 5.28), the researcher decided to categorize human error into two groups; the 
zero-error group and the human error group (HE1+HE2+HE3=HE). The researcher 
explored possible correlations using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. 
 
5.9.2  Spearman’s rank correlations for HE and EA 
 
A Spearman’s rank-order correlation was run to explore a possible correlation between 
the HE group (HE1+HE2+HE3=HE) and EA sub-scales. The Spearman correlation 
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coefficient from the output matrix (Table 5:14) presents a correlation coefficient between 
the dependent group, human error r = .49 and EA sub-scale; blend p = .49. The fact that 
the significant value was below the standard criterion p = .05 presents a statistically 
significant relationship between human error and the independent variable emotional 
awareness sub-scale ‘blend’.  
 
Spearman's rank-order correlation was used to calculate the strength of relationships 
between the emotional awareness traits and two experience groups. The standard 
deviation for the variable ‘experience’ was measured as the average difference of human 
error observations and experience groups from the mean. 
 
5.9.2.1 Spearman correlations between emotional awareness and human error  
 
When investigating ranked human error the results (Table 5:13) indicated a positive 
significant correlation between the human error group and the trait ‘blend’ (r = .150; p = 
.049), confirming the need for exactness. All other sub-scales showed no significant 
correlation with the human error categories.  
 
5.9.2.2 Spearman correlations between emotional awareness and experience 
groups 
 
As mentioned, the aircrew’s years’ experience was coded into two groups. Those with 
less than ten years’ experience and those with more than ten years’ experience. 
Spearman's correlations were calculated to determine differences between emotional 
awareness traits and experience. The results are presented in a matrix (Table 5.13) and 
indicate that the more than ten years’ aviation experience group correlated significantly 
(negative) with both the trait ‘exactness’ r = -.158 (p = .038) and with the trait ‘openness’, 
r = -.244; (p < .001), indicating experienced pilots are less ‘exact’ and less ‘open’.  
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Table 5.13 Correlations between emotional awareness sub-scales, human error and 
experience groups (N = 173) 
Spear-man’s 
rho 
Involved Blend Imaginative Exactness Flexibility Structured Un-
structured 
Open-
ness 
Ex-
perience 
HE 
Involved 1 .379** 
.000 
.475** 
.000 
.112 
.060 
.142* 
.012 
.040 
.410 
.267** 
.000 
.455** 
.000 
-.014 
.000 
.11 
.882 
Blend  1 
 
.278** 
.000 
.115 
.371 
.197* 
.040 
.051 
.794 
.155** 
.000 
.370** 
.000 
-.155 
.041 
.150* 
.049 
Imaginative   1 -.006 
.941 
.167* 
.028 
-.039 
.611 
.251 
.000 
.290** 
.000 
-.015 
.029 
.073 
.341 
Exact    1 .226* 
.003 
.516 .247** .355** 
.000 
-.158* 
.038 
-.016 
.838 
Flexibility     1 .244 .141 .249 
.001 
-.084 .065 
.398 
Structure      1 .193** .293** 
.000 
-.017 .045 
.557 
Unstructured       1 .414** -.239 .048 
.529 
Open        1 -.244* 
.001 
.026 
.737 
Experience         1  
HE          1 
** correlation is significant (Sig.) at the level p ≤ .05 (2-tailed).  
 
In the above, Spearman’s correlations determined the degree to which the relationships 
were monotonic and if there was a component of association between emotional 
awareness, human error and experience groups. 
 
5.10  CONCLUSION 
The literature review could not provide substantial evidence to explore human error 
models related to safe performance traits. As the data was not normally distributed, the 
researcher performed nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests for more than two groups; i.e. 
four ranked mustering and human error groups. Spearman correlations tested the 
strength of relationships between the ordinal variables, emotional awareness, the human 
error group and two experience groups.  
 
This empirical section explored relationships between emotional awareness, human 
error, experience and four mustering groups. This chapter, provided descriptive data and 
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explored possible relationships with non-parametric tests. Against the background and 
aviation scope of the research findings, a discussion of the results, a conclusions and 
applied recommendations are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6:  FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
To “err is human” and making mistakes is part of the human condition. Adding to this, 
Cicero realised that “in the stress of battle, brave men do not feel their wounds”. 
Unfortunately, in the world of aviation, suppressing emotion and human error may have 
serious consequences. Aviation human factors studies consider human error as the main 
cause of aviation accidents (Arendt & Adamski, 2011; Kern, 2009; Schwarz et al., 2016). 
Worldwide, aircraft accident data and aviation human error analysis denote that more 
than 90% of accidents can be attributed to human error (Karanikas, 2016). 
 
Human error management is considered critical for aviation safety (Munene, 2016). 
Adding to this argument, Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) attribute human error to task 
fixation and distractions. Hobbs (2008) also argues that emotional stressors lead to 
perception errors, memory lapses, slips and flawed assumptions, while Kern (2011) 
states that overconfidence, complacency and misplaced motivation result in adverse 
mental states. Cooke (2012) claims that the highest number of errors is due to perceptual-
motor bungles and decisional errors. The researcher has realised that stress, ego states, 
sensory and information overload, as well as cognitive biases have an impact on aircrew 
performance and human error (Behrmann, 2015; Tehrani & Molesworth, 2016). The 
science of applied human factors indicates growing concern regarding the influence that 
flight deck automation has on aircrew’s perceptions and error management (de Boer & 
Hurts, 2017). 
 
In aviation, mandatory human factors development becomes a multidisciplinary field to 
optimise human performance and manage human error within the human-machine 
interface (Karwowski et al., 2010; Salas & Maurino, 2010). To date, the Human Factors 
Analysis Classification System (HFACS) (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) has been the 
most comprehensive and applied framework to categorise human factors that influence 
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human performance. An HFACS study conducted in Kenya found that reduced situational 
awareness is the main contributor to human error (Munene, 2016). 
 
Although the human factor concept evolved over the last 60 years, applying the human 
factor science remains limited with safe performance models and safe behavioural 
indicators. Adding to this, applied human factors do not address human performance 
limitations within Crew Resource Management (CRM). Though the science of human 
factors studies behaviour markers to manage human error (Baier & Zimmer, 2015), 
experts contest available models and argue that they are limited in scope and application 
(Karanikas, 2016; Schwarz et al., 2016). Considering these generalisations and theories, 
the researcher asked the question whether emotional awareness training can be 
practically applied to reduce human error. 
 
Applied human factors science and research limitations directed this study to 
conceptualise emotional awareness as a practical human factors trait application to 
manage human error in aviation (Karanikas, 2016). Since situational awareness is too 
complex to measure (Govern & Marsh, 2001), literature directed this study to explore the 
relationship between emotional awareness and human error. The general aim was 
formulated to explore a possible relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error (Baier & Zimmer, 2015; Landry, 2012). 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the research findings, conclusions, limitations and recommendations 
for future aviation human factor studies. The researcher suggests practical human factors 
application to CRM training in order to skilfully manage human error. 
 
6.2 BACKGROUND 
 
The concept of emotional awareness is a traditional psychological trait theory and 
personality measure that is considered an important dimension of personality. Emotional 
awareness levels explain the degree of separateness and connection between thought 
and processes. People with low emotional awareness tend to see the world in structured 
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“black-and-white" terms, whereas those with higher emotional awareness tend to be more 
unstructured and see different shades of grey (Jawer & Micozzi, 2011; Stein & Book, 
2011). 
 
Results from a study by Hartmann suggested that individuals who score lower on 
emotional awareness include military officers and persons suffering from alexithymia1 
(Hartmann, 1991). Studies suggest that low emotional awareness is more helpful at times 
of war, threat, or danger. Groups that feel threatened tend to suppress emotion. 
Generally, emotional awareness is more valuable when there is less danger and the 
individual can “let go”. Along military lines, it is possible to think of war and peace in 
emotional awareness terms. 
 
Literature review and studies directed this empirical research towards measuring 
emotional awareness levels as the independent variable with Hartmann’s Boundary 
Questionnaire. The Boundary Questionnaire was administered to 173 aircrew members 
to operationalise emotional awareness and explore a relationship with human error in 
aviation. 
 
6.3 REVISITING THE AIMS OF THIS STUDY 
 
The researcher identified a gap in the science of aviation psychology and applied human 
factors in aviation when she attempted to conceptualise the safety term situational 
awareness for safety training purposes. She subsequently posed the question whether a 
significant relationship existed between emotional awareness and human error. The 
researcher believes that findings from this study will contribute to future human factor 
research and propel a new perspective applicable to safety training. Human error data 
and research results directed the hypothesis of this study to explore the relationship 
between emotional awareness and human error in an attempt to discover differences 
                                            
1 Alexithymia is a trait characterised by an inability to recognise, understand or manage emotions or to understand 
facial cues. Individuals appear detached from others. 
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between aircrew who perform well versus those who do not. The researcher based her 
study on safety data, research findings, recommendations and limitations, and formulated 
specific and general research aims to encourage future applied human factors studies. 
The general aim of this study was to explore a significant relationship between emotional 
awareness variables related to human error. The practical purpose of the study was 
directed at improving aviation safety and manage human error. Limitations guided this 
study to apply human factors training to CRM training so as to enhance safe aviation 
performance.  
 
6.3.1 General aim 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the general aim of this study was to explore the relationship 
between aircrew’s emotional awareness and human error. The researcher formulated five 
specific research aims, to operationalise and conceptualise aviation concepts related to 
human error.  
 
6.3.2 Specific aims 
 
To achieve the general aim of this study, the following four specific aims were explored 
as indicated in Chapter 1: 
Research aim 1: Conceptualise the aviation human factor paradigm. 
Research aim 2: Conceptualise human error management in aviation. 
Research aim 3: Conceptualise emotional awareness related to aviation. 
Research aim 4: Conceptualise the theoretical relationship between emotional 
awareness and human error. 
 
6.3.3 Empirical aims. 
 
The empirical study operationalised the following aims: 
Research aim 5: Operationalise human error measurement in aviation. 
Research aim 6: Operationalise emotional awareness measurement with the Boundary 
Questionnaire. 
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Research aim 7: Operationalise the relationship between emotional awareness and 
human error in aviation.  
 
6.4 INTEGRATED FINDINGS 
 
While conceptualising the research aims the researcher found sufficient evidence that 
aircrew must have multi-tasking abilities, high levels of attention and response speed to 
perform safely (Schwarz et al., 2016; Pecena et al., 2013). 
 
6.4.1 The aviation human factor conundrum 
 
Various studies have identified human error as the primary factor responsible for aircraft 
accidents, and it is exacerbated by a variety of environmental pressures (Kanki et al., 
2010). Aviation safety research and aircraft accident investigations support the viewpoint 
that human error remain the primary causes of aircraft accidents (Karanikas, 2016). 
Additionally, Hobbs (2008) argues that emotional stressors lead to perception errors, 
memory lapses, slips and flawed assumptions. Unfortunately, aircrew are also 
competitive by nature, and they often try to impress and outperform their peers (Schwarz 
et al., 2016; Rash et al., 2011). 
 
Barker (2011) argues that although aviation automation increases safe performance, 
overreliance on technological solutions often results in reduced situational awareness and 
thus causes human error (Lintern, 2011; Vidulich & Tsang, 2016). Environmental factors 
and emotional stressors all make an additional demand on effective human error 
management of workload, interpret aviation data correctly and perform safely. 
 
Additionally, this study explored aviation research results (Vermeulen & Mitchell, 2007) 
to assess perceptions related to the human factors that cause error. Their findings support 
this study and suggest that aviation safety training should be adapted to educate aircrew 
to adjust gender stereotyping attitudes. The researcher proposes that emotional 
awareness training should be applied as part of CRM training. Additionally, aircrew must 
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be informed of gender stereotyping and awareness must be created of the potential 
impact that flawed perceptions have on safe aviation performance and human error.  
 
6.4.2 Research aim 1 
 
The first research aim addressed the human factor paradigm, and highlighted human 
limitations. Furthermore, it is often said that aircrew members are generally unfamiliar 
with the human factors concept and do not always comprehend the man-machine 
synthesis in a technologically advanced environment (Schwarz et al., 2016). 
Unfortunately, aircrew members are usually not familiar with emotional recognition and 
regulation (De Boer & Hurts, 2017). Human factors concepts should be integrated with 
Crew Resource Management training. 
 
6.4.3 The value for aviation psychology and applied human factors 
 
The aviation industry is challenged by acute pressures in a dynamic environment 
(Vidulich & Tsang, 2016) and Kern (2009) acknowledges the continuous struggle of 
human performance experts to find a cure for the ‘human error disease’. In support of 
Kern’s arguments, Tshabalala (2011) argues that negative emotions such as stress 
reduce safe performance. His study related to ATCs and he examined work stress and 
emotional coping abilities in the stressful aviation environment that contribute to human 
error. Similarly, Brink (2009) found statistically significant relationships between high 
levels of stress and low emotional awareness while studying 64 South African air traffic 
controllers (ATCs). Unfortunately, aircrew has limited emotional understanding regarding 
influences on performance (De Boer & Hurts, 2017; Schwarz et al., 2016).  
 
Emerging technology adds to environmental pressures (Vidulich & Tsang, 2016). Casner 
and Woods (2014) argue that increased automation in cockpits leads to pilots having a 
higher percentage of task-unrelated thoughts. Aircrew are hence becoming more 
vulnerable to automation-induced complacency (De Boer & Hurts, 2017; Woods & Sarter, 
2000). Supporting this study, Barker (2011), implores the hidden human factors threat 
and proposes that CRM should counter the effect of such automation-induced 
 143 
complacency. De Boer and Hurst (2017) argue that aviation automation reduces 
performance and decision-making abilities, and raised a terrifying question– is the 
autopilot considered friend or foe?  
 
6.4.4 Research aims 2 and 3 
 
The researcher explored the emotional intelligence sub-construct, emotional awareness 
and human error and proposed an emotional awareness trait taxonomy to facilitate safety 
training. As prescribed by ICAO, aircrew expect emotional intelligence training to provide 
them with the necessary skill to reduce human error. The researcher proposes emotional 
awareness training as traditional emotional intelligence training does not operationalise 
safe behaviour and provide skill to manage human error. Furthermore, applied human 
factors training should be regulated and facilitated by health professionals to enable 
aircrew to perceive their environment in combination with emotional awareness and to 
accurately voice early warnings such as “I don’t feel comfortable” (Brown & Moren, 2003, 
p. 270). 
 
6.4.5  Research aim 4 
 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO, 2013) regulates safety training and 
proposes recruitment requirements for aircrew. Excellent multi-tasking abilities, 
extraordinary levels of attention and response speed are among the top ten cognitive 
abilities (Mnguni, 2011). Internationally, research is concerned with specific safe 
behaviour markers and personality constructs, such as level-headedness and mental 
alertness to enhance situational awareness (Tehrani & Molesworth, 2016). Aviation 
research studies propose safety training methods and behaviour markers to predict safe 
aviator profiles and to instil safe behaviour that will create human safety nets. Although 
limited, aviation safety trends aim to enhance safe aircrew performance. Collaboration in 
various social and behavioural sciences, including aviation psychology and applied 
human factors, aims to inform CRM, Team Resource Management (TRM) and Line-
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) strategies. 
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Kern (2009) realised the limitations within the safety management system, as it focuses 
on groups, and claims that therein lies the problem. He urges that applied sciences should 
focus on the individual per se, so as to understand his/her psychological predispositions 
and the skill necessary to enhance situational awareness. Kern also claims that “to avoid 
error”, we should empower aircrew to predict their own performance based on enhanced 
emotional awareness. 
Linking Kern’s statement with the classical situational awareness model, an accurate 
perception is critical for decision making and to perform safely within the given 
environment (Reason, 2000). Kern (2009) argues that although social scientists have 
added greatly to the sum of our knowledge, they made it more difficult for the individual 
to merge all this information into a gestalt of performance in the real world. More so, the 
military environment is not homogenous. Aircrew need to perform safely despite 
additional pressures from the operational environment, and they should cope with 
accurate mission timing, challenging geographical environment and weather conditions – 
all of which add to workload and pose a threat to safety (Ojedokun & Idemudia, 2014). 
Considering these variables, an additional load is placed on military aviators to maintain 
their situational awareness and mitigate errors. 
A plethora of research findings, including military studies, indicate scant literature related 
to safe performance indicators to guide CRM programmes. Current literature also reflects 
an almost exclusively US military perspective (Kanki et al., 2010). Cooke (2012) argues 
that South African aviation studies are limited to enhancing a safety culture. He presents 
the notions of behavioural change through an understanding of human error and argues 
that the cognitive system approach is limited to developing a scientific model aimed at 
behavioural change and developing safety-based thinking and behaviour. Similarly, the 
South African Air Force must manage acute pressures in a constantly changing and 
dynamic domain and aircrew must perform operations safely within this environment. 
CRM safety training is recognised as a controllable variable in the aviation safety system 
(ICAO, 2013). The link between applied human factors and CRM training to instill safe 
behaviour is widely recognised (Kern, 2011). Aviation practitioners agree that applied 
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human factors and CRM training require a renewed effort to embed safe behaviour in 
aircrew and ensure lower accident rates (Salas & Maurino, 2010). Adding to these 
limitations, resilience engineering is an underdeveloped science in South Africa; it is not 
effectively integrated within CRM training, and therefore does not provide aircrew with the 
necessary skills to detect and manage risk pro actively. 
Although researchers agree that emotion influence aircrew performance, and that this 
may result in human error, this concept is not fully addressed in CRM training (Kern, 
2011). Behaviour-based assessment provides evidence of emotional content and 
suggests that emotional suppression is detrimental to our well-being and safety (Hefferon 
& Boniwell, 2011; Stein & Book, 2011). Agreeing with Kern (2011), Behrmann (2015) 
describes the influence of hazardous attitudes and cognitive biases, which may well turn 
us into our own worst enemy.  
Clearly, the scope of human factor science should be broadened. One prominent reason 
remains why aircrew do not speak up, but remain silent despite devastating 
consequences (Dekker, 2011). A study by Ramesar, Koortzen and Oosthuizen (2009) 
revealed a significant relationship between emotional intelligence and stress 
management and explains how stress erodes mental abilities. Available literature studies 
dealing with the effect of emotion on safe performance emphasise current research 
limitations. These limitations were the underlying reasons why the researcher wanted to 
explore the manner in which emotion affects situational awareness related to human 
error.  
Emotional competence and emotional intelligence have parallel definitions, and both 
incorporate aspects of thinking, feeling and emotional awareness. Furthermore, social 
intelligence overlaps closely with emotional intelligence constructs (Ortner & van de 
Vijver, 2015). The evolution of the definition of emotional intelligence is echoed in various 
definitions of emotional constructs. Importantly, this study agrees with Bar-On (1997) who 
defined emotional intelligence as an array of non-cognitive capabilities, competencies and 
emotional skills. In the current study, the researcher was specifically interested in the 
array of emotional abilities related to situational awareness and human error in aviation. 
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The researcher therefore explored numerous behaviour-based models and theories 
(Ortner & van de Vijver, 2015) and found that literature and research studies directed this 
study towards many applied human factor models. Based on Reason’s (2000) classical 
Swiss Cheese human error model and situational awareness theory, human factor 
classification was extended by developing the HFACS model (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003) to identify latent and active factors that may lead to human error. Furthermore, the 
researcher consulted information-processing models (Behrmann, 2016) and emotional 
intelligence models (Bar-On, 1997). She explored many scientific models and was guided 
by classic behaviour-based taxonomies, including the Boundary Questionnaire, Big Five 
and MBTI, to develop a taxonomy of emotional awareness constructs related to safe 
performance. These constructs were conceptualised, operationalised and explored in 
relation to situational awareness and human error. Theoretically, the researcher derived 
at emotional awareness constructs related to aviation performance and situational 
awareness. Specific scales applicable to situational awareness are emotional awareness, 
stress management, flexibility for good judgement, openness, impulse control, problem 
solving, assertiveness and independence. 
Aware of the limitations of CRM, the researcher argued that aircrew must be coached in 
terms of emotional awareness. Additionally, the researcher suggested that CRM must be 
applied to the unique demands of the environment and focused at individual experiences 
that have an impact on safe performance (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012). 
According to Brown and Moren (2003) it requires a paradigm shift for most of us to accept 
that our behaviour is driven by emotions of which we are mostly unaware. Considering 
the importance of emotional awareness, the researcher realised the need for applied 
human factors to enhance aviation safety by applying CRM skills. 
Research findings by Bar-On (2010) acknowledge the importance of emotional 
awareness for safe behaviour, and indicate that although emotional intelligence is an 
integral part of positive psychology, self-awareness is the most prevalent human factor to 
consider (Stein & Book, 2011). 
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Adding to these studies, the researcher explored the role of emotion on human 
performance and human error. This study therefore explored a behaviour taxonomy for 
human factor training embedded in CRM (Stein & Book, 2011). 
The literature review and aviation research limitations amplify the need for aviation human 
factor research that is aimed at safe behaviour. Worldwide, aviation studies express the 
need for applied human factor studies to provide aircrew with the necessary psychological 
skills to practically enhance safe flights (Cooke, 2012; Kern, 2009). Considering these 
limitations, the researcher explored the effect that emotion has on human performance 
and human error and to arrive at a safe-behaviour taxonomy for CRM (Stein & Book, 
2011). 
The value of applied human factors in aviation has only recently been acknowledged 
(Harris, 2012; Kanki et al., 2010). Research in the applied human factor domain aims to 
gain an understanding of human factors and apply such human factor knowledge to 
aviation. Human factor studies all over the world aim to enhance aircrew performance by 
means of CRM training. The literature review and aviation studies support the 
researcher’s argument that human error has an emotional platform (Kern, 2011; Lintern, 
2011). 
The ICAO (2013) prescribes applied human factors and CRM training to address human 
factor limitations and argues that it is essential to create emotional awareness relating to 
unsafe hazardous attitudes. Emotional awareness skills enhance strategies for stress 
management to cope with environmental demands, manage emotion and reduce human 
error. 
The applied human factor science identified an array of human influences within the 
HFACS framework (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) that challenge safe human 
performance. Examples of these human factors include stress management, adult ADHD, 
impulsiveness, destructive emotion, ego states and distrust, which add to false mental 
models and limit CRM strategies, thus resulting in human error (Schwarz et al., 2016). To 
perform optimally within a limited time in a stressful aviation environment, cockpit or 
control tower, and to make good decisions, aircrew and ATC need CRM skills to ensure 
 148 
an uncontaminated psychological demeanour (Harris, 2012; Kern, 2011; Stein & Book, 
2011). 
This study proposes the safety requirement for applied human factors and safe 
behaviour-based research to understand the world of aviation, integrated with human 
factors for safe performance. Added to these, the psychological demands on aircrew, life 
experiences, personality types and limited emotional understanding, influence safe 
performance. 
Applied human factors within the scope of CRM provide a platform for potential learning 
that is conducive to emotional understanding, shared lessons learned and openness 
towards human factor principles. The researcher is of the opinion that emotional 
awareness training will contribute to enhanced decision making, emotional clarity and 
problem solving. Research provides evidence of the influence of emotional awareness 
and its contribution towards safer skies. 
Aviation safety is a worldwide concern that needs to be addressed within the aviation 
psychology and applied human factor domains. Researchers realise the value and 
importance of emotion as human factors trait, as well as the effect of hazardous attitudes 
have on safe performance, and therefore agree that it must be included in CRM training. 
Thus, the researcher formulated a research proposal and hypothesised a relationship 
between emotional awareness and human error. She planned an etiology and exploratory 
research design for the aircrew descriptives to be effective, and organised the data to be 
explored for the different research hypotheses. The researcher spent the necessary time 
on exploratory research before she conducted the descriptive phase.  
Acknowledging the need for emotional awareness, the researcher hypothesised that 
emotional awareness training must be incorporated as applied human factors into CRM 
training. She believes that emotional awareness will enhance aircrew’s situational 
awareness abilities and reduce future human error. Furthermore, aviation incidents and 
life occurrences such as divorce, depression or death in the family have a negative impact 
on aircrew’s behaviour and necessitate additional interventions. This fact illustrates 
obvious limitations to annual CRM training. Individual human factor coaching will 
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contribute positively and enhance aircrew’s emotional awareness and ability to manage 
and regulate emotion – ultimately contributing to aviation safety. 
 
6.5 THEORETICAL CONCLUSION 
 
Literature could not provide substantial evidence to explore human error models and 
questionnaires to guide safe aircrew behaviour traits. Research results and construct 
validity can only be tested based on a well-contextualised theoretical model. The 
researcher conducted a comprehensive literature study followed by a meta-analysis of 
the Boundary Questionnaire to measure emotional awareness traits. She pursued the 
initial research aims to explore the value of emotional awareness and suggests emotional 
awareness training to manage human error. The researcher believed her study was 
consistent with the theoretical model and findings, and possessed content and construct 
validity to the extent that the findings were consistent with the theory of the constructs 
emotional awareness and human error. 
 
The fourth aim of this study explored and conceptualised the theoretical relationship 
between emotional awareness and human error in aviation. She also questioned whether 
a relationship existed between the emotional awareness sub-constructs related to human 
error. Adding to these findings, literature studies were consistent by validating the “Big 
Five” taxonomy applicable to aviation, human error and aircrew selection, regardless of 
mustering (Fitzgibbons et al., 2004). Results correlated positively with training 
performance and found that agreeableness and conscientiousness were crucial 
performance traits. Fitzgibbons et al. (2004) made use of the NEO Personality Inventory 
with the “Big-Five” scales neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness. They reported a high correlation (r = .73) between 
thinness of boundaries and openness to experience. Adding to these findings, the 
researcher theoretically explored and contextualised the “Big Five” traits and coupled 
them with the engendered emotional awareness sub-constructs. These personality traits 
related consistently with the emotional awareness sub-constructs. The researcher argued 
that emotional awareness would increase aircrew’s performance to emotionally sense 
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threatening flight conditions that might jeopardise flight safety, and thus to correct their 
perception and manage human error. 
 
Although human factors research and literature contributed significantly to aviation safety, 
practitioners argue that the academic debate does not help aircrew to understand and 
practically apply human factors. This challenge amplifies the need for a new error 
management approach and applied CRM training. Training must equip aircrew with the 
ability and self-knowledge to improve their emotional awareness to skilfully manage 
human error (O'Connor & Campbell, 2010; Salas & Maurino, 2010). Additionally, experts 
argue that applied human factors training is limited in providing aircrew with the necessary 
emotional skill to sense and perceive themselves accurately in relation to the 
environment. Emotionally aware aircrew should regulate and manage emotional threats 
accordingly and in time to manage human error (Harris, 2011; Schwarz et al., 2016). 
 
Specific research aims were addressed to explore the relationship between emotional 
awareness and human error. Adding to Endsley’s (2000) well-known definition of 
situational awareness, the researcher argues that aircrew must not only “perceive the 
elements of the environment” accurately, they should also direct attention inwards, and 
perceive and integrate emotional information with visual environmental information. In 
order to explore emotional awareness related to human error, specific research aims were 
conceptualised and operationalised in the current study. These aims involved gaining 
perspective in the field of aviation safety, industrial psychology and applied human 
factors, to develop emotional awareness as a skill to manage human error.  
 
6.6 EMPIRICAL CONCLUSION 
 
Positivism assumes that there is only one truth – an objective reality that exists 
independent of human beings (Sale, Lohfeld & Brazil, 2002). Chapter 3 presented the 
empirical phase of this study within a positivist framework. The basic stance of this 
paradigm was argued to be both reductionist and deterministic. The investigator assumed 
the investigated “object” to be an independent entity, and studied aircrew in isolation from 
 151 
any influence (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). A positivist reality was assumed, driven by 
immutable natural laws and mechanisms. From this perspective, this study provided 
proportionate evidence to be generalised to aviation. 
 
Literature studies support arguments that human error remain the primary cause of 
accidents (Karanikas, 2016). To contribute to aviation research, the researcher extended 
her study by exploring possible relationships between emotional awareness, human error, 
aviation experience and mustering. Identified applied human factors studies affirmed the 
need for aircrew to recognise their emotions and the relationship between emotional 
awareness (de Boer & Hurts, 2017) and human error. The conceptual framework that 
constitutes the basis for this study was developed within the aviation human factor 
paradigm. The independent variable; emotional awareness and the dependent variable; 
human error was conceptualised in accordance with research aims 2 and 3. 
 
Variables were conceptualised to specify the exact meaning of each emotional 
awareness and human error concept. Measurement indicators were described to 
measure these concepts and relate them to the dimensions of human error (research aim 
5). The Boundary Questionnaire was administered to 173 SAAF aircrew members and 
results were related to human error data captured for the past ten years. 
 
The researcher selected five Boundary Questionnaire categories applicable to this field, 
to study aviation-related behaviour. Aircrew results from Boundary Questionnaire 
chapters 1, 3, 5, 7 and 8 were selected and operationalised for research analysis 
(research aim 6). To unravel the independent variable, emotional awareness, the 
researcher conducted factor analysis to explore emotional awareness sub-constructs 
related to human error. Factor analysis explored the underlying themes of the construct 
emotional awareness to derive a taxonomy of behaviour indicators. The researcher 
explored specific relationships between the eight emotional awareness factors related to 
human error (research aim 7).  
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This study explored three empirical research questions. It was asked if there were any 
differences between human error incidences related to aviation experience and 
mustering. A non-experimental quantitative research design was adopted to measure a 
possible relationship between the variables emotional awareness and human error by 
administering the Boundary Questionnaire. The researcher obtained quantitative human 
error data related to aircrews’ self-reported human error. Emotional awareness and 
human error data analyses were performed, in relation with the moderator variables of 
aviation experience and mustering. According to Chapter 2 (the literature study), variables 
were conceptualised to specify the exact definitions and meanings of the different 
emotional awareness and human error concepts. Measurement indicators were 
described to measure the emotional awareness concepts related to the dimensions of the 
ill-defined construct of situational awareness in aviation. The research found few 
significant relationships between the emotional awareness traits, human error and the 
moderator variables. Only experience (in aviation) correlated significantly (negative) with 
both the sub-scale ‘exactness’ and with the sub-scale ‘openness’, indicating less 
experienced pilots tend to be more precise and like rules to be spelled out and more open 
to alternate experiences.  
 
 
Research question 7 dealt with the relationship between emotional awareness and 
human error. The emotional awareness construct was explored and analysed as sub-
constructs and related to individual aircrew human error incidences. The researcher found 
that there was no significant relationship between emotional awareness and human error. 
A positive significant correlation between human error and the ‘Blend’ sub-scale was 
found confirming the need for exactness. All other sub-scales showed no significant 
correlation with the human error categories. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test were 
significant for human error and the ‘Imaginative’ trait. Results presented in Chapter 5 
indicate the significant difference for aircrew who are considered ‘imaginative’ (p = .043). 
The implications of this are discussed in section 6.11. The current study provides a 
platform for further research to explore why imaginative aircrew are prone to err and the 
results highlight the need for a safe behaviour trait taxonomy applied to aviation. These 
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results are consistent with previous aviator profile studies that used the MBTI as 
measuring instrument and congruent with findings from a study conducted in South Africa 
by Bar-On (2010) on emotional intelligence to explore the factors related to success and 
well-being. 
 
All the research aims were addressed, conceptualised and operationalised as directed by 
the proposed research question, to explore the relationship between emotional 
awareness and human error in aviation. The study found no significant relationships 
between the emotional awareness sub-constructs and human error – with one exception, 
namely the sub-construct ‘Imaginative’ – and the researcher discussed the value of this 
finding in terms of human error management. Furthermore, relationships were 
conceptualised and variables operationalised for future applied human factor studies.  
 
 
6.7 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
The researcher conceptualised and operationalised the research aims and identified 
several research limitations that might have influenced the quantitative data and limited 
the scope of this study. These limitations must be considered for interpretation. 
 
6.7.1 The Hartmann Boundary Questionnaire 
 
The Boundary Questionnaire measures emotional awareness boundaries and refer to 
degree of separateness or connection between mental functions and processes. High 
emotional awareness is associated with open mindedness, creativity, and imagination 
versus reality, high emotional boundary people have fluid sense of identity and tend to 
merge or lose themselves in relation to others. Aircrew with low emotional awareness 
differentiate clearly between reality and imagination and self and others and tend to prefer 
well defined structures (Hartmann, 1991; Zborowski, Hartmann, Newsom & Banar, 2003). 
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The literature review guided the researcher to select only five Boundary Questionnaire 
categories applicable to this field in order to study aviation-related behaviour. Aircrew 
results from Boundary Questionnaire chapters 1, 3, 5, 7 and 8 were selected and 
operationalised for research analysis. 
 
6.7.2 Limitations of human error data  
 
A plethora of research studies support the view of the researcher regarding limited applied 
human factors literature within aviation literature (see Chapters 1 and 2). Researchers 
agree that although human error data is available, human factors application is poor and 
poses a threat to aviation safety. In addition, aviation practitioners are not integrated 
within the aviation system, thus limiting application within the field. These limitations 
influence every aspect of safe human performance and providing emotional awareness 
skill to manage human error (Karanikas, 2016). Aircrew furthermore under-report human 
error, which results in false low incidence reports and skewed safety data that 
subsequently influence interpretation. It is important to note that aircrew’s silence may be 
attributed to flawed safety cultures, fear of punishment and avoiding shame. Limited 
human factors application may also fail to encourage reporting and facilitate effective 
CRM. 
 
6.7.3 Range restriction  
 
The researcher expected that aircrew recruitment and selection according to a 
predetermined profile may have influenced the aircrew sample. Skewness of emotional 
awareness data may be the effect of recruitment and selection that is directly or indirectly 
subjected to a preference for selecting medium to thick emotional awareness boundary 
profiles.  
 
6.7.4 Aircrew medical evaluation 
 
Since prescribed annual flight fitness ratings are subjected to psychological evaluation 
and have an impact on aircrew careers, the researcher expected the medical evaluation 
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of aircrew to have influenced and limited her data and research results. Aircrew members 
do not always disclose self-knowledge honestly (ICAO, 2013). Furthermore, aircrew self-
reported a sense of heightened caution when they completed the Boundary 
Questionnaire regarding emotional awareness limitations. Aircrew admitted that they 
were protecting their fit-to-fly ratings at all cost. They also acknowledged a predisposition 
and concern about psychological measuring instruments (especially emotion) adding to 
their fear to be evaluated or judged. Although the researcher complied with ethical 
procedures, she believed aircrew to have completed the Boundary Questionnaire with 
caution to prevent harm to their own medical validations. The researcher admitted that 
there were limitations in human error and emotional awareness data, as the questionnaire 
was subjected to a degree of safe and neutral answers that affected research results and 
meaningful interpretation. 
 
6.7.5 Emotional awareness training 
 
The researcher also expected neutral responses, due to the perceived influence on 
annual medical ratings. Personal perceptions and biases might have influenced aircrew’s 
attitudes and caused suppressed emotional awareness or flawed responses. 
These limitations and evidence of suppressed emotional awareness influencing aircrew 
performance (Schwarz et al., 2016) contribute to the need for applied human factor 
research related to human error (Vidulich & Tsang, 2016). In South Africa, applied 
aviation psychology is lagging. Industrial psychologists need to apply human factors for 
ethical CRM training and enhance human error management. 
6.7.6 Small female sample 
 
Gender bias encouraged the researcher to explore aircrew’s gender differences in 
relation to human error. Exploring literature and previous studies, no gender differences 
were found related to human error (Walton & Politano, 2016). Similarly, no evidence was 
found in a study by Vermeulen and Mitchell (2007) to assess gender differences related 
to human error. Although the female sample in the current study was too small to analyse 
(9%), previous studies found a significant difference between gender and emotional 
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awareness related to aviation human error. Recommendations from this study will be 
discussed in the following section.  
 
6.10 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORGANISATIONAL PRAXIS 
 
The aviation system provides a valuable platform and research opportunity for applied 
aviation psychology and human factors science. The researcher found that human factor 
training was limited in South Africa and not integrated with human error management 
programmes. She also realised the opportunity that crew resource management provide 
for applied human factors research and development. Experience shows that aircrew are 
more open during human factors training discussions when they freely share emotional 
experiences and participate in role play scenarios. Knowledge gained from safety reports, 
incidents and accidents should be continuously incorporated into human factor 
interventions to develop and align them with future CRM training. Adding to this, 
psychologists and industrial psychologists should use human factors and error 
information to explore aircrew performance. This integrated approach provides scientific 
scope for applied human factors science to develop within the challenging human-
machine synthesis within the technologically advanced aviation environment. 
 
Although research question 4 was explored within the literature review and studies 
suggest that women are emotionally aware, gender data was not sufficient to be studied 
empirically. Results from this study are consistent with the utility of differentiating 
androgyny into positive and negative categories of gender role identity and suggest that 
androgynous people are psychologically advantaged. Gender role behaviour supports the 
additive androgyny hypothesis that androgyny predicts higher emotional awareness 
related to safe behaviour (Bernstein & Volpe, 2016; Lam & McBride-Chang, 2007). An 
emerging trend in respect of androgyny in aviation indicates that female aviators with 
higher testosterone levels show more masculine personality traits, equal to male aviators 
(Walton & Politano, 2016). Future research might be directed toward the ideal 
combination of gender-related behavioural traits for optimal performance and provide best 
gender CRM practices. 
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Research aims were directed at exploring and operationalising the relationship between 
emotional awareness and human error. Supporting the primary aim of this study, the 
researcher proposed additional human factor training to previous human error models 
(Reason, 2000). For safe performance, the researcher suggested that aircrew must not 
only direct their attention outward to perceive information from the environment 
accurately, but they should also integrate emotional awareness cues. Emotional 
awareness provides important tell-tales related to the outside world, for a comprehensive 
and real-time aviation picture. 
 
In positivism, reality is assumed to exist, driven by immutable natural laws and 
mechanisms. From this perspective, this study provides proportionate rewards to aircrew, 
generalised to aviation. 
 
6.11 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is only over the past decade that human factors in aviation have been formally 
recognised and applied within crew resource management. The international regulatory 
body, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) prescribes compulsory CRM 
training annually, to provide aircrew with the necessary knowledge, skills and attitude to 
manage human error (O'Connor & Campbell, 2010; Salas & Maurino, 2010). 
 
The value of emotion awareness training to guide safe behaviour (Jawer & Micozzi, 2011) 
propelled this study to explore the relationship between emotional awareness and human 
error. The researcher proposes that low emotional awareness as human factor, influence 
aircrew safe performance negatively. Aircrew need to realise that their hazardous 
emotional states influence aviation safety (Reason, 2000) and degrade effective Crew 
Resource Management and performance (Munene, 2016). Following this predisposition, 
a flawed perception influences comprehension of available information and data 
configuration, as well as behaviour and decision making, resulting in system indications 
not being monitored, late responses and re-active behaviour. This study proposes that, 
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information derived from emotional awareness must be integrated with real-time 
environmental information to enhance problem solving and decision making.  
 
6.11.1 SACAA Regulation: Applied human factors and CRM 
 
Although this study focused mainly on SAAF aircrew within the confined military space, 
research findings and recommendations can be applied in future human factor studies 
and generalised to the entire aviation population. As supported by this study, human 
factors scientists agree that aircrew members rationalise and suppress their emotions, 
and this may cause human error. Similarly, Brown and Moren (2003) argues that false 
beliefs and flawed self-perceptions cause low emotional awareness, leading to 
suppressed stress to avoid embarrassment. Supporting these statements, aircrew profile 
studies concur that interpersonal and emotional aspects must be incorporated into 
applied CRM training (Landman et al., 2017). 
 
Human factors studies realised that aircrew members lack emotional skill to sense 
emotional tell-tales and realise human error in time (Harris, 2011). Studies by NASA 
argue that safe performance can be construed as a product of skill, attitude and 
personality factors (Fitzgibbons et al., 2004). It is evident from these studies that 
emotional awareness is required to enhance safe performance. These arguments provide 
compelling evidence in support of the need for applied human factors in South African 
airspace. 
 
To predict and reduce human error in aviation, this study explored emotional awareness 
as behavioural indicator to predict human error as operationalised in Chapter 4. Logically 
arranged human error data was recorded according to aircrew experiences and related 
to each of the emotional awareness traits: imagination, involved, exactness, structured 
thought, unstructured thought, openness, blend and flexibility. The researcher proposed 
these emotional awareness sub-constructs as taxonomy behavioural traits and human 
error predictors for aircrew profiling and CRM training to enhance aviation safety.  
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The researcher identified a gap within applied human factors and CRM that has not been 
facilitated by aviation industrial psychologists and recommended emotional awareness 
training to reduce human error. The researcher also proposed a taxonomy of emotional 
awareness traits as behavioural markers to direct aircrew selection and CRM. 
 
Although the researcher was mainly concerned with emotional awareness related to 
human error, this study highlighted the limitations of CRM training. Aircrew realised the 
value of human factors training but are concerned with non-professional CRM facilitators 
tackling and teaching psychological constructs such as emotional intelligence, without 
realising the ethical and dire consequences of flawed application. Aircrew members admit 
the value of applied CRM principles and realise the ineffectiveness of old school practices 
such as aversion therapy as primary training method (i.e. displaying fatal aircraft 
accidents). Applied human factors is recommended to explore aircrew behaviour related 
to emotional awareness and human error management, and to provide skill to enhance 
safe behaviour. 
 
6.11.2 Predictive behavioural models for pro-active safety management 
 
Emotional awareness variables were structured as eight sub-scales to performance 
measurement for future aviation safety assessment and training. The research in hand 
proposed applied human factor training, integrated with industrial psychology involved not 
only with aircrew selection, but also with safety training and human error analysis. Human 
factor training must address emotional awareness as trait to be aware of stress, distrust, 
anxiety and negative emotional states. Besides these human predispositions, life 
happens and individuals are faced with additional stressors such as family difficulties, 
external deployments, career uncertainty, expiring contracts, aviation incidents, accidents 
and colleague fatalities. All these emotions influence safe performance by affecting the 
individual’s coping strategies and unless pro-actively managed, the stressors pose a 
threat to aviation safety. The researcher suggested that emotional awareness as Human 
Factor trait be included in CRM training to manage human error. In addition, the 
researcher realised the need for personal directed coaching. Interactions with aircrew 
 160 
highlighted the need for practitioner support to gain emotional awareness and manage 
stressors within a demanding environment. 
 
The ICAO (2013) prescribes the application of human factors such as EI training to CRM 
to teach skill for safe performance. Although applied aviation psychology is limited in 
South Africa, the researcher proposes continuous human factors interventions, referred 
to as “positive intervention programmes” (Ehmke, 2012). The value of this approach was 
presented to aviation human factors practitioners during an aviation psychology 
symposium held in South Africa in 2015. 
 
6.11.3 Re-active safety management 
 
Aircraft accident investigations (AAI) provide valuable information regarding the human 
error chain. For maximum value, industrial psychologists and human factor practitioners 
must analyse human factors related to human error. The impact of an aircraft accident in 
2011 on an aviator illustrates the need for practitioner interventions, as the young female 
commander afterwards quit her flying career. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher recommends critical incidence stress management and 
aircrew support such as the Mayday-sa Aviator Support Group (www.mayday-sa.org.za) 
as they acknowledge the impact of a significant aviation event on aircrew performance 
and aviation safety. 
 
Search and Rescue (SAR) often exposes aircrew to fatal accidents, which causes trauma. 
Feedback from aircrew confirmed the negative impact of these emotional experiences. 
Although aircrew do not speak up, they often continue with their flying duties without 
critical incidence interventions to address the emotional trauma. 
 
6.11.4 Emotional Awareness as Human Factor trait included in CRM training 
 
A decade of traumatic aviation experiences and numerous confidential reports from 
aircrew confirm the dire need for applying human factors, providing emotional support, 
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coaching and recommend human factor practices. Qualitative data derived the value of 
human factor interventions and coaching for CRM. This amplifies the need for applied 
human factors and further research and development to understand and enhance safe 
performance. 
 
For maximum value, the researcher proposes an applied health practitioner approach and 
continuous involvement to explore the field of aviation. Specific coaching must be 
provided in addition to CRM, life events and psychological support, and this should not 
threaten aircrew’s medical status. Annual CRM training should not be referred to as a 
mere “tick-in-the-box” requirement to fly, prescribed by international aviation regulations. 
The researcher consequently proposes emotional awareness as human factor trait to be 
included in CRM training by introducing interventions applied for specific aircrew 
mustering. 
 
6.12 FINAL CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter dealt with the conclusions, limitations and recommendations of this research 
in the field of human factors. Although aviation safety relies on flawless and smooth 
interaction between man, environment and machine, we are faced with a flawed human 
design prone to human error. Adding to this conundrum, operational tempo and 
environmental demands do not only pose a threat to safe performance, but also to human 
lives. 
 
The research aims were contextualised to deal with the research question and the general 
aim, namely to explore emotional awareness related to aviation human error. The study 
in hand explored literature and previous research results, and provided a platform for an 
alternative approach to human error. The value of emotional awareness as human factor 
trait was explored and linked to safe aircrew performance (Reason, 2000).  
 
Worldwide, aviation human error remains a threat and aircrew remain silent, failing to 
speak up when they feel uncomfortable or concerned. Added to these are underlying 
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shame, ego limitations, and fear of revealing human vulnerabilities, all of which influence 
reporting and reliable human error data. An integrated ethical approach that involves 
health practitioners and aviation specialists must direct future CRM training, in order to 
explore human limitations and identify safe performance indicators. The researcher 
proposes that emotional awareness training be incorporated with CRM, configured for the 
unique expectations of mustering and operational environment. 
  
Based on the specific research aims, this study explored the relationship between 
emotional awareness and human error. The researcher explored the well-known 
definition for situational awareness by Endsley (2000) and realised the importance of 
emotional awareness, in addition to information from the outside world. To perceive 
environmental elements accurately it is necessary that aircrew integrate information with 
emotional awareness, as the latter provides valuable cues in addition to environmental 
information, to accurately comprehend information. 
 
In the dynamic world of aviation, the researcher aimed to create research space to explore 
the relationship between emotional awareness and human error. Although this study did 
not provide evidence of a significant relationship between emotional awareness and 
human error, literature and human factors studies confirm the importance of emotionally 
aware aircrew to regulate emotions in the aviation environment. The researcher proposes 
future research with aviation industrial psychologists to synthesise and apply emotional 
awareness knowledge in an attempt to reduce aviation human error. Future research 
must be based on systematic aircrew enquiry to guide the selection of members and CRM 
training to develop skills for safe behaviour. The present study explored human factors 
and realised the need for future studies, applied human factors and interventions to 
facilitate emotional skill. Collectively, human factor specialists must explore the field of 
aviation and develop safety training strategies and interventions with one seamless goal 
– to manage human error. 
 
The real value of applied human factors for effective crew resource management has not 
been discovered yet. Although compulsory, it is no secret that most aircrew consider their 
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annual CRM training as a mere formality – a “tick in the box” to indicate that they are “fit 
to fly” or a ticket to perform air traffic control duties. Contrary to this belief, annual CRM 
training is not ticking the safe box. Aircrew need emotional understanding to manage 
human error. Industrial psychologists must address CRM limitations, conduct research 
and collaborate to ensure pro-active safety measures. Aviators are deprived of self-insight 
to understand and manage their own emotions and emotional states, which affect 
decision making and problem solving. 
 
There is still much to discover within the domain of human factors and error management 
in aviation. To explore human factors application, reliable human error data is required. 
Therefore, regulators must encourage honest human error reporting to regulate applied 
human factors by means of Crew Resource Management, as advocated by the non-
punitive just safety approach within an open, learning and flexible culture (SACAA, 2016) 
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APPENDIX A:  Oblique Factor Rotations  
 
BQ Category 1: Pattern Matrix 
 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
q1        
q49   .714     
q27  .493      
q92  .447      
q119 .342  - -.418    
q60 .566  .313     
q134 .534   .542    
Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood 
Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 19 iterations 
 
BQ Category 3: Pattern Matrix  
Pattern Matrix 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
q3   .781     
q15  .547      
q39      .557  
q51  .597      
q62   .693     
q74  .325  -.355    
q84  .436   .718   
q94 .561 .618      
q102 .367 .510    -.376  
q106  .401   .399 -.372  
q115     .392   
q127  .921      
q132  .702      
q136 .985       
q27r        
q139r     .730   
Extraction method: Maximum likelihood 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 26 iterations  
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BQ Category 5:  Pattern Matrix  
Pattern Matrix 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Q41  -.343  .460    
Q53 .761       
Q64 .412       
Q85 .385  .630     
Q95   .576     
Q103    .523    
Q116        
Q146   .425     
Q5  .347  .365    
Q29  .418      
Q122  .490      
Q125  .653      
Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 6 iterations  
 
BQ Category 7: Pattern Matrix  
     
Factor 
   
q65   .482     
q86   .430     
q7r .979       
q19r   .422     
q31r        
q43r .479 .413      
q55r .562 .509      
q76r .610 .597      
q96r .647 .676      
q108r .394 .436      
q121r 
 
.438 .454      
Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood 
Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 19 iterations 
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Category 8:  Pattern Matrix 
Pattern Matrix 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
q109      .431  
q133    .437    
q142 .484    -.635   
q145 .779       
q67 .735   .453    
q128        
q44r  .603      
q77r .561  .543     
q87r .367  .657     
q97r  .378      
q137r  .459  -.466    
q140r     .369   
q144r   .347     
q8r  .419      
q20r    -.759    
Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 10 iterations  
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APPENDIX B: Factor Loadings 
Reproduced factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis after oblimin rotation for the 
underlying emotional awareness sub-constructs 
BQ 
items 
BQ questions Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
BQ Category 1: Sleeping/waking and dreaming SDW 
1 
When I wake up, I am 
not sure whether I am 
awake for a few 
minutes 
.311   .315     
25 
My daydreams don’t 
always stay in control 
.499   .529     
37 
I spend a lot of time 
daydreaming or 
fantasizing 
.348    .378    
82 
In my daydreams 
people merge into one 
another 
.492        
112 I have day mares .534        
119 
My dreams are so vivid 
that I cannot tell them 
from waking reality. 
.342        
60 
My thoughts blend into 
one another 
.566   .455     
 
% of variance pre-
rotation 
% of variance post-
rotation 
Eigenvalue 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
25% 
25% 
 
3.51 
.749 
       
BQ Category 1: Sleeping/waking and dreaming (SDW) 
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
72 
I have dreams, 
daydreams/nightmares 
in which I see isolated 
body parts 
 .493       
92 
In my dreams, people 
merge into each other 
.492 .560       
130 
In my dreams, I have 
been a person of the 
opposite sex. 
 .772       
 
% of variance pre-
rotation 
% of variance post-
rotation 
Eigenvalue 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
25% 
25.% 
2.67 
.749 
      
 
BQ Category 3: Thoughts and feelings (TFM) 
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
15 
Sometimes I don’t 
know if I’m thinking or 
feeling 
.563 .563 .676      
51 
At times, I feel happy 
and sad 
.612 .612 .742      
84 
I get over-involved in 
things 
.452 .452 .488      
94 
When I read 
something, I get so 
involved that it’s 
.611 .618 .561      
 183 
difficult to get back to 
reality 
102 
When I get involved, it 
is sometimes hard 
when I stop and the 
world begins 
.471 .367 .510  .373    
106  
When I listen to music, 
I get so involved it is 
difficult to get back to 
reality 
.345 .345 .401  .399    
 
% of variance pre-
rotation 
% of variance post-
rotation 
Eigenvalue 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
  
22% 
 
31% 
3.5 
.729 
     
BQ Category 3: Thoughts and feelings (TFM) 
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
3 
My feelings blend into 
one another 
.340 -.748  .792     
62 
My thoughts blend into 
one another 
 -.710  .717     
 
% of variance pre-
rotation 
% of variance post-
rotation 
Eigenvalue 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
   
10.8% 
31% 
2.3 
.729 
    
 BQ Category 3: Thoughts and feelings (TFM)  
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
74 
I can easily imagine 
myself to be an animal 
or what it might be to 
be an animal. 
 .325  .348 .355    
127 
When I recall a 
conversation or a piece 
of music, I hear it just 
as though it was 
happening there again 
right in front of me 
 .746  .834 .817    
132 
I can visualise 
something so vividly 
that it is just as though 
it is happening right in 
front of me. 
.351 .641  .605 .610    
 
% Variance explained 
Extraction sums % 
variance 
Eigenvalue 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
    
9% 
31% 
3.63 
.729 
   
BQ Category 7: Neatness/exactness or Precise (NEP) 
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
43r 
I am good at keeping 
accounts and keeping 
track of my money. 
.508 .413      .479 
55r 
I like things to be 
spelled out precisely 
and specifically. 
.495 .509      .562 
76 r 
When I am in a new 
situation, I try to find 
out precisely what is 
going on and what the 
rules are as soon as 
possible. 
.622 .597      .610 
 184 
96r 
When I am working on 
a project I make a 
careful detailed outline 
and then follow it 
closely. 
.647 .676      .676 
108r 
I am a down-to-earth, 
no-nonsense kind of 
person. 
.405 .436      .436 
121r 
I read things straight 
through from beginning 
to end 
.443 .454      .454 
 
% of variance pre-
rotation 
% of variance post-
rotation 
Eigenvalue 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
       
18% 
19% 
3.6 
.754 
 BQ Category 8: Edges and lines (LEC)  
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
67 
I like paintings or 
drawings with soft and 
blurred edges 
.339 .303 .402 -.643  .735   
142 I like fuzzy borders    -.418  .484   
145 
I like wavy or curved 
lines better than I like 
straight lines. 
  .313 -.695  .779   
 
% of variance pre-
rotation 
% of variance post-
rotation 
Eigenvalue 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
     
16% 
23% 
3.60 
.703 
  
 BQ Category 8: Edges and lines (LEC)  
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
44r 
I like stories that have 
a definite beginning, 
middle and end. 
    -.552  .603  
137r 
I like clear precise 
borders. 
 .336 .338    .459 .309 
 
% of variance pre-
rotation 
% of variance post-
rotation 
Eigenvalue 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
25% 
13% 
3.5 
.731 
10% 
5.6% 
2.7 
.749 
22% 
20% 
3.5 
.734 
10.8% 
5.08% 
2.3 
.729 
18% 
10.3% 
3.6 
.690 
16% 
10.3% 
3.6 
.690 
73% 
26% 
2.0 
.713 
18% 
10% 
3.6 
.703 
Extraction method: Principle Axis Factoring 
Note: SPSS suppressed loadings less than 0.3, therefore blank spaces for many loadings. Selected factor 
loadings appear in bold. 
